Who is the informed and reasonable person who might perceive judicial bias? R v Edwards, 2024 SCC 15

The criteria for establishing perceived judicial bias have been summarised and applied in R v Edwards, 2024 SCC 15.

This case is about whether the composition of courts martial in Canada infringes the s 11(d) Charter right to an independent and impartial tribunal.

But of wider interest is the description of the attributes of the informed and reasonable person. The issue is whether such a person would perceive the tribunal as independent.

At [84]-[85] it is observed that there is a strong presumption of judicial impartiality. The reasonable and informed person, according to the established jurisprudence,

has knowledge of all the relevant circumstances

views the matter realistically and practically

is apprised of and takes into account all relevant circumstances

is well informed

is alive to the relevant contextual considerations

is right minded

thinks the matter through

applies themself to the question and obtains the relevant information

has a degree of mature and informed judgement

Even so, there can be judicial differences over what conclusion such a reasonable and informed person would reach. This case produced a dissent from Karakatsanis J. The difficulties can readily be appreciated from her judgment, particularly at [152]-[153], [161], [168], [185]-[193], and [194]-[208].

The scope of extended secondary liability: Burke v R [2024] NZSC 37

 

Let’s have a look at s 66(2) of the Crimes Act 1961 [NZ].

66 Parties to offences

(1) Every one is a party to and guilty of an offence who—

(a) actually commits the offence; or

(b) does or omits an act for the purpose of aiding any person to  commit the offence; or

(c) abets any person in the commission of the offence; or

(d) incites, counsels, or procures any person to commit the offence.

(2) Where 2 or more persons form a common intention to prosecute any unlawful purpose, and to assist each other therein, each of them is a party to every offence committed by any one of them in the prosecution of the common purpose if the commission of that offence was known to be a probable consequence of the prosecution of the common purpose.

In particular, focus on subsection (2), and, limiting our attention to the two-person minimum, call these two persons A and B. Person A is the one who commits an offence which B knows is a probable consequence of their acting in furtherance of their common purpose. This subsection makes B a party to that same offence. It is not necessary that B assisted in the commission of that offence or that B did anything else that would attract liability under subsection (1).

Extension of criminal liability for an offence that B has not committed or participated in is plainly a serious matter. So, what policy is at play here?

What B does is known by B to probably result in greater harm because of what A does, than the harm directly caused by B’s own acts. And it does result in that greater harm. Is this greater harm caused by B, or by A? And either way, is this a direct or an indirect result of B’s participation in the pursuit of the common purpose? The policy seems to be the discouragement of foreseeable harm.

Complex arguments in law are likely to be wrong. And, while the facts of criminal cases are usually simple, application of the law to them can be very difficult indeed.

In Burke v R [2024] NZSC 37 a year passed between the hearing of submissions and the delivery of the judgments, and the Court could not reach unanimity on its reasons for allowing B’s appeal. Person A murdered V and the issue was whether s 66(2) made B (the appellant) liable for manslaughter. The unlawful common purpose was to give V a serious beating. It was not proved that B knew that A had a weapon, a knife. A used the knife to murder V in the course of administering the serious beating. Manslaughter is, broadly, a culpable homicide that does not amount to murder: see s 160 of the Crimes Act 1961.

Did B have to know that the killing of V was a probable consequence of the serious beating? The majority (O’Regan, Williams and Kós JJ) held, no: [146], 170], [172]. It would have been sufficient for liability if B knew that A would probably use a weapon such as a knife: [45], [142], and he was not proven to have had that knowledge here.

The Court was unanimous in allowing B’s appeal. But Winkelmann CJ and, separately, Glazebrook J, differed from the majority’s reasoning. They both held that B would have had to have foreseen V’s death [180], [248], because to require something less would be to put a gloss on the statutory language. That is, it would be to read in a requirement of a foresight of harm that is more than trivial. The essence of subsection (2) is foresight of consequences, so it is logical to require foresight of death [225]-[229]; [291], [300], [304], [314]. But, the difficulty with this argument is that doing an unlawful act (here, assaulting V) knowing that death is a likely consequence, is murder: s 167(d) of the Crimes Act 1961, not manslaughter.

On whether the phrase “probable consequence” needs elaboration, only the Chief Justice dissented. The (new) majority held that no elaboration is needed beyond saying that it is a substantial or real risk, something that could well happen, and it could also be helpful to point out that probable is not the same as possible. [87]-[88]; [251]. The Chief Justice thought that the elaboration went too far beyond the statutory words and it would be unhelpful [235]-[236], but that if juries ask for assistance it could, in partial agreement with the other members of the Court, be helpful to contrast probable with “merely possible” [238].

There was agreement on the desirability of the alleged common purpose, which was for the prosecutor to define, to be aligned to the offence that was ultimately committed: [78]; [243]. This is because a close fit will make it easier to determine whether the offence was a probable consequence of the common purpose.

If we remember that in this case A pleaded guilty to the murder of V, see [21], and if we refer to s 66(2), it seems plain that this subsection could only make B a party to murder: “… is a party to every offence committed…”. Manslaughter should not be an option under this subsection in these circumstances. Yet this case has proceeded on the basis that the jury found B guilty of manslaughter under subsection (2).

It must have been wrong for the trial judge to sentence B on the basis that the jury had found him guilty under s 66(2). [25] The Crown case was that B committed murder, and the prosecutor did not mention manslaughter. [27] Defence counsel mentioned manslaughter while nevertheless arguing for a verdict of not guilty on murder and manslaughter. It is not stated under what provision defence counsel mentioned manslaughter, but it can only, it seems, have been subsection (1)(a). Here the theory would be that the unlawful act causing V’s death was B’s participation in a non-trivial assault on V. But the jury were not given this direction. [30]

The majority judgment appears to put this difficulty aside when it says that under subsection (2), “the issue becomes whether Mr Burke knew that a probable consequence of the prosecution of the common purpose was the commission of a culpable homicide different in nature from that actually committed by Mr Webber.” [34] However, under subsection (2) the possibility of B’s conviction for a different offence than that committed by A is excluded. The assumption upon which this appeal proceeded - that the conviction for manslaughter was under subsection (2), [37] - was false.

The Chief Justice, describing the state of the authorities as “unsatisfactory” [218], suggests that the offences were both culpable homicide [219]. The difficulty here is that culpable homicide is not itself an offence because no punishment is provided for it; it is a generic term, applicable to homicides that are not the result of blameless accident or self-defence, and distinguishing murder from manslaughter. "Culpable homicide" is a sub-category of homicides, which are murder, manslaughter, and what may be termed non-insane infanticide; those are the offences.

That aside, although the summary provided by the Court at [1]-[11] mentions the need to apply the judgment of the majority in future cases, it is difficult to resist the logic of the dissenting judges where they would require B to have foreseen death, and the observation by the Chief Justice that the answer may lie with the legislature [229]. The dissents do diminish the authoritative strength of this case (where they differ from the majority - there are significant areas of agreement).

Here, if at trial the Crown had wanted a verdict of manslaughter it would have included that specific charge, specifying that B’s liability was under s 66(1)(a). Perhaps the trial judge had been attempting to avoid the sense of injustice that could have followed a simple acquittal of murder. [1]

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[1] Update: The Crown and the appellant agreed that a conviction for a lesser offence should be substituted for the manslaughter conviction. This liability was plainly (although not stated) under s 66(1): Burke v R [2024] NZSC 59. 

Tendency evidence - proof and cross-proof: DPP v Roder (A Pseudonym) [2024] HCA 15

When a trial involves multiple charges against one defendant, and they are of a similar nature, an issue may arise over when evidence relating to one or more of those charges can be used as contributing to proof of one or more other of the charges.

If evidence about one offence is relevant to proof of another charge, that can be because it shows that the defendant has a propensity or a tendency to act in the way charged.

I use the synonym [23] propensity out of habit: I have a tendency to say propensity when I could equally say tendency.

Do the facts that allegedly show a propensity have to be proved beyond reasonable doubt before they can be used towards proof of another charge?

Further, what is the correct way to use propensity evidence in reasoning towards a verdict on a charge in respect of which the propensity evidence is admissible? Do charges have to be worked through sequentially and then re-worked as verdicts are reached and propensity evidence is accumulated?

In DPP v Roder (A Pseudonym) [2024] HCA 15 a bench of 7 justices delivered a unanimous judgment addressing issues that I have summarized in these questions, except here there was agreement between counsel on the cross-admissibility of the propensity evidence (the issue mentioned in my first paragraph, above). [6] The context is evidence legislation in the State of Victoria, but this judgment also has wider relevance.

Of interest to criminal procedure buffs and law reformers is the interlocutory nature of this appeal: the trial judge had issued a ruling about how the jury would be directed about the use of propensity evidence, and this ruling was the subject of the appeals. Plainly, this is a sensible method of preventing errors that could require orders for retrials.

What was decided here? No standard of proof applies to the issue of whether the evidence shows that the defendant has a propensity to act in the way charged. [31] There is one exception to this: where the existence of the propensity is an essential link in a chain of proof leading to the verdict. In such a case, the propensity would have to be proved beyond reasonable doubt unless legislation provides to the contrary. [24]

Here, the legislation does provide to the contrary, so the facts alleged to show a propensity never have to be proved beyond reasonable doubt. A different legislated position exists in New South Wales, as described at [29].[1]

Roder settles the question, whether a standard of proof applies to propensity evidence, that had been unclear at common law in Australia: see HML v The Queen [2008] HCA 16 (noted here on 26 April 2008) and Grooby v R [2018] NZSC 114. Now, the starting point for deciding issues concerning propensity evidence is always the relevant legislation.

But the more general relevance of this decision is on the use of propensity evidence where it arises from multiple charges. This is addressed at [26] where the Court endorsed the reasoning in JS v The Queen [2022] NSWCCA 145 at [43]:

“It is the tendency that is relied on as circumstantial evidence in proof of the charge on the indictment. The proper approach is to have regard to all the evidence ... relied on in proof of the tendency as evidence of the tendency alleged. To the extent that the jury is satisfied of the existence of the tendency, the tendency may be relied on in proof of the charge. …”(emphasis added by the HCA)

Points made here are mentioned at [27] and [28]. These are the demonstration of the lack of circularity and the confining of the use of the standard of proof to the verdict.

So, from the summary at [37], if the fact-finder is satisfied on the basis of all the evidence of the relevant propensity (gleaned from the evidence admissible on each charge) that the propensity exists then it can be used in deciding whether the likelihood is increased that the defendant committed the offence the fact-finder is considering. The complexity arising from a gradual emergence of propensity evidence as charges are worked through sequentially is thus avoided.

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[1] If, like me, you came to law after a degree in science, you will, at least at first impression, be horrified that standards of proof are not more widely used and are not specified precisely in terms of probabilities. After all, and on reflection, a trial at law is all about conditional probabilities and the comparison of two hypotheses. That is, given this item of evidence what is the probability of each hypothesis (guilt or innocence), and given all these items of evidence, what is the overall probability of each? And when are the probabilities sufficient to support a verdict of guilty? When is the probability of something high enough for me to be satisfied of it? Being satisfied of something in law usually means having decided to accept the existence of that thing. And usually, for example in relation to items of evidence as opposed to the ultimate verdict, acceptance means acceptance on the balance of probabilities. But courts can differ over whether the balance of probabilities is a fixed standard or whether it changes according to the seriousness of the consequences of being satisfied of the existence of the thing.

Conspiracy and the scope of the agreement: DPP(Cth) v Kola [2024] HCA 14

Identifying the scope of an agreement is essential when considering the law of conspiracy. This is illustrated in DPP(Cth) v Kola [2024] HCA 14. The statutory context is important, particularly if it provides that where an offence has an element of absolute liability the conspiracy to commit that offence retains absolute liability as to that circumstance. [1]

In Kola the charge was conspiracy to import a commercial quantity of cocaine. For the full offence, importation of a commercial quantity of cocaine, absolute liability applied to the amount of the drug. That is, it was not necessary to prove that the defendant knew of the amount of drug that was imported. One of the issues in this appeal was whether liability for the corresponding conspiracy required an intention to import that quantity of the drug.

Consistently with R v LK, [2] the Court held that under the relevant legislation proof of the agreement to commit the offence did not include proof that the parties to the agreement intended to import a commercial quantity of cocaine. [25]

The illustration given at [29] is helpful in that it shows the importance of identifying the scope of what was agreed. The facts might be such that by using the agreed method of importation it would not be possible to import a commercial quantity of the drug. Further, if the agreed method of importation was departed from by other co-conspirators so that a commercial quantity of the drug could be imported, the defendant would not then be a party to the new agreement to import a commercial quantity of the drug. But if the defendant had agreed to a method of importation that allowed for a commercial quantity of cocaine to be imported, the defendant would be liable for the conspiracy to import a commercial quantity of the drug because of the absolute liability provision.

And this is where the second aspect of this appeal comes into play. The charge was conspiracy because, as is usually the case with conspiracy charges, the full offence was not committed. [3] It was still necessary to prove the scope of the agreement. Here, from the proven facts, it was obvious that there was reasonable proof that a commercial quantity of the drug was intended to be imported [45], and consequently that evidence of the acts of co-conspirators was admissible to prove that the intended course of conduct would, had it been carried out, have resulted in the importation of a commercial quantity of the drug. Again, whether the defendant knew or intended this was irrelevant because of the absolute liability provision, but it was relevant that he knew how the importation was to occur.

A puzzling point occurs in Kola at [25]:

“… to establish the offence of conspiring to import a commercial quantity of a border controlled drug, the prosecution must prove, inter alia: that the accused participated in or was a party to an agreement to import a commercial quantity of a border controlled drug; that the accused intended to participate in or be a party to such an agreement; and that the accused and another person intended that a border controlled drug would be imported pursuant to the agreement, that is, they knew or believed that a border controlled drug would be imported pursuant to the agreement.” [emphasis added]

As a result of the agreement having to be to import a commercial quantity of the drug (this was the way the Court stated the first element), the Court identifies “an obvious tension” [27]. The resolution given in that paragraph is somewhat obscure, particularly as the Court approved the trial judge’s direction which had omitted reference to commercial quantity when describing the first element [39]-[40]. The real issue was whether the scope of the agreement was such that, if executed, a commercial quantity of the drug would have been imported [41]. This would be a correct way of putting the first element.

Here, there was no suggestion that the co-conspirators had gone beyond what Mr Kola had agreed to [46], and the circumstances indicating the scope of his agreement are mentioned at [13].

In considering the law of conspiracy and the relevance of this decision in other jurisdictions, differences in legislation must be assessed, as must the particular circumstances bearing on the scope of the alleged agreement.

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[1] Here the Court was considering s 11.5 and 307.1 of the Criminal Code (Cth). For s 11.5, see [20], and for a description of s 307.1 see [24].

[2] R v LK [2010] HCA 17. See my note dated 26 May 2010. LK is remarkable for its use of the word epexegetical at [133]. Don’t play Scrabble against those guys. LK holds that if an offence can be committed recklessly, a conspiracy to commit that offence requires intention or knowledge [141]. The relevant element there was the fact that money was the proceeds of crime. Another element, not relevant to that decision, was that the amount of the money was $1m or more and this was an element to which absolute liability applied: Kola at [23].

[3] Often, defendants are charged as conspirators even though the full offence has been committed, for example where supplies of a drug have occurred.

The meaning of "and": Pulsifer v United States USSC 22-340

When a statutory exception is followed by a list of conditions, a court may have to decide whether the list is conjunctive or disjunctive. That is, must all the conditions be satisfied before the exception applies, or need only an individual condition be satisfied for the exception to apply?

This problem split the Supreme Court of the United States 6-3 in Pulsifer v United States USSC 22-340 (15 March 2024).

At issue was an exception to protection against imposition of a statutory minimum sentence. It was an issue that mattered “profoundly”, affecting the lives and liberty of thousands of individuals (per Gorsich J, joined by Sotomayor and Jackson JJ for the minority).

For lawyers, the point of construction at issue has an entertainment value that belies its seriousness. It is worth reading the provision first (set out in the Appendix to the judgment of the Court), to see what you think is its ordinary and natural meaning.

The majority, in a judgment delivered by Kagan J, did not consider that the provision was genuinely ambiguous, notwithstanding that, viewed in the abstract, two readings were grammatically permissible. Therefore the rule of lenity (which would favour the construction that was most favourable to a defendant) had no role here. The interpretation argued for on behalf of Mr Pulsifer, said the majority, created “glaring superfluity”. Considered in its legal context, the text must be construed to avoid superfluity, and further, the exception to protection against liability for a minimum sentence must as a matter of policy reflect the (relative lack of [1]) seriousness of defendants’ criminal records.

In the majority’s opinion, Mr Pulsifer”s argument was that to be included in the exception from protection against imposition of the minimum penalty a defendant would have to meet all three conditions, but this would mean that if conditions 2 and 3 were met, condition 1 would be superfluous.

The minority disagreed with this claim of superfluity as it depended on how prior offenses were counted, and held that the policy justification could not overcome the plain meaning of the text.

Anyway, students of statutory construction should read this case, if only for entertainment (but remembering the minority’s observation that statutes aren’t games or puzzles).

Fifty-nine and a half pages on the meaning of “and”. Who could resist?

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[1] I parenthesize "relative lack of" seriousness, because ironically the majority insist that only one of the disqualifying conditions needs to be met, whereas the minority would have required all the conditions - meaning a very serious record of offending - to be met before a defendant was disqualified from protection against imposition of the minimum sentence.