Wednesday, March 13, 2024

The Australian common law of duress: The King v Anna Rowan (A Pseudonym) [2024] HCA 9

Is it right in principle to require, for the defence of duress, that the threat be accompanied by a demand that a particular offence be committed?


And can the threat be implied from the circumstances, or must it be an express threat?


The Australian common law was considered in The King v Anna Rowan (A Pseudonym) [2024] HCA 9.


In a joint judgment Gageler CJ, Gordon, Jagot and Beech-Jones JJ held that Australian common law of duress does indeed require that the threat included a requirement or demand that the defendant commit the acts that constitute the offence charged [53]. Also, the threat and the demand can be unstated but implied from the circumstances [55], [57]. Here, the Court of Appeal had not made the mistake of moving away from the established common law of duress, which was the Crown’s concern, and, as there had been sufficient evidence at voir dire to raise duress as a live issue, this appeal against the Court of Appeal’s reversal of the judge’s decision was dismissed.


Edelman J concurred in the result but suggested a principled development of the Australian common law. He argued that there is no basis for a distinction between threats made by a human person and threats from other sources [84]. This is so, notwithstanding that duress and necessity are separate, and neither party here sought their unification [86]-[87]. Also, although neither party submitted that a demand directed at the commission of a particular offence was unnecessary, such a demand is not needed [98].


The requirement for a demand that a particular offence (the offence charged) be committed to avoid the threatened acts is contrary to principle [106]. Here, the point being made appears to be that if the defence of duress was only available for the demanded offence, a defendant who found a way to avoid the threatened action by committing a lesser offence would not have the defence of duress for that lesser offence. Indeed, continued Edelman J, there need not be any demand for an offence to be committed, as where the defendant drove dangerously to avoid threats of violence from a dangerous mob [107].