Search incidental to arrest

An interesting aspect of Arizona v Gant [2009] USSC, No 07-542, (21 April 2009) is the omission of any reference to Herring v United States [2009] USSC, No 07-513, (14 January 2009), noted here 15 January 2009.

Gant rejects a broad reading of the Supreme Court's decision in New York v. Belton, 453 U. S. 454 (1981) which had applied an assumption that things in the vehicle were accessible to the person arrested.

The topic is the police power to search a vehicle incident to the arrest of an occupant. Gant holds that the vehicle may be searched when it is reasonable to believe that evidence of the offence for which the person was arrested might be found in the vehicle. It also holds that, since the power of search incident to arrest has the purpose of preventing the arrested person accessing weapons or destroying evidence, the search may only be of areas within the arrested person's immediate control. When the arrested person has been secured and cannot access the interior of the vehicle, a vehicle search incident to arrest is not authorised.

In Gant the search was unreasonable. Mr Gant had been arrested for driving with a suspended licence (or, as they spell it, license) and had been handcuffed and placed in the back of a patrol car. His car was then searched and a bag of cocaine was found in the pocket of a jacket which was on the back seat. The US Supreme Court held 5 – 4 that the Arizona Supreme Court had correctly held that the search was unjustified. That Court had held that the trial court should have suppressed the evidence.

In Herring, the Supreme Court held that the fact that a search was unreasonable does not mean that the exclusionary rule necessarily applies: exclusion depends on whether the efficacy of deterrence of official misconduct outweighs the substantial cost of letting guilty defendants go free. This issue was not argued on this appeal.

One can readily imagine that evidence of a really serious crime might be found as a result of an unreasonable search of a vehicle following the arrest of an occupant for a relatively minor matter. Automatic exclusion would be absurd in those circumstances. The issue of admissibility is distinct from the issue that was argued here – the constitutionality of the search.

Reviewing or revising

There can be a fine line between evaluating facts and making up new ones.

In Carroll v R [2009] HCA 13 (21 April 2009) the CCA NSW majority had held that a sentence imposed for manslaughter was "manifestly inadequate". That ground for allowing the prosecutor's appeal amounted to an assertion that the sentence was unreasonable or plainly unjust. It is one of the recognised ways of challenging the exercise of a discretion.

Sentencing remarks have to be carefully cast, lest they stray beyond the offending that has been proved or acknowledged by plea.

Here the CCA majority had latched on to an objective aspect of the offending that was never in dispute - that the offender's violence was not justified - and used that to ignore a matter that was relevant: that there had been some provocation from the victim.

The second error by the CCA majority was to exaggerate what had been admitted. The unlawful act necessary for manslaughter – here a head-butt to the victim's face – was acknowledged by the guilty plea to be an unlawful and dangerous act that carried with it an appreciable risk of serious injury. But the CCA majority stretched this to "severe injury was clearly foreseeable and death at least a possibility", which was not acknowledged. All the offender had admitted by pleading guilty was that his act had carried an appreciable risk of serious injury to the victim.

Back then, goes this case, to the CCA for proper consideration of the prosecutor's appeal.

Private garbage?

Do the police act improperly if they search, without warrant, the contents of a rubbish bag left on a property by the fence line for uplifting by the official garbage collectors? This was the issue in R v Patrick [2009] SCC 17 (9 April 2009).

The police action involved a trespass: the act of reaching into the air space of the property occupied by the appellant, and uplifting the bag, which had been left on a stand in an opening or indentation in the fence at the boundary.

In the bag was evidence of ecstasy manufacturing, and the appellant was consequently convicted of unlawfully producing, possessing and trafficking in that substance.

There had been six such searches, on separate days, of the appellant's rubbish bags, and information obtained was used in support of an application for a warrant to search the address.

For evidence of serious offending to be excluded on grounds of unreasonable search it is necessary that it was obtained by means that were seriously improper. That is, exclusion of the evidence must not be a disproportionate response to the impropriety. On that basis the evidence here was admissible. Arguing otherwise requires asserting a serious impropriety, which in turn requires asserting breach of a significant privacy interest.

Abella J came closest to recognising a significant privacy interest. She delivered a judgment concurring with that of the other judges (delivered by Binnie J, appropriately enough as a cruel punster might observe), but reached that conclusion – that there was no impropriety – on the basis that the police had, before they searched the rubbish bags, reasonable suspicion that the appellant had been offending in this way. Such a threshold of suspicion was necessary, she held, because of the appellant's privacy interest which was "diminished ... not unlike the reduced expectation at border crossings" (para 90).

That, I suggest, is unsatisfactory, because it creates uncertainty over when a search warrant is needed. Border crossings are different, because submission to search is required.

The joint judgment gets to grips with analysis of privacy expectation, applying R. v. Tessling, 2004 SCC 67 (CanLII), 2004 SCC 67, 2004 SCC 67 (CanLII), [2004] 3 S.C.R. 432. There are three types of privacy interest: personal, territorial, and informational. This case involved assertion of territorial and informational privacy interests. Here, the interests were appropriately analysed as being informational. Issues were whether the appellant had a direct interest in the information and a subjective expectation of privacy in it; then, if he did, was his expectation reasonable in all the circumstances?

Here the conclusion was that the appellant had abandoned any reasonable expectation of privacy: he had done all he needed to in order to commit the bags to the municipal collection system. It would have been different (ie not unequivocally abandoned) if he had not placed the bags within reach of the collectors.

Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed. Only one, of all the 11 judges who considered this case, concluded that the evidence should have been excluded. Conrad JA emphasised the territorial privacy aspect and would not have permitted the totality of the circumstances test to diminish that, and also reasoned that people who leave garbage for collection expect it to be made anonymous by being mixed with other people's garbage.

Interesting issues were discussed, as is reflected by the participation of five interveners in this case.

What if the police had obtained the bags from the official collectors immediately after the bags had been lawfully uplifted? The availability of alternative lawful means of obtaining the evidence can weigh in favour of increasing the impropriety (as the police are expected to behave lawfully). But, arguably, the ready availability of lawful means should make the actual impropriety less, on a sort of "where's the real harm?" rationale.

Extended interrogations and voluntariness

Awful legislative drafting caused a 5 – 4 split in the United States Supreme Court in Corley v United States [2009] No 07-10441, 6 April 2009.

The peculiarity of the legislation makes the case of little interest outside the USA but the difference between the majority (delivered by Souter J, joined by Stevens, Kennedy, Ginsburg and Breyer JJ) and the minority (delivered by Alito J, joined by Roberts CJ, Scalia and Thomas JJ) judgments reflects differing approaches to the significance of the context of a subsection.

Before looking at the details, I can summarise the broad position of the majority as being that the subsection (c) could not be read down to accommodate the wider meaning to be given to subsection (a). There was no legislative suggestion that (a) had to be the dominant provision, and in any event they dealt with different topics.

The case is about whether delay in bringing the accused before a court meant that his confession was inadmissible even though it was voluntarily made.

The first part of the legislation, 18 USC §3501(a), provides:

"In any criminal prosecution brought by the United States or by the District of Columbia, a confession, as defined in subsection (e) hereof, shall be admissible in evidence if it is voluntarily given. Before such confession is received in evidence, the trial judge shall, out of the presence of the jury, determine any issue as to voluntariness. If the trial judge determines that the confession was voluntarily made it shall be admitted in evidence and the trial judge shall permit the jury to hear relevant evidence on the issue of voluntariness and shall instruct the jury to give such weight to the confession as the jury feels it deserves under all the circumstances."

Note that this does not refer to the other subsections in §3501. Also, it only deals with voluntariness.

The minority treat this as the dominant provision, so that delay does not matter if the confession is voluntary.

The part of the legislation dealing with delay is §3501(c):

"In any criminal prosecution by the United States or by the District of Columbia, a confession made or given by a person who is a defendant therein, while such person was under arrest or other detention in the custody of any law-enforcement officer or law-enforcement agency, shall not be inadmissible solely because of delay in bringing such person before a magistrate judge or other officer empowered to commit persons charged with offenses against the laws of the United States or of the District of Columbia if such confession is found by the trial judge to have been made voluntarily and if the weight to be given the confession is left to the jury and if such confession was made or given by such person within six hours immediately following his arrest or other detention: Provided, That the time limitation contained in this subsection shall not apply in any case in which the delay in bringing such person before such magistrate judge or other officer beyond such six-hour period is found by the trial judge to be reasonable considering the means of transportation and the distance to be traveled to the nearest available such magistrate judge or other officer."

Note that this is a rule drafted in the negative, when it is, if read with the proviso, more sensible as a positive rule of exclusion. In effect it means a statement made after six hours of arrest or detention is inadmissible, provided that a longer time may not render the confession inadmissible if it was reasonable in the light of travel practicalities. That is how the majority interpreted it.

The minority reasoned that the admission of confessions made within six hours did not justify the implication that those made after longer delay were to be excluded.

The majority held that the minority's reading rendered subsection (c) redundant, or, as it said, "nonsensical and superfluous". The interpretative canon is that

" '[a] statute should be construed so that effect is given to all its provisions, so that no part will be inoperative or superfluous, void or insignificant . . . .' " Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U. S. 88, 101 (2004) (quoting 2A N. Singer, Statutes and Statutory Construction §46.06, pp.181–186 (rev. 6th ed. 2000))."

The majority pointed out that the minority were not reading the section as a whole, and to say that (a) is clear on its own proves nothing. The minority treated subsection as if it said "a confession will not be treated as involuntary because of delay if ...", whereas the word is inadmissible, not involuntary. Voluntariness and admissibility are not synonymous and both concepts are used in subsection (3); their different usage is not to be treated as simply a mistake in draftsmanship. They are different under the McNabb-Mallory rule at common law, which Congress is presumed to have been aware of:
Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U. S. 677, 699 (1979).

The majority reasoned that many evidential rules would be redundant if the only criterion for admissibility was voluntariness (the reduction ad absurdum argument), and that the legislative history supported its interpretation. The mischief of subsection (3) is interrogations of unlimited duration:

"No one with any smattering of the history of 20th-century dictatorships needs a lecture on the subject, and we understand the need even within our own system to take care against going too far. "[C]ustodial police interrogation, by its very nature, isolates and pressures the individual," Dickerson, 530 U. S., at 435, and there is mounting empirical evidence that these pressures can induce a frighteningly high percentage of people to confess to crimes they never committed, see, e.g., Drizin & Leo, The Problem of False Confessions in the Post-DNA World, 82 N. C. L. Rev. 891, 906–907 (2004).

"Justice Frankfurter's point in McNabb is as fresh as ever: "The history of liberty has largely been the history of observance of procedural safeguards." 318 U. S., at 347. McNabb-Mallory is one of them, and neither the text nor the history of §3501 makes out a case that Congress meant to do away with it."

So, illustrated here are various approaches to statutory interpretation: reading a provision in context, avoiding redundancy, reference to legislative intent, avoidance of absurdity. Another point was that established approaches should not be departed from, as here where the rule that relevant evidence is admissible (Rule 402, Federal Rules of Evidence) has been understood to be subject to exclusionary rules.

Jury selection

Just a glance at Rivera v Illinois [2009] USSC No 07-9995 (31 March 2009) will get you thinking about whether there should be peremptory challenges to potential jurors.

There is huge variety in the jury selection procedures that jury trial jurisdictions have developed. Peremptory challenges are no longer allowed in England and Wales. Where such challenges are permitted, their number varies. In the USA there are measures to prevent peremptory challenges being exercised on racial or sexist grounds. That requires the judge to determine whether a peremptory challenge should be permitted.

In Rivera the judge wrongly refused to allow a peremptory challenge. The trial proceeded with that juror knowing she was not wanted by the accused. She became the foreman (foreperson) of the jury. The Supreme Court unanimously held that the error did not raise due process issues, as there was no risk of bias.

Perhaps the Court had to come to that conclusion, because to reverse the error here would have the effect of discouraging judges from ever exercising the control over the use of peremptory challenges that was designed to overcome racial or sexist discrimination in jury selection.

Be that as it may, Rivera illustrates the complications that can arise from sensitivity to the motives for which peremptory challenges may be exercised.

How big should juries be? How can it be ensured they are not biased? What sort of inquiry should be permitted into the competence of potential jurors? These issues go to the fundamentals of the jury trial process: the need for the facts at issue in a trial to be determined impartially.

Youth justice procedures in Canada

A Supreme Court of Canada case, abundant in citations of authors and cases, and with 12 counsel appearing, deals with aspects of youth justice: R v SJ L-G [2009] SCC 14 (27 March 2009).

The case establishes that when young persons are jointly charged with adults, young persons are nevertheless tried in the youth court, as there is a statutory separation of trial systems. Whereas the purpose of the adult courts is to emphasise the need for punishment, youth courts favour rehabilitation, reintegration and fair and proportionate accountability.

Further, there is no constitutional right to a preliminary hearing, which is only a screening mechanism. A preliminary hearing is distinct from discovery, and absence of a preliminary hearing does not impair the right to discovery.

The case is largely an exercise in statutory interpretation, so is not of great interest in jurisdictions where legislation differs.

Duties, errors and complaints

For discussion of counsel's duties in relation to defences that have no real prospect of success, see Knowles v Mirzayance [2009] USSC No 07-1315 (24 March 2009).

Points of general interest mentioned here are:

• There is no requirement that a defence has to be run if all that can be said for it is that there is "nothing to lose" in running it.
  
• In alleging deficient representation by counsel, an appellant must show both deficient performance by counsel, and prejudice (ie a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different).
  
• Deficient performance requires that the appellant show that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.
  
• Counsel's conduct was virtually unchallengeable where he had made a decision on an informed basis after thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible options.
  
• There is no prevailing professional norm that counsel must assert the only defence available, even one almost certain to lose.
  

And another decision of the United States Supreme Court is of general interest for its terminology concerning inappropriate defence tactics: Puckett v United States [2009] USSC No 07-9712 (25 March 2009):

• Sandbagging: a defendant's conduct in remaining silent about his objection and belatedly raising the error only if the case does not conclude in his favour. Cf. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U. S. 72, 89 (1977); see also United States v. Vonn, 535 U. S. 55, 72 (2002).
  
• Gaming the system: instead of pointing out an error in a timely way, "wait[ing] to see if the sentence later str[ikes] him as satisfactory," Vonn, 535 U. S., at 73, and then seeking a second bite at the apple by raising the claim.
  

And a phrase which is probably new to many people: "hornbook law", used here in the sentence "But it is hornbook law that misrepresentation requires an intent at the time of contracting not to perform." The idea is that this is the sort of law that is hallowed.

In Puckett, it was conceded that a plea bargain had been broken by the prosecution, but the Court found that in the circumstances this did not invalidate the plea of guilty and that there was no prejudice to the appellant as it was he would "likely would not have" (as Americans say) obtained the benefits that the parties had agreed to. He was seeking to use his guilty plea as a sign of contrition, but he had subsequently reoffended so the plea could hardly be said to have come from contrition. Plain error review requires, as held in United States v. Olano, 507 U. S. 725 (1993), (1) an error that has not been waived; (2) the error must be clear or obvious, (3) the error must have affected the appellant's substantial rights – usually in that it affected the result of the proceeding; (4) and, if those requirements are met, a remedy may be given if the error has seriously affected the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.

But to begin with, the error must be complained of at the earliest opportunity:

""anyone familiar with the work of courts understands that errors are a constant in the trial process, that most do not much matter, and that a reflexive inclination by appellate courts to reverse because of unpreserved error would be fatal." United States v. Padilla, 415 F. 3d 211, 224 (CA1 2005) (en banc) (Boudin, C. J., concurring)."

Just leave it to the Crown

The Supreme Court of New Zealand has decided the jury vetting case (see blogs for 14 April 2008 and 29 July 2008): Gordon-Smith v R [2009] NZSC 20 (23 March 2009).

The majority (McGrath J dissenting) upheld the Court of Appeal majority decision:

"22. ... the Crown should disclose any previous convictions of a potential juror known to it, if the previous conviction gives rise to a real risk that the juror might be prejudiced against the accused or in favour of the Crown. Disclosure should not otherwise be made. By this means the interests of accused persons are reconciled with the legitimate privacy and security concerns of jurors. The non-disclosure of a previous conviction which does not give rise to a real risk of prejudice cannot be said to jeopardise the accused's right to a fair trial."

McGrath J's dissent, echoing the position taken by Robertson J in the Court of Appeal, led him to conclude:

"87. ... the Crown has to make disclosure within a reasonable time prior to trial of all information concerning convictions of those on the panel whenever that information is in the Crown's possession and a juror with a prior conviction is not to be challenged by the Crown. The ... Crown must similarly disclose other information it receives from the police which may indicate a juror is possibly biased."

The dissent reasoned that, since the accused's right to a fair trial is absolute (84, citing R v Condon [2007] 1 NZLR 300 (SC), at para 77), and as there is no need to supplement the extensive legislative provisions recently introduced to protect jurors' privacy interests, and as opinions may vary on the significance of previous convictions in relation to potential juror bias (82), and as a well-informed observer would have reasonable grounds for apprehending that a jury may not be impartial when selected in the context of an imbalance of information as between Crown and defence, all information available to the prosecutor should be shared with the defence (86, 87). McGrath J would also have required Crown challenges to be exercised in a principled way in accordance with instructions that would need to be promulgated.

The majority downplayed the risk of unfairness, calling it "entirely speculative" (17). The recent legislation bolstering jurors' privacy interests was taken to be a lead the Court should follow (19), and

"20. With these points in mind we do not consider it is necessary or desirable to go as far as Robertson J and require all information to be made available. That would unreasonably impact on jurors' legitimate concerns for their privacy and security, and for no sufficient reason. ... ."

The majority would not require disclosure of any information other than convictions.

In other words, the Crown can decide when a previous conviction gives rise to a real risk of bias such that the defence would wish to challenge the juror.

Many readers of this decision will be sceptical of the majority judgment. Sarcastic readers (for alas, some there will be) will think the Crown may as well exercise all the defence challenges.

The nastiness of tapering

For a horror story of abuse of power see Takitota v. The Attorney General & Ors (Bahamas) [2009] UKPC 12 (18 March 2009). How do the courts calculate how much money to give a person who has been unlawfully detained for years in inhumane and degrading conditions?

There are two aspects to consider: first, constitutional or vindicatory damages, and second, compensation for loss of liberty.

Exemplary damages are not appropriate where constitutional or vindicatory damages are awarded:

"15. Their Lordships consider that it would not be appropriate to make an award both by way of exemplary damages and for breach of constitutional rights. When the vindicatory function of the latter head of damages has been discharged, with the element of deterrence that a substantial award carries with it, the purpose of exemplary damages has largely been achieved. To make a further award of exemplary damages, as the appellant's counsel sought, would be to introduce duplication ... ."

The fact that constitutional or vindicatory damages are to be awarded should not affect the calculation of the compensatory damages. But, in calculating the amount appropriate for compensation for a lengthy period of unlawful detention (here it was over 8 years), the phenomenon of "tapering" comes into play.

"9. ... it is usual and proper to reduce the level of damages by tapering them when dealing with an extended period of unlawful imprisonment: cf Thompson v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [1998] 1 QB 498, 515, per Lord Woolf MR. ... ."

Tapering looks rather odd, but it is an established method of calculation. It is a bit like reducing a sentence for multiple offences on totality grounds to prevent the final sentence being out of proportion to the harm that the offender caused. But I think it is morally dubious. Is a person to receive less compensation because he may have become accustomed to inhumane treatment? Does the law grow weary of his claim? Don't the days become increasingly valuable, as they are each a greater proportion of his remaining life?

Here the Board upheld the amount awarded for constitutional or vindicatory damages, but remitted the question of compensatory damages to the Court of Appeal because that Court's judgment was imprecise and did not enable assessment of the correctness of its mathematics. The haphazard nature of tapering is illustrated where, after calculating compensatory damages on a dollars-per-day basis, the Court of Appeal continued:

"96. In light of the fact that the appellant will be receiving a lump sum [ie $100,000 for constitutional or vindicatory damages] we would reduce the figure for compensatory damages by $330,500.00 and award the sum of $400,000.00 as compensation for the loss of 8 years and two months of the appellant's life. We will not, however, reduce the sum of $100,000.00 by way of exemplary damages since that sum is awarded to show the strong disapproval of the courts for the conduct of the respondents in this case from the time of the appellant's arrest until this case is finally disposed of."

Why chop off $330,500? The Court was wrong to use constitutional damages as the reason for doing this, but how much will it take away as "tapering"? The Privy Council thought the local court better placed to set the amount of compensation, but one wonders.

Equinox sunrise

As promised, here is my effort at explaining why the sun rises in the east for nearly all observers at equinox.

Finality

Three Privy Council decisions:

The inherent jurisdiction of final appellate courts

Bain v R (New Zealand) [2008] UKPC 6 (16 March 2009) at para 6:

"The Privy Council, like other final courts of appeal, has an inherent jurisdiction to discharge or vary its own orders in cases in which this is necessary for the purposes of justice. But the exercise of this jurisdiction will be rare, because finality is generally in the interests of justice. In Taylor v Lawrence [2003] QB 528 the English Court of Appeal discussed the circumstances in which it would exercise the jurisdiction in cases in which it was for practical purposes a final court of appeal because the case was not of sufficient general public importance to justify leave to appeal to the House of Lords. Lord Woolf CJ said (at p.547):

"What will be of the greatest importance is that it should be clearly established that a significant injustice has probably occurred and that there is no alternative effective remedy.""

The significance of absent evidence

In John v The State (Trinidad and Tobago) [2009] UKPC 9 (16 March 2009) there had been no identification parade in circumstances where one should have been held (26). The witness, an accomplice, claimed to have been forced to drive the offender to a Club where a robbery and murder occurred, and then to drive them away. He also claimed to have recognised the appellant as someone he had seen hanging around Queen and Nelson Streets, Port of Spain. This witness, a taxi driver, was, much later, given immunity from prosecution in exchange for evidence identifying the offender. He identified the appellant in the dock at the preliminary hearing.

Immediately after the offending the witness had given the police two facts which led to the appellant's arrest: the nickname "Dollars" by which the other offenders had called the person, and that he picked up the person at Sea Lots and returned him there after the offending.

The Board split 4-1 on whether the absence of an identification parade had caused the trial to be unfair. Baroness Hale dissented; she would have held the trial to have been unfair. She referred (43) to the majority's bootstraps argument: one can't say this was a recognition case, therefore the absence of a parade didn't matter, without assuming that the identification was correct. The majority (judgment delivered by Lord Brown, with brief concurring remarks by Lord Hoffmann at 34 – 36) considered that on the evidence actually given, in the context of the judicial cautions that the jury received, there was no significant possibility of mistaken recognition here (23, 27).

This case is one of a clash of theories about the witness's assertion of the link between the offender and the appellant.

Send out the jury while we discuss threats

Too much information was given to the jury before a chambers discussion of the possibility that an accused had made threats to witnesses in Mitcham v R (Saint Christopher and Nevis) [2008] UKPC 7 (16 March 2009). The court record summarised what had happened (9):

"MR. MERCHANT, DPP rises to state that certain destructing developments have occurred which threaten the orderly conduct of the matter. It relates to threats."

Not to worry, said the Privy Council: this was a fleeting and oblique reference to threats (18); there had been no request to discharge the jury (and discharge would not have been justified), and the point was not taken in the Court of Appeal.

The proper procedure was referred to at 13, with the possible judicial responses mentioned at 14. The Board approved the approach to the decision whether to discharge the jury taken by Auld LJ in R v Lawson [2005] EWCA Crim 84, [2007] 1 Cr App R 20.

The melancholy fact

The melancholy fact of the existence of dishonest lawyers has led to the need, on occasion, to intercept the private communications between lawyers and their clients. The House of Lords has considered whether a statutory regime had the effect of overriding the client's right to private consultation: In re McE [2009] UKHL 15 (11 March 2009).

The majority (Lord Phillips dissenting) held that as a matter of interpretation the powers of surveillance contained in the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000[UK] ("RIPA") are capable of extending to the private communications between a lawyer and his client.

Baroness Hale referred to the general terms of s 27(1) of RIPA, which make covert surveillance under the Act "lawful for all purposes". She referred to the history of surveillance legislation, which had been introduced after the ECtHR had held that the House of Lords had been wrong in thinking that there was no privacy right attaching to telephone communications: Malone v United Kingdom (1985) 7 EHRR 14. The intention of the legislation is, as Lord Neuberger said at 110, that s 27(1) should be able to impact on Convention rights and on all rights.

The leading opinion was delivered by Lord Carswell, who addressed the two arguments advanced by the appellants. These were that the principle of legality pointed to a construction of RIPA that preserved the right to private consultation with a lawyer, and that the same construction was supported by the maxim generalia specialibus non derogant.

He held that the principle of legality, stated in R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Simms [2000] 2 AC 115, did not apply here as it was most unlikely that Parliament had overlooked the possibility that privileged communications might be intercepted (100), and that the maxim did not assist, as there was no surveillance legislation when the private consultation rights were established (101). This latter point looks a little weak, and Lord Neuberger added (115) that the maxim could be applied the other way around from that advanced by the appellants. That too is a bit weak, and the stronger rationale for the majority's interpretation lies in necessity (per Lord Carswell at 102).

Lord Phillips dissented on the basis that if Parliament wishes to permit the interception of privileged communications it can say so expressly (41).

Lord Neuberger referred to "the melancholy fact" (117)

" ... that there are dishonest lawyers, and it is therefore positively consistent with the permissible purpose of RIPA, and indeed with the public interest, that their freedom of action be curtailed, and that their abuse of their clients' rights of privilege and rights to privacy be exposed, and, where appropriate, punished. That applies as much to lawyers with clients in custody as to those with clients at liberty."

Pressures of work and difficult clients

Just a small note today on an illustration of how some sorts of delay can be attributable to the accused, not to the prosecution: Vermont v Brillon [2009] USSC 9 March 2009.

Here there was a three year delay before trial, two years of which were wrongly attributed by the Vermont Supreme Court to the State. These were caused by multiple changes of assigned counsel (at least six) who had difficulties in continuing to act: Mr Brillon fired one, allegedly threatened another's life, and dismissed another for alleged incompetence (no judicial finding was made on that). Not all the changes in counsel were the fault of Mr Brillon, and for some periods he was without assigned counsel. There was, however, no systemic breakdown of the public defender service.

The United States Supreme Court applied the ad hoc balancing exercise required by Barker v. Wingo, 407 U. S. 514 (1972), and held that the Vermont court had made the error of attributing to the state the failure of several assigned counsel to move the case forward, and had failed adequately to take into account the effect of Mr Brillon's disruptive behaviour.

The difficulty with attributing to the State the delays due to requests by assigned counsel for continuances due to their heavy workloads was (held the US SC) that this would become an avenue by which such counsel could seek dismissal on delay grounds, and the courts would come to treat requests for continuances by assigned counsel with skepticism. Then, assigned counsel would be treated differently from privately instructed counsel.

The US Supreme Court held that there would have been no delay issue here if Mr Brillon had not dismissed his first counsel on the eve of trial, and if he had not acted aggressively to his third counsel. The six month period during which he was without counsel was insufficient to base a delay application. The case was remanded to the Vermont court for further proceedings not inconsistent with the USSC's opinion.

We all occasionally have clients who are demanding out of all proportion to the fee their cases will bring. Many unpaid hours can be devoted to ensuring proper instructions are received and proper advice is given. Is it right to pretend that publicly funded counsel have the same ability to tolerate the inevitable frustrations as privately instructed counsel? A State will often be assiduous to restrict the billable hours of its publicly funded lawyers, and, where these are salaried counsel, to maximise their workloads. The courts should be sensitive to detecting when those policies amount to systemic failure.

Equinox challenge reminder

You, diligent reader of these blogs, will remember the equinox challenge. The point is to practise your advocacy skills by explaining something complex in as simple a way as possible. Simple enough for a jury to understand.

Never mind, for the purposes of this challenge, that a judge would take judicial notice of the matter. Some judges might not.

The task is to explain why the sun rises at equinox due east for all observers (except those few people at or near the poles, who can be ignored for the purposes of this Level One exercise).

Pretend you are briefing an expert witness who will explain this to the jury. Get the witness to avoid technical jargon as much as possible.

Equinox is due soon: 20^th March 1144hrs GMT. I will post my answer – which will not necessarily be the best answer – a few hours before the moment of equinox (which will be at 0044hrs on the 21^st here in Auckland, as we will still be in summer time).

Reverse onus and standard of proof

Reverse onus provisions for establishing a defence can conflict with the right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty, as was seen in Hansen v R [2007] NZSC 7 (blogged here 20 February 2007).

That case drew Parliament's attention to s 6(6) Misuse of Drugs Act 1975[NZ], and the words "presumed until the contrary is proved" were held to put the burden of proof to the standard of the balance of probabilities on the accused.

It was not possible, held the Court in Hansen, to interpret this phrase as meaning until the accused raises a reasonable doubt about whether he or she had the proscribed purpose.

No doubt the New Zealand Law Commission, which is currently reviewing the legislation concerning serious drug offending, will be looking around for a way to formulate the statutory defence of absence of purpose of supply without raising a conflict with the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990. That is, assuming that the possession for supply offences remain: an alternative would be to replace them with offences of possession of traffickable quantities of drugs.

Legislation that provides a potentially useful analogy was considered yesterday by the House of Lords in R v G [2009] UKHL 13 (4 March 2009). The offences created by sections 57 and 58 of the Terrorism Act 2000[UK] were analysed here, with reference to how the defences in s 118 applied to them.

The offences involve possession, so there is an interesting discussion of what possession is in this context: see paras 46 – 48, 50, 53, and 60 – 62. In particular, the ingredient of knowledge of the nature of the information in one's possession, for the s 58 offence, was held to be akin to that required in the famous old case Sweet v Parsley [1970] AC 132 (HL).

Sections 57(2) and 58(3) of the Terrorism Act 2000[UK] create defences if the person charged proves certain things. For what "proves" means, reference must be made to s 118(2):

"If the person adduces evidence which is sufficient to raise an issue with respect to the matter the court or jury shall assume that the defence is satisfied unless the prosecution proves beyond reasonable doubt that it is not."

And s 118(4):

"(4) If evidence is adduced which is sufficient to raise an issue with respect to the matter mentioned in subsection (3)(a) or (b) the court shall treat it as proved unless the prosecution disproves it beyond a reasonable doubt."

This is statutory recognition of the idea that the raising of an issue can amount to proof. The evidential burden is treated as a legal burden. In Hansen the Supreme Court held that "proves" cannot mean "raises a reasonable doubt", for reasons too mysterious to discern. Actually, that’s a bit dismissive. The Court held that this meaning was not available because of Parliament’s intent in 1975, because of there being only two recognised standards of proof, because raising an issue is just testing the proposition, not proving anything, and because the expression “the contrary” in the phrase “until the contrary is proved” indicates that more than merely testing the proposition is required. In effect the Court was not prepared to revise the statute by reading in a provision like s 118, above.

Watching the river flow

Tomorrow, and tomorrow, and tomorrow,

Creeps in this petty pace from day to day ...

Unaccountable official delay in determining the appeal occurred in Elaheebocus v The State of Mauritius (Mauritius) [2009] UKPC 5 (25 February 2009). The case was not complex, and none of the delay was attributable to the appellant. The Supreme Court took 19 months between hearing the appeal and dismissing it. The judgment that was eventually delivered was brief, and the Privy Council noted (13) that the appeal had been hopeless and it could have been dealt with ex tempore. This 19 month delay (which was followed by a further 17 month delay before the Supreme Court refused the appellant's application for leave to appeal to the Privy Council) amounted to a breach of the constitutional guarantee of a hearing within a reasonable time.

A symbolic remedy was required. The Board was plainly tempted to simply hold that its decision finding a breach would be sufficient, but on balance it decided to make a modest reduction in the sentence: four years' imprisonment was reduced by six months.

The appellant had been on bail since before his trial, and naturally enough – as his case was apparently hopeless [Macbeth again: " ... full of sound and fury, signifying nothing"] – he had done nothing to hurry things along, such as asking when he might hear the result of his appeal (20); but he was not at fault for that: the delay was a matter of constitutional significance for which the authorities were responsible.

In addressing delay the Board applied the approach in Boolell v The State (Mauritius) [2006] UKPC 46 (blogged here 18 October 2006): three questions must be asked: is the case complex, has the defendant contributed to the delay, and has there been delay by the authorities?

Some of the delay in the present case didn't count because it occurred to accommodate the appellant's counsel's commitments: this was a three year period between the trial and the appeal to the Supreme Court.

Strasbourg approves the special advocate procedure

The special advocate procedure has received endorsement from the Strasbourg Court: A v United Kingdom [2009] ECHR 301 (19 February 2009).

The special advocate procedure may be resorted to where it is inappropriate to permit a party to the proceedings to know the full extent of the evidence against him. How can the proceedings be made procedurally fair?

Here the issue was whether there were the necessary reasonable grounds to continue the appellants' (referred to as the applicants here) detention under legislation aimed at preventing terrorist activity. The tribunal, the Special Immigration Appeals Commission (SIAC) had full access to the evidence. Some of the evidence was "closed" – not disclosed – and a special advocate was given full access to it in order to make submissions to SIAC on behalf of the applicants to test its reliability. Of course it would be necessary to devise some means of allowing the special advocate to obtain relevant instructions from the applicants. So each case turned on its own facts as far as the issue of procedural fairness was concerned.

The Grand Chamber's remarks on the special advocate procedure are at paras 209-217. The important general principle is in para 218:

"... it was essential that as much information about the allegations and evidence against each applicant was disclosed as was possible without compromising national security or the safety of others. Where full disclosure was not possible, [fairness] required that the difficulties this caused were counterbalanced in such a way that each applicant still had the possibility effectively to challenge the allegations against him."

This does not mean that the party who does not receive full disclosure must be satisfied with a lesser degree of fairness than would otherwise apply.

Here the Grand Chamber found, obviously without going into a lot of detail, that there had been breaches of fairness in respect of some of the applicants. For one group unfairness arose because the link between their financial activities and al'Qaeda was not disclosed so they could not challenge it. For another, the main evidence against them was in closed material and the evidence to which they had access was insubstantial and of no assistance to them in challenging the relevant allegation.

For other references to the special advocate procedure, see the Index to these blogs. An important House of Lords case is R v H [2004] UKHL 3 (pre-dating the start of this site), which I have discussed in "Public interest immunity and fairness to the accused" [2004] NZLJ 301. The special advocate procedure was designed to achieve the absolute standard of fairness to the accused that was required by that case.

Abuse of process fundamentals

There is a small part of the brief judgment of the High Court of Australia in PNJ v R [2009] HCA 6 (10 February 2009) that is of interest to us all.

It concerns the concept of abuse of process, and is as follows (3):

"It is not possible to describe exhaustively what will constitute an abuse of process [Batistatos v Roads and Traffic Authority of New South Wales [2006] HCA 27; (2006) 226 CLR 256 at 265-267 [9]- [15] per Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne and Crennan JJ; [2006] HCA 27.]. It may be accepted, however, that many cases of abuse of process will exhibit at least one of three characteristics [Rogers v The Queen [1994] HCA 42; (1994) 181 CLR 251 at 286 per McHugh J; [1994] HCA 42. See also Batistatos [2006] HCA 27; (2006) 226 CLR 256 at 267 [15] per Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne and Crennan JJ.]:

(a) the invoking of a court's processes for an illegitimate or collateral purpose;

(b) the use of the court's procedures would be unjustifiably oppressive to a party; or

(c) the use of the court's procedures would bring the administration of justice into disrepute."

Indeed so.

Unfair, secret and too long

A fair trial is one where the law is accurately applied to facts that are determined without partiality. The partiality aspect of a fair hearing was examined in Olujic v Croatia [2009] ECHR 209 (5 February 2009).

As can be seen from the Index to this site, there are many decisions in which senior appellate courts have considered trial fairness. Olujic v Croatia applies principles that would be universally accepted. This case concerns the proceedings of a disciplinary tribunal which led to the dismissal from office of a judge of the country's most senior court.

Breaches of the Convention occurred in respect of two associated rights: the proceedings had been too lengthy (over 6 years to determine the employment future of the applicant who was a senior judge): para 90 – 91. Also the hearings had not occurred in public (70 – 76). The link to fairness is apparent from the need for public confidence (70):

" ... The public character of proceedings protects litigants against the administration of justice in secret with no public scrutiny; it is also one of the means whereby confidence in the courts can be maintained. By rendering the administration of justice visible, publicity contributes to the achievement of the aim of Article 6 § 1, a fair hearing, the guarantee of which is one of the foundations of a democratic society (see Sutter v. Switzerland, 22 February 1984, § 26, Series A no. 74 )."

On the central requirements of fair proceedings, violations were also found. Some members of the tribunal (the National Judicial Council) had publicly expressed views in newspaper interviews, given before the hearings were concluded, which indicated they were biased against the applicant.

The importance of impartiality has both a public perspective and a party perspective, and requires consideration of the judge's subjective interests and of the objective impression that was conveyed:

"57. First and foremost, it is of fundamental importance in a democratic society that the courts inspire confidence in the public and above all, as far as criminal proceedings are concerned, in the accused (see Padovani v. Italy, 26 February 1993, § 27, Series A no. 257-B). To that end Article 6 requires a tribunal falling within its scope to be impartial. Impartiality normally denotes absence of prejudice or bias and its existence can be tested in various ways. The Court has thus distinguished between a subjective approach, that is endeavouring to ascertain the personal conviction or interest of a given judge in a particular case, and an objective approach, that is determining whether he or she offered sufficient guarantees to exclude any legitimate doubt in this respect (see Piersack v. Belgium, 1 October 1982, § 30, Series A no. 53, and Grieves v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 57067/00, § 69, ECHR 2003-XII)."

The subjective and objective tests are interrelated (60) and both may apply on particular facts. Here the Chamber found there were objective grounds to fear lack of impartiality arising from the public statements that three members of the tribunal had made (65 – 68).

Another aspect of fairness was breached: there had been lack of equality of arms, because the tribunal had refused to hear defence evidence. Whereas the ECtHR does not have jurisdiction over the rules of admissibility applicable in member States,

"77. ... the requirements of fairness of the proceedings include the way in which the evidence is taken and submitted. The Court's task is to ascertain whether the proceedings in their entirety, including the way in which evidence was taken and submitted, were fair within the meaning of Article 6 § 1 (see, inter alia, Dombo Beheer B.V. v. the Netherlands, 27 October 1993, § 31, Series A no. 274)."

Here the proposed defence evidence was relevant to advancing a denial of the allegations against the applicant (81), and the tribunal's reasons for refusing to hear the evidence were inadequate. The ECtHR's jurisdiction arose from the impact of inequality of arms on the fairness of the hearing:

"84. The Court observes further that, although it is not its task to examine whether the court's refusal to admit the evidence submitted by the applicant was well-founded, in its assessment of compliance of the procedure in question with the principle of equality of arms, which is a feature of the wider concept of a fair trial (see Ekbatani v. Sweden, 26 May 1988, § 30, Series A no. 134), significant importance is attached to appearances and to the increased sensitivity of the public to the fair administration of justice (see Borgers v. Belgium, 30 October 1991, § 24, Series A no. 214 B). In this connection the Court notes that the NJC admitted all the proposals to hear evidence from the witnesses nominated by the counsel for the Government and none of the proposals submitted by the applicant."

The refusal to hear the evidence here was another violation of the right to a fair hearing.

This astonishing catalogue of fundamental errors by a tribunal and its members - persons elected from among the members of the judiciary, the State Attorney's Office, the Croatian Bar Association and law professors, all of whom were persons of high standing - highlights the ease with which a sense of balance can be lost when a case involves high public interest.

The more people in the audience, the more likely it is the juggler will drop the balls.

Extended secondary liability in Queensland

Extended secondary liability was the subject of R v Keenan [2009] HCA 1 (2 February 2009). The High Court of Australia was here considering s 8 of the Criminal Code (Q):

"When 2 or more persons form a common intention to prosecute an unlawful purpose in conjunction with one another, and in the prosecution of such purpose an offence is committed of such a nature that its commission was a probable consequence of the prosecution of such purpose, each of them is deemed to have committed the offence."

This sort of liability has common law and statutory forms, and it is important to notice the aspects of the definition that differentiate it from others. Here the phrase "of such a nature" and the objective nature of the probability ("was a probable consequence", not the subjective formulation "was known to be a probable consequence") are significant. An example of a different formulation is s 66(2) Crimes Act 1961[NZ].

In Keenan an alleged common purpose of inflicting serious physical harm on the victim was followed by the use of a gun by one of the offenders to cause grievous bodily harm to the victim. Was Mr Keenan, the respondent in this appeal, correctly convicted of doing grievous bodily harm with intent to do that harm, pursuant to s 8, if use of a gun was not part of the common purpose?

For discussion of the common law, see Rahman [2008] UKHL 45 (blogged here 3 July 2008). Kirby J (dissenting) preferred not to interpret s 8 in a way that would depart from the common law, which left to the jury the task of determining the boundary of secondary liability in the particular circumstances.

The other members of the Court held that it is not the way that the harm is caused that matters (the fact that it was by use of a gun) but rather it is the nature of the harm that was caused (grievous bodily harm). Then the questions are, what was the common purpose, and was the offence that occurred (in a generic sense, not the precise acts) a probable consequence of the prosecution of that purpose. As Hayne J pointed out (83), this gives effect to the phrase "of such a nature", whereas Kirby J's interpretation would focus on the way the offence was committed and ask whether that was a probable consequence of the prosecution of the common purpose. Kiefel J (with whom all the majority agreed) held (115) that the act involved in the commission of the offence is not part of the connection between the common purpose and the offence.

Kirby J supports his dissent with policy grounds (66), emphasising the importance of the jury's role as the setter of the boundaries of liability in accordance with community values.