Stairway to heaven?

Disagreement over whether sufficient reasons had been given for a judge-alone decision occurred in the Supreme Court of Canada in R v Szczerbaniwicz [2010] SCC 15 (6 May 2010). The Court had given guidance on sufficient explanation for judge-alone decisions in R v REM (blogged here 3.10.08).

To prevent his wife from damaging his Masters diploma which had been hanging on the wall of a stairway, the appellant (let's call him D) pushed her. She fell on the stairs and received bruising.

D relied on the justified use of force in defence of his property: s 39(1) Criminal Code:

"39. (1) Every one who is in peaceable possession of personal property under a claim of right, and every one acting under his authority, is protected from criminal responsibility for defending that possession, even against a person entitled by law to possession of it, if he uses no more force than is necessary."

This was held to import a requirement of reasonableness (majority per Abella J para 17; minority per Binnie J para 29, 33). The prosecution must prove D did not use reasonable force and that he did not believe on reasonable grounds that he was using reasonable force.

The minority (Binnie and Fish JJ) did not suggest that the verdict had been wrong, but held that sufficient reasons for it had not been given. Of concern was absence of explanation for how the pushing or shoving was itself an excessive amount of force, either objectively or subjectively (para 26, quoting the dissenting judge in the court below). Yes, the wife fell on the stairs and received bruising, but it is wrong to reason backwards by saying that because the injuries were serious the force used was excessive (para 39). Also, it was wrong to rely on D's apparent admission that he had overreacted, because he may have lost his self-control but still used reasonable force (para 40). D can't be expected to "weigh to a nicety" the amount of force needed in a quick response situation (para 35). The fact findings were unclear as to where the diploma was when D pushed his wife, so one could not say "why" the judge concluded the force used was unreasonable (para 43).

It helps in this sort of case to return to basics and separate the actus reus and the mens rea components of the offence in the light of the claimed defence. The actus reus is the use of unreasonable force. The only evidence of unreasonableness was the injuries. They resulted from the victim's loss of balance on the stairway, so the actus reus question is whether the force used, being sufficient to cause loss of balance, was reasonable. Only if the actus reus component is satisfied do we need to consider the mens rea component. The mens rea component is either knowing that the force used was unreasonable, or unreasonably thinking it was reasonable. Those issues would require fact findings on, for actus reus, the nature of the stairway (steepness, length, availability of handrails) and the likelihood of the victim losing her balance (which way was she facing and leaning compared to the direction of the push, what was she doing at the moment she was pushed, did she have any warning, should she have foreseen the danger?), and for mens rea, what risk to his property did D reasonably apprehend – where was the diploma and what was about to happen to it, what alternative course should he reasonably have been aware of – would she have stopped if warned, what risk of injury to his wife should he reasonably have foreseen – what force did D intend to use and what was his purpose in using it?

The majority found the trial judge's decision to be "eminently justified" (para 23), stressing the finding that D had lost his temper.

This is one of those cases where the correct verdict may well have been arrived at, and the SCC majority's judgment would, on its face, appear routine, but where closer analysis by the dissenters leaves us in some doubt as to the rigor with which R v REM has been applied.

Liability in international criminal law – exclusion from refugee status

International criminal law may contain wider complicity provisions than exist in domestic law. Different standards for decision making can also exist. These points are illustrated by JS(Sri Lanka) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010] UKSC 15 (17 March 2010).

"serious reasons for considering", Lord Brown, with whom the other Justices agreed, held (para 39)"

"...obviously imports a higher test ... than would, say, an expression like "reasonable grounds for suspecting". "Considering" approximates rather to "believing" than to "suspecting". I am inclined to agree with what Sedley LJ said in Yasser Al-Sirri v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2009] EWCA Civ 222, para 33: "[the phrase used] sets a standard above mere suspicion. Beyond this, it is a mistake to try to paraphrase the straightforward language of the Convention: it has to be treated as meaning what it says."

The Convention under consideration here, the Refugee Convention, excludes from refugee status any one in respect of whom (Art 1F(a)):

"there are serious reasons for considering that (a) he has committed a crime against peace, a war crime, or a crime against humanity, as defined in the international instruments drawn up to make provision in respect of such crimes".

The focus here is on the acts of the applicant for refugee status. The Court stressed that mere membership of an organisation that commits war crimes is not enough to establish serious reasons for considering that he has committed such crimes.

The wide definition of complicity in international law must be applied, and here Articles 12(3) and 25(3) of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court were relevant. In summary (38), extended complicity here includes

" ... wider concepts of common design, such as the accomplishment of an organisation's purpose by whatever means are necessary including the commission of war crimes. Put simply, I would hold an accused disqualified under article 1F if there are serious reasons for considering him voluntarily to have contributed in a significant way to the organisation's ability to pursue its purpose of committing war crimes, aware that his assistance will in fact further that purpose."

The Court held that it is wrong to try to place the relevant organisation at some point on a continuum ranging from the (in my terms) relatively benign to the relatively malevolent, as was done in Gurung v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2003] Imm AR 115. There are (32) too many variable factors in war crimes cases, and the proposed continuum included irrelevant considerations:

" ... Whether the organisation in question is promoting government which would be "authoritarian in character" or is intent on establishing "a parliamentary, democratic mode of government" is quite simply nothing to the point in deciding whether or not somebody is guilty of war crimes. War crimes are war crimes however benevolent and estimable may be the long-term aims of those concerned. And actions which would not otherwise constitute war crimes do not become so merely because they are taken pursuant to policies abhorrent to western liberal democracies."

Instead, the focus is on what the individual applicant for refugee status actually did and actually believed.

This leads me to the question (in criminal law, including the law of evidence) of when conceptual modelling may appropriately involve the use of a continuum in analysis. One can imagine that a Canadian court might have been tempted to apply a "decision tree" type of approach to classifying terrorist organisations, by analogy to its approach in the unrelated field of improperly obtained evidence in R v Grant, discussed here on 18 July 2009 (twice) and on 19 July 2009. That case came down to what I think is one-dimensional (linear) continuum analysis. Continua in two dimensions can assist in admissibility decisions where the degree of official impropriety must be balanced against the public interest in admitting improperly obtained evidence. In rare cases the actus reus may be held to exist after a balancing of rights, for example disorderly behaviour: Brooker v R, discussed here on 4 May 2007. But in cases like JS(Sri Lanka) the focus on the applicant's acts and beliefs makes weighing inappropriate. Either there is an actus reus and mens rea, or there is not. They are either established to the necessary standard or they are not. There are no variables to measure and weigh against each other.

Fundamentals of secondary liability and wilful blindness

A useful reminder of the meanings of aiding, abetting, and wilful blindness has been given by the Supreme Court of Canada in R v Briscoe [2010] SCC 13 (8 April 2010). Charron J, for the Court, noted that the actus reus of aiding is assisting or helping the principal offender, and abetting is encouraging, instigating, promoting or procuring the commission of the offence (para 14).

The definition of secondary liability in s 21(1)(b) and (c) of the Criminal Code will be familiar everywhere:

"21. (1) Every one is a party to an offence who

(a) actually commits it;

(b) does or omits to do anything for the purpose of aiding any person to commit it; or

(c) abets any person in committing it."

The mens rea element has two components: purpose or intention of assisting (which does not require a desire that the offence should be committed), and knowledge of the principal offender's intention to commit the offence (para 16, 17).

In some jurisdictions inciting, counselling, and procuring are included with aiding and abetting, but in Canada counselling is dealt with in s 22 of the Code and is defined there to include procuring, soliciting or inciting.

Wilful blindness is a substitute for actual knowledge. It is not the same as recklessness. It is a subjective state of mind: seeing the need for further inquiries but deliberately choosing not to make them. Wilful blindness could more aptly be called "deliberate ignorance" (para 20, 21, 24).

The Court in Briscoe approved Glanville Williams's description, in Criminal Law: The General Part (2nd ed, 1961) at p 159, of wilful blindness being equivalent to knowledge. This could be a little confusing, because if it is equivalent to knowledge, and if recklessness is the unreasonable taking of a known risk, then wilful blindness should constitute the knowledge required for recklessness. We are left clear on what wilful blindness is, but confused about why its distinction from recklessness is important. Williams was, as the passsage quoted at para 23 of Briscoe makes clear, concerned to distinguish wilful blindness from civil negligence (in relation to the failure to perceive what a reasonable person would have perceived). A negligent failure to be suspicious could not amount to wilful blindness, but - I suggest - recklessness involves an actual suspicion and could be wilful blindness. Acting in the face of a suspicion is not far removed from acting while not wanting to know if the suspicion is true.

These considerations prompt us to ask whether the mens rea for a secondary party should necessarily be stricter than that for a principal offender. However, no new law was established in Briscoe. The alleged secondary party had to know that the principal had the necessary state of mind to be guilty of the offence, and here the trial judge should have considered whether Mr Briscoe had been wilfully blind so as to have this knowledge imputed to him. The appeal was dismissed, so that the Court of Appeal's order for a retrial stood.

Notional even-handedness?

Who can more easily adduce hearsay evidence – the prosecution or the defence? Or are they equal?

In Morgan v R (criticised here recently) the majority of the Supreme Court held that the Crown could adduce evidence that the accused when in a cell had confessed to his cell-mate who was now a hostile witness. This hostility was the route through which the evidence came in, but in reality the position was the same as if a reliable witness had been called to say that the cell-mate had previously said that the accused had confessed. This is, in effect, like the use of a "notional witness" who gives hearsay evidence.

One would think, by analogy, that the defence could call a reliable witness to say that another person – not the present accused - had confessed. But in R v Key [2010] NZCA 115 (31 March 2010) the Court of Appeal refused to allow the defence to ask a police officer whether he had made a note of his conversation with the mother of a witness, who said that the witness had confessed to her. The witness in evidence had denied making such a confession to his mother, and the mother was not available to testify. The reason the evidence from the police officer was not admissible was because there was insufficient assurance of reliability as is required by s 18(1)(a) Evidence Act 2006.

It seems odd that there was insufficient assurance of reliability where (1) a mother told the police what her son had said; (2) where the son had spoken against self-interest; (3) where a police officer investigating the case noted the conversation. Where were the sources of error in these against-interest communications? Furthermore, in contrast to Morgan, in Key the confession contained information that only a guilty person would know and that was corroborated by other witnesses.

I was not involved in either case, and it may be that on careful scrutiny of the evidence Key can be justified. But these are the sorts of cases that make observers most anxious about the even-handedness of the application of the law.

Slaves to the system?

For refusal of counsel's application for leave to withdraw from acting, see R v Cunningham [2010] SCC 10 (26 March 2006).

Current purpose or original meaning: interpreting the US Constitution

Justices Breyer and Scalia debate Constitutional interpretation! Video clip available here.

Possession and internet files

The meaning of possession of electronic files has been established by the Supreme Court of Canada in R v Morelli [2010] SCC 8. This case concerned allegedly pornographic internet files. Central to the requirements for possession is the concept of control.

The Court split 4-3. The minority made much more use of case law than did the majority, and the majority relied more on fundamental principles. The majority held that knowledge is a requirement for control, and that control is not constituted by the mere viewing of an internet file. Control requires knowingly acquiring the underlying data file and storing it in a place within one's control. The mere automatic caching of an internet file does not of itself amount to storing it unless that caching occurred with knowledge that the file was retained.

The minority regarded control as existing when the accused willingly took or maintained the use or benefit of the material, so that it did not need to be on his computer's hard drive.

In this case a search warrant had been obtained without sufficient grounds (as held by the majority) and the evidence had been obtained improperly. Applying R v Grant [2009] SCC 32 the majority held the evidence to be inadmissible.

Evidence of fingerprint matches

For an interesting article on how fingerprint evidence should be given, see New Scientist, 22 March 2010 , "Fingerprint evidence to harden up at last" by Linda Geddes.

The Waihopai spy base case

In this site, which is aimed at the decisions of leading appellate courts, I do not usually comment on trials. However, today our little nation is abuzz with discussion of the implications of what the media call the Waihopai spy base case.

Some people damaged some big plastic domes that cover secret communications facilities. I am vague on this description, but for me the most interesting thing about this case is the revelation that the big white domes can be slashed with a knife to expose the underlying things. Aerials and whatnot. The people were put on trial and yesterday were acquitted by a jury of offences like burglary and wilful damage.

What was their defence? That is not really the point. What matters is that a jury decided the case, and acquitted when a judge almost certainly would have convicted.

The case illustrates the role of juries in bringing community standards to the law. The common law's origin is the customs of the realm, and those customs were based on what people thought was reasonable. If the community thought that what a person believed and what he did were reasonable, then he would not be held to be acting illegally. You can apply the same criteria today to the criminal law. Although offences are now statutory, their definitions will always - except for some minor offences of absolute liability - be such as to permit acquittal of people who have held reasonable beliefs and who have acted reasonably in pursuit of those beliefs. Sometimes the law is more generous, allowing a defence if the belief was unreasonably held as long as it was honestly held (for example, self defence).

The best arbiter of what a community believes to be reasonable is a jury. This is recognised by courts (see the discussion by Heydon J in AK v Western Australia [2008] HCA 8 at paras 90-98) and by law reform bodies (see the New Zealand Law Commission report "Juries in Criminal Trials" para 78). There are limits to the extent to which juries should be admired (as I have suggested). Even so, if you say the jury was wrong in this case, you have to show that community values are such that what the defendants did was, in the context of what they reasonably believed, unreasonable.

We disagree, but we won’t say why

The majority in Morgan v R [2010] NZSC 23 (16 March 2010) do not explain why they reach the opposite conclusion to that of the dissenting Chief Justice. All Justices agreed that the issue came down to whether there was unfairness in admitting the contested evidence. The Chief Justice explained in detail why she thought there was unfairness. In the absence of a detailed response by the majority we are left feeling some disquiet about the soundness of the majority's conclusion.

Here the contested evidence was a statement previously made by a witness who was now hostile to the extent that he claimed not to remember the events in issue, and the making of any previous statement about them.

In contrast to the earlier position, under the Evidence Act 2006[NZ], any statement that is admissible is admissible to prove the truth of what it asserts. Where a witness is declared hostile, a relevant previous statement by that witness can become admissible. It may be elicited in cross-examination by the party that called the witness: s 94, or the Judge may permit such cross-examination even if the witness is not hostile: s 89. If the witness is hostile to the extent of refusing to be cross-examined, it is arguable that he is not a "witness" within the definition of that term, and his prior statement is hearsay. But even if it is not hearsay, fairness should require reasonable assurance that the statement is reliable when the s 8 discretion to exclude it is being considered.

The matter comes down to this (as expressed in the majority judgment):

"[41] Parliament has legislated to make previous statements of a hostile witness admissible as proof of their contents without adoption, presumably on the basis that the witness will be subject to cross-examination. The reality of that premise may differ from case to case. Parliament's policy decision should not be undermined by too ready a resort to s 8. It certainly should not be undermined on any generic basis. The ultimate question will always be whether the evidence is unfairly prejudicial in all the particular circumstances of the case, of which opportunity for realistic cross-examination will always be important."

The majority considered that in this case the witness had implicitly adopted his previous statement when he was cross-examined by the prosecutor. But this was on the basis of the last two questions in the critical passage, whereas the Chief Justice put these in a larger context and concluded that the witness had consistently refused to acknowledge the previous statement. Because she gave more detailed reasons, she is more convincing on this point.

The majority held that difficulties that might have arisen if defence counsel had attempted to cross-examine the witness on the prior statement were not such as to give rise to unfairness. No elaboration of that was offered. So we don't know why it was fair to admit the statement. The Chief Justice explained her conclusion by pointing out that in this case there was no other evidence sufficient to provide a reasonable assurance that the prior statement was reliable. The majority alluded to "a number of circumstantial features pointing to Mr Morgan's involvement, established elsewhere in the Crown's evidence" (para 45).

Still, the case is authority for, or illustrates, the following points: statements are admissible for their truth; admissibility is subject to s 8; there is a need for particular care to avoid unfairness when there can be no cross-examination of a hostile witness; the judge should hear evidence in voir dire before ruling on admissibility and should include an exploration of the witness's willingness to be cross-examined.


A significant omission from the factual narrative is whether the witness, a cell-mate of the accused, knew what the accused was charged with at the time he reported to the police that the accused had confessed. The Court of Appeal judgment summarises the facts ([2008] NZCA 537):

"[27] Mr Roskam shared a cell with the appellant shortly after the appellant was remanded in custody. Mr Roskam said in a statement to the police that he and the appellant had been watching a programme called “Police 10-7” which featured the robbery at issue in the present case. The appellant became very excited, and subsequently (some days later) told Mr Roskam that he had committed the robbery."

In the absence of this important fact, I will assume that the cell-mate knew, at the time he reported the confession, what the accused was charged with.

On that basis, the majority judgment contains a logical fallacy. It is fundamental but easily overlooked:

“[45]  One of the matters that will have significance in the s 8 assessment is the view that the Judge forms of the inherent reliability or otherwise of the statement in issue.  In this case Mr Roskam’s statement that Mr Morgan had confessed to him, in an apparently spontaneous manner, his involvement in the robbery was substantially supported by a number of circumstantial features pointing to Mr Morgan’s involvement, established elsewhere in the Crown’s evidence.”

This was not a case where the alleged confession contained details that only the offender could have known. It amounted simply to the accused, watching a news item about the robbery on television in a cell with Mr Roskam, allegedly yelling out “yeah, yeah!”, getting excited, and saying it was him (see para 8, the passage from the prosecutor’s cross-examination of Mr Roskam). Therefore, the “number of circumstantial features” that the majority say supported the reliability of the statement in issue (that is, Mr Roskam’s statement that the accused confessed) were not in the alleged confession but were indicative of the accused’s guilt. But here the majority confuse proof that the alleged confession had been made with proof that the alleged confession was true. The latter is not a substitute for the former. Just because a person may be guilty does not mean he is likely to have confessed.

The question is, "does this evidence, the confession, exist?" The majority say that if the confession existed it would fit with other evidence against the accused, therefore the confession existed. You can see the circularity. If the confession did exist, then the other evidence would indeed be useful in assessing whether it was true; but we have not got to that stage yet. To decide whether the confession existed, we would have to assess the credibility of the witness and that would include examining his honesty and whether there was any incentive for him to lie. He was endeavouring to retract his evidence, and that would be a relevant factor too. If the evidence of the existence of the confession was of sufficient value to have a tendency to prove that the confession existed, then it would be relevant evidence. Then its probative value would have to be assessed, and weighed against its unfairly prejudicial effect. The probative value could be assessed in Bayesean terms as a likelihood ratio: the probability of the witness saying that the confession existed, on the assumption that the accused was guilty, compared with the probability of him saying it existed, given that the accused was not guilty. If the witness had low credibility, he might have been almost equally likely to say that the confession existed, whether or not the accused was guilty. The likelihood ratio, or the probative value of his claim that the confession existed, would be very small. The risk of unfair prejudice would outweigh the probative value, because the jury would be likely to attach too much weight to the witness's claim that the confession existed.

After conscientiously advising care in the application of s 8, the majority misapply it to the probative value of the confession instead of to whether the confession existed. It is difficult to accept that a judgment flawed in this way can enhance the standing of the Court.

Of course, if Mr Roskam did not know what the accused was charged with, the other evidence of guilt would support his credibility. If that fact had existed, however, it would have been highlighted in the judgments.

 

People interested in the real politik of law will note the distancing between the Chief Justice and Wilson J, and the apparent collegiality between Wilson J and the other judges whose judgment he delivered (Blanchard, Tipping and McGrath JJ). Ho hum. And flash forward! "I think, but dare not speak."