Economy overwhelms the need for a fair trial

Here is another illustration of a divergence of opinion between appellate judges over whether to apply the proviso: R v Van [2009] SCC 22 (28 May 2009).

The proviso permits the court to dismiss an appeal if it considers that an error at trial was not substantial. The meaning of substantial is at the root of the difficulties.

The Supreme Court of Canada split 5 – 4. The minority, in a judgment delivered by newbie Cromwell J, did not discuss the law on the proviso. For the majority, LeBel J (with McLachlin CJ, Deschamps, Abella and Rothstein JJ) summarised the law (34 – 36) as requiring the Crown to establish that the error was of one of two kinds:

1. An error that is harmless on its face or in its effect, in the sense of being trivial, peripheral, or actually favouring the defence. The idea here is that a jury need not be "perfectly" directed, as long as it is "properly" directed (citing Lamer CJ in R v Jacquard [1997] 1 SCR 314 at para 2). These errors are such that if they had not been made any reasonable judge or jury could not possibly have rendered a different verdict.
   
2. An error that, although not minor or not without prejudice to the defence, occurred in a context where depriving the accused of a proper trial is justified (citing Sopinka J in R v S (PL) [1991] 1 SCR 909) and the cost and delay involved in a retrial is avoided (citing Binnie J in R v Jolivet [2000] 1 SCR 751 at para 46). This requires that the Crown case is so strong as to be overwhelming, and in assessing this any possible measure of doubt as to the strength of the prosecution case favours the appellant.
   

 Well, permitting that second type of error is contrary to the widely accepted dictum of Lord Bingham in Randall v R [2002] 1 WLR 2237 at para 28 – mentioned in these notes as recently as 28 May 2009. The Supreme Court of Canada made no reference to fair trial requirements, and its approach is consistent with the view – repulsive to a civilised person - that a guilty accused need not be tried fairly.

Failure of the Supreme Court of Canada to update its jurisprudence on the proviso is important in this appeal because the type of error at trial was of the second kind, as is indicated by the Crown's concession (noted by Cromwell J at 97) that the error was serious.

The better approach to the proviso is to ask whether the error deprived the accused of a fair trial, that is, a trial where the law was correctly applied to facts determined impartially. If the trial was not fair, the appeal must be allowed. If the error did not prevent a fair trial, is there a real risk that it deprived the accused of a more favourable verdict? If there is such a risk, again the proviso cannot be applied.

However, even under this suggested approach, the Court in Van would probably have split on whether the trial had been fair. The minority would still say that the error may have affected the jury's assessment of credibility so that it is impossible to say whether they would have convicted in the absence of the error. The majority would still say that the error would not have affected the jury because they would have thought the witness was referring to his earlier evidence and not to inadmissible hearsay. In reasoning this way the majority sidestep the Crown's concession and treat the error as being of the first kind.

The possibility is that even the best approach to the proviso yet devised will not prevent appellate judges from coming to different conclusions when evaluating the significance of errors. But when they approach their task without a focus on trial fairness they are likely to consider errors insubstantial when the prosecution evidence is strong.

Is a buyer party to the sale?

Abuelhawa v United States [2009] USSC No 08-192, 26 May 2009 deals with whether a buyer of a drug is a party to its sale in a statutory context where the buyer commits a minor offence (or, as they spell it, offense) and the seller a serious offence as indicated by the penalty regime.

Souter J, delivering the opinion of the unanimous Court, said

"Where a transaction like a sale necessarily presupposes two parties with specific roles, it would be odd to speak of one party as facilitating the conduct of the other. A buyer does not just make a sale easier; he makes the sale possible. No buyer, no sale; the buyer's part is already implied by the term "sale," and the word "facilitate" adds nothing. We would not say that the borrower facilitates the bank loan. ...

" ... The traditional law is that where a statute treats one side of a bilateral transaction more leniently, adding to the penalty of the party on that side for facilitating the action by the other would upend the calibration of punishment set by the legislature ..."

He noted that "facilitate" has a similar meaning to aid, abet, and assist.

There has been a diversity of opinion as to whether a buyer is a party to a sale. In R v Meston (1975) 34 CRNS 323 the Supreme Court of Canada held that a buyer who encourages the vendor is abetting the sale.

In the UK the offence is defined as "supply ... to another" and "to be concerned in the supplying ... to another" (s 4 Misuse of Drugs Act 1971[UK]), and it seems to be regarded as "a matter of common sense" that that other person cannot be a person charged: Connelly [1992] Crim LR 296 (CA), although in his commentary to that case Professor Smith said that holding the recipient liable as a secondary party to the principal's offence "might perhaps be thought a devious way to proceed; but it seems right in principle."

In Australia a person can be liable for supply of a drug to himself: Maroney v R [2003] HCA 63.

In New Zealand we seem to say that there is nothing inherently wrong with the idea that a buyer may be a party to the sale to himself: R v Ngamoki 7/11/97, Heron J, HC Palmerston North T5/97, although the better approach may be to classify the buyer as a procurer (who commits the lesser offence): R v Lang (1998) 16 CRNZ 68 (CA).

Breach of prosecutor’s duties

Breach of the prosecutor's duties made the trial unfair in Stewart v R [2009] NZSC 53 (28 May 2009). That meant that the proviso could not be applied. But even if the trial had been fair the convictions would have been quashed because the trial outcome may have been different without the errors.

There is no new law in this decision, just a reminder of the duties of prosecutors and illustrations of their breach. Cases applied are R v Roulston [1976] 2 NZLR 644 (CA), R v Hodges CA535/02, 19 August 2003, R v Cook [1997] 1 SCR 1113, R v Mallory (2007) 217 CCC(3d) 266 (Ontario CA), R v E CA308/06, 11 September 2007, and Lord Bingham's well known dictum in Randall v R [2002] 1 WLR 2237 at para 28 (noted here 30 June 2008). There is also a quotation from Matenga v R [2009] NZCS 18 (13 March 2009) – a case that has been withheld from publication until completion of a retrial: does this breach the Court's own suppression order? (Of course not, don't be silly.)

Here the prosecutor had created substantial prejudice to the accused's right to a fair hearing by his criticism, in closing, of a defence expert witness. This was a senior psychiatrist, who the prosecutor, without evidential foundation, said had accepted money in an attempt to establish a defence, had spoken "psychobabble", and had "[bent] things around to suit the accused". This was an appeal to prejudice through the use of emotive and inflammatory language, which was made all the worse because the witness was in general agreement with the Crown's expert. The Judge may not have been able to remedy this prejudice, but in any event he had increased it by referring to the witness's evidence as crucial and mentioned without disapproval the Crown's submission that the witness's conclusion was "patently ridiculous".

Another important breach by the prosecutor was alleging, without an evidential foundation, that the accused and his witnesses were lying in order to avoid his being convicted. This required an assumption of guilt as the motive for lying, and so subverted the presumption of innocence.

This point was not affected by the accused having alleged that prosecution witnesses had their own reasons for lying, because no presumption of innocence applies to them.

The Crown did not seek a retrial, as the appellant had served his sentence. This does not always prevent a retrial, as is illustrated by a high-profile (well, world famous in New Zealand) retrial currently under way. I say no more ... hush ma mouf.

Unstilted voluntariness

"When a defendant is not in custody, he is in control, and need only shut his door or walk away to avoid police badgering. And noninterrogative interactions with the State do not involve the "inherently compelling pressures," Miranda [v Arizona 384 U.S. 436 (1966)], ..., at 467, that one might reasonably fear could lead to involuntary waivers."

The assumption that a suspect who is not in custody does not experience objectionable pressure to consent to official investigatory measures (interrogation, search) is not one that would be made by many counsel experienced in criminal law. Yet it is an important part of the reasoning of the Court (Scalia J, joined by Roberts CJ, Kennedy, Thomas and Alito JJ) in Montejo v Louisiana [2009] USSC No 07-1529 (26 May 2009), slip op. p 16.

The Court overruled its decision in Michigan v Jackson, 475 U.S. 625 (1986), finding it to be "superfluous" (ibid, p 15). Its objectionable aspect was its presumption that waiver of the right to counsel is invalid if the police have initiated interrogation after the defendant has invoked his right to counsel at arraignment or similar proceeding.

There is no need for that presumption, held the Court in Montejo, because a line of cases that have hitherto been concerned with Fifth Amendment rights is applicable to these Sixth Amendment rights too. These cases are not in question, and are Miranda v Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), Edwards v Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981), and Minnick v Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146 (1990). They require respectively (1) that a suspect in custody being interrogated must be advised of his right to have a lawyer present, (2) that such interrogation must stop once the Miranda right is invoked and any subsequent purported waiver is invalid, and (3) that there be no subsequent interrogation until counsel is present.

So, without the Jackson rule, it is possible for the police to interrogate the defendant after arraignment if he is given his Miranda right but he does not invoke it. There is, in other words, no need for the police to seek the prior consent of counsel before interrogating the defendant after commencement of proceedings.

The Court's approach to overruling its own decisions is of interest. It asks whether the previous decision proved unworkable, how old it is, what reliance interests are at stake, and whether it was well reasoned. The reliance interests are its costs and benefits. The benefits were put this way (slip op, p 15):

"A bright-line rule like that adopted in Jackson ensures that no fruits of interrogations made possible by badgering-induced involuntary waivers are ever erroneously admitted at trial.

"But without Jackson, how many would be? The answer is few if any. The principal reason is that the Court has already taken substantial other, overlapping measures toward the same end [ie Miranda, Edwards and Minnick, above]."

So, the Court has done away with the need for the police (or any enforcement authority) to advise counsel in advance of an effort to interrogate the defendant, at the same time as it has retained the application of the Miranda, Edwards and Minnick line of cases to only custodial interrogation. Is it realistic to suppose that coercion only exists in custody?

Short in trumps

There are times when it's a struggle to say anything interesting about the final resolution of a disputed point of law.

"How sour sweet music is, when time is broke and no proportion kept ..."

isn't quite it, yet it almost is.

Overall, five judges decided against the appellant (six if you count the first instance court where the point was taken for granted without argument), and four decided it for the appellant. These four, being the majority of the highest court, determined the result.

The Supreme Court decision is Davies v Police [2009] NZSC 47 (25 May 2009). The point is narrow and peculiar to New Zealand statutory law. It is about whether an order for payment of reparation at sentencing can include an award to cover a top up to the amount of compensation to which the victim is entitled under legislation which provides a scheme for that but only to the extent of 80% of the actual loss.

But enough of that. Anyone keen enough to read the decision will note an error in para 21: the sentence

"It [the Court of Appeal] thought that the legislative history made it clear that s 32(5) [of the Sentencing Act 2002] was concerned only to exclude losses not compensated under the Injury Prevention, Rehabilitation, and Compensation Act, and there was no basis for excluding reparation for losses not able to be compensated."

is obviously wrong (delete the first "not"). Stop the presses, alert the Court! Yawn.

A night mission

Judicial decisions must be based on adequate grounds, and a decision to stay proceedings is no different. In R v Edwards [2009] HCA 20 (21 May 2009) the High Court overturned the Supreme Court of Tasmania's decision to enter a stay. That Court (SlicerJ) had, held the High Court in a unanimous judgment, acted on a wrong principle and taken into account irrelevant considerations relating to the suggested complexity of the trial.

The charge was reckless operation of an aircraft. The recklessness was alleged to be taking off in darkness without the necessary runway illumination. Five people outside the aircraft saw that the takeoff was done without this lighting. Through delay in the proceedings electronic records of the operation of the lights was lost.

The respondents, the two pilots of this Boeing 737-400, sought a stay because of this loss of evidence. Slicer J put the test as "whether on the material before this Court continuation of the indictment to trial by jury could constitute an unacceptable injustice or unfairness" (emphasis added by the High Court at para 22)

The test, however, is not "could", but "would": "whether, in all the circumstances, the continuation of the proceedings would involve unacceptable injustice or unfairness", or whether the "continuation of the proceedings would be 'so unfairly and unjustifiably oppressive' as to constitute an abuse of process": Walton v Gardiner (1993) 177 CLR 378 at 392 per Mason CJ, Deane and Dawson JJ.

The High Court summarised Slicer J's errors as

" ... [his] ultimate conclusion was based upon the loss of the primary evidence and "overall" delay. It was not explained how the overall delay operated in combination with the lost evidence to create irremediable prejudice to the respondents, nor did his Honour address the circumstance that at least some of the delay was attributable to the conduct of the defence" [Footnote: See Jago v District Court of New South Wales [1989] HCA 46; (1989) 168 CLR 23 at 33 per Mason CJ; [1989] HCA 46 as to the significance of the reasons for delay as a factor in the exercise of the balancing process in determining whether to grant a stay.]

On appeal, the "overall delay" point was not relied on by the respondents, but their argument was that "the loss here is of the independent record of the event giving rise to the charge. This is ... productive of unfairness of the kind that informs the power to stay since the trial will necessarily involve an incomplete reconstruction of the event."

Not so, said the High Court. There is nothing unusual in a court having to consider an incomplete account of events:

"31. The distinction between an independent record forming a constituent part of an event and an independent record of an event is without substance. Trials involve the reconstruction of events and it happens on occasions that relevant material is not available; documents, recordings and other things may be lost or destroyed. Witnesses may die. The fact that the tribunal of fact is called upon to determine issues of fact upon less than all of the material which could relevantly bear upon the matter does not make the trial unfair [Footnote: Jago v District Court of New South Wales [1989] HCA 46; (1989) 168 CLR 23 at 34 per Mason CJ, 47 per Brennan J; Williams v Spautz [1992] HCA 34; (1992) 174 CLR 509 at 519 per Mason CJ, Dawson, Toohey and McHugh JJ; [1992] HCA 34.]"

And,

"33. It is well established that the circumstances in which proceedings may be found to be an abuse of process are not susceptible of exhaustive definition [Footnote: Ridgeway v The Queen (1995) 184 CLR 19 at 74-75 per Gaudron J; [1995] HCA 66; R v Carroll [2002] HCA 55; (2002) 213 CLR 635 at 657 [73] per Gaudron and Gummow JJ; Batistatos v Roads and Traffic Authority of New South Wales [2006] HCA 27; (2006) 226 CLR 256 at 265-267 [9]- [15] per Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne and Crennan JJ; [2006] HCA 27.] It is not necessary to consider whether there may be circumstances in which the loss of admissible evidence occasions injustice of a character that would make the continuation of proceedings on indictment an abuse of the process of the court. This is not such a case. The content of the ... [missing evidence] is unknown. In these circumstances it is not correct to characterise ... [its] loss as occasioning prejudice to the respondents. The lost evidence serves neither to undermine nor to support the Crown case. It is to be observed that if the Crown is unable to exclude the hypothesis, that the runway lighting was illuminated as the aircraft moved along it and that it ceased operating coincidentally at the time of take-off, it would fail to establish an element of the principal and the alternative offence."

It could not be established that any prejudice arising from the delay could not be addressed by a direction (para 34, citing Jago v The District Court of New South Wales [1989] HCA 46; (1989) 168 CLR 23 at 34 per Mason CJ, 60 per Deane J, 77-78 per Gaudron J; R v Glennon [1992] HCA 16; (1992) 173 CLR 592 at 605 per Mason CJ and Toohey J; [1992] HCA 16; see also Longman v The Queen (1989) 168 CLR 79; [1989] HCA 60).

This case illustrates that more is required for a stay than merely a complaint that evidence that might have assisted the defence is lost. It is not sufficient simply that the evidence would have been relevant to an issue in the case, it needs to be shown that the missing evidence would have tended to establish a proposition that would assist the defence. Loss of the evidence may mean that prosecution evidence is uncorroborated, and the court may properly be cautious for that reason, but that goes to weight. A stay is a drastic remedy and is not given on a whim. As I have noted in relation to risk of unfairness (see, for example, entries for 19 July 2005, 1 May 2006) it is appropriate to look at this as a question of fact rather than as an "evaluation". Is there a real risk that the lost evidence would have had probative value for the defence? In the present case, some evidence that the takeoff had been illuminated by the runway lights would have been needed: the respondents had not given evidence at this pre-trial application. Whether evidence from them would have been enough to give rise to a risk that could not be dealt with by a direction cannot be ascertained from this judgment: the High Court ordered that the application for a stay be dismissed. Could a fresh application based on further evidence be made, or would that be an abuse of process as the applicants have had their opportunity? You decide.

Also decide whether the High Court has inappropriately merged the reluctance of the court to grant a stay with the receptiveness of the court to the risk of unfairness.

Remedies for undue delay

The remedy for undue delay before trial was the subject of Williams v R [2009] NZSC 41.

As would be expected, the Court applied dicta in Attorney-General's Reference (No 2 of 2001) [2004] 2 AC 71 at para 24, and Elaheebocus v The State of Mauritius [2009] UKPC 7 (noted here 2 March 2009).

"Undue" delay means unjustifiable (para 12), and

" ... there is no obligation on any accused to progress matters towards trial, or to protest about delay; the obligation is on the prosecution to ensure trial without undue delay. Whether delay is attributable to the Courts or to the prosecution is irrelevant to the determination of the question of excessive delay, but may be relevant in assessing the validity of any explanation for the delay and (if necessary) what remedy should be granted."

The Court observed that the right to a fair trial and the right to a trial without undue delay are distinct rights but they can overlap. There may be undue delay, requiring a remedy, even though the delay did not affect trial fairness. Therefore, a stay of proceedings is not the automatic remedy for undue delay. It is not even a usual remedy (para 18):

"Staying the proceedings is likely to be the correct remedy only if the delay has been egregious, or there has been prosecutorial misconduct or a sanction is required against a prosecutor who does not proceed promptly to trial after being directed by a Court to do so. If an accused is convicted after being on bail pending trial, a reduction in the term of imprisonment is likely to be the appropriate remedy. If the accused has been in custody, that time will count towards service of the term of imprisonment. In an extreme case, [Footnote: As for example in Darmalingum v The State [2000] 1 WLR 2303 (PC)] the conviction may be set aside. Upon acquittal, monetary compensation may be justified.
The seriousness of the offending will usually not be relevant to the nature of the remedy. If however the offending is well towards the lower end of the scale, that may be sufficient to tip the balance in favour of a stay."

Obviously, where delay (or anything else) leads to an unfair trial a stay (or on appeal the quashing of a conviction) would be necessary.

In Williams the reduction of sentence was the appropriate remedy for the undue delay.

Knowledge of circumstances

Knowledge of circumstances was required as a matter of statutory interpretation in Flores-Figueroa v United States [2009] USSC No 08-108, 4 May 2009. It was necessary that a person who used false identification numbers knew that they identified another person. The statutory language contained the phrase "knowingly transfers, possesses, or uses, without lawful authority, a means of identification of another person": 18 U. S. C. §1028A(a)(1).

The Court was unanimous in the result, although Scalia J and Alito J in separate judgments were concerned that Breyer J (joined by the others) was making a new rule of interpretation involving the application of adverbs. However, Breyer J acknowledged Alito J's concern and recognised the importance of context. Even so, there were no examples that the Government could cite in support of its approach. This was a case of normal English usage being applied.

There is no discussion here of what "knowledge" means. Does it include suspicion, wilful blindness, belief, doubt? Usually mens rea includes recklessness, but does it here? Some recognition of the difficulties is apparent from the Government's argument, noted at p 10 slip op., mentioning the possibility that the defendant might not care whether the identification he presented belonged to another person, but the Court felt this was not a sufficient argument in this case:

"... in the classic case of identity theft, intent is generally not difficult to prove. For example, where a defendant has used another person's identification information to get access to that person's bank account, the Government can prove knowledge with little difficulty. The same is true when the defendant has gone through someone else's trash to find discarded credit card and bank statements, or pretends to be from the victim's bank and requests personal identifying information. Indeed, the examples of identity theft in the legislative history (dumpster diving, computer hacking, and the like) are all examples of the types of classic identity theft where intent should be relatively easy to prove, and there will be no practical enforcement problem. For another thing, to the extent that Congress may have been concerned about criminalizing the conduct of a broader class of individuals, the concerns about practical enforceability are insufficient to outweigh the clarity of the text."

This seems to support knowledge meaning actual knowledge.

Scalia J disliked Breyer J's use of what we usually call Parliamentary materials (legislative materials in the USA) or legislative history:

"Relying on the statement of a single Member of Congress or an unvoted-upon (and for all we know unread) Committee Report to expand a statute beyond the limits its text suggests is always a dubious enterprise. And consulting those incunabula with an eye to making criminal what the text would otherwise permit is even more suspect. See United States v. R. L. C., 503 U. S. 291, 307–309 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). Indeed, it is not unlike the practice of Caligula, who reportedly "wrote his laws in a very small character, and hung them up upon high pillars, the more effectually to ensnare the people," 1 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 46 (1765)."

However Breyer J had found the legislative history inconclusive.

Contradicting the snitch

If improperly obtained evidence is inadmissible in chief, is it necessarily inadmissible in cross-examination?

In Kansas v Ventris [2009] USSC No 07-1356, 29 April 2009, the Court held (7 – 2) that an improperly obtained statement, from a jailhouse informant where the breach was of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, which the prosecution conceded was inadmissible in chief, could be used in cross-examination to impeach the accused's inconsistent testimony.

This was on the basis, as Scalia J delivering the opinion of the Court (joined by Roberts CJ, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, Breyer and Alito JJ) put it, that

"Our precedents make clear that the game of excluding tainted evidence for impeachment purposes is not worth the candle. The interests safeguarded by such exclusion are "outweighed by the need to prevent perjury and to assure the integrity of the trial process." Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S. 465, 488 (1976). "It is one thing to say that the Government cannot make an affirmative use of evidence unlawfully obtained. It is quite another to say that the defendant can provide himself with a shield against contradiction of his untruths." Walder, supra, [Walder v. United States, 347 U. S. 62, 65 (1954)] at 65. Once the defendant testifies in a way that contradicts prior statements, denying the prosecution use of "the traditional truth-testing devices of the adversary process," Harris, supra,[Harris v. New York, 401 U. S. 222, 225–226 (1971)] at 225, is a high price to pay for vindication of the right to counsel at the prior stage."

So, that's the rule. Scalia J, perhaps a little inconsistently, disavowed any rule-making function for the Court in his final footnote:

"Respondent's amicus insists that jailhouse snitches are so inherently unreliable that this Court should craft a broader exclusionary rule for uncorroborated statements obtained by that means. Brief for National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers 25–26. Our legal system, however, is built on the premise that it is the province of the jury to weigh the credibility of competing witnesses, and we have long purported to avoid "establish[ing] this Court as a rule-making organ for the promulgation of state rules of criminal procedure." Spencer v. Texas, 385 U. S. 554, 564 (1967). It would be especially inappropriate to fabricate such a rule in this case, where it appears the jury took to heart the trial judge's cautionary instruction on the unreliability of rewarded informant testimony by acquitting Ventris of felony murder.[ He was convicted of aggravated burglary and aggravated robbery.]"

Stevens J (joined by Ginsburg J) dissented. He repeated his reasons for dissent in Michigan v Harvey, 494 U.S. 344 (1990).

On the topic of whether judges should adhere to earlier dissents, see blogs for 19 January 2007 and 16 January 2009.

He reasoned that the state's use of the improperly obtained evidence compounded the violation and promoted "shabby" police tactics.

This case is a reminder that an application to have evidence admitted may be renewed. The interests in using improperly obtained evidence in chief might not be the same as the interests in using it in cross-examination.

In New Zealand, our Evidence Act 2006 is silent on this point, but it does allow the use of voir dire evidence in cross-examination if the witness gives evidence that is inconsistent with evidence he gave at voir dire: s 15. Note s 90(1) and (2) which prohibit the use of inadmissible documents in questioning witnesses. At common law, use of an inadmissible statement in cross-examination was not permitted: Wong Kam-Ming v The Queen [1980] AC 247. In R v Ryland 17/4/02, CA389/01 the Court referred to such a confession being "inherently inadmissible", contrasting it to evidence which had earlier in the trial lacked an evidential foundation for its relevance but which subsequently became relevant.

Oops!

Firing a gun during the commission of a crime can increase the minimum sentence. What if the firing was accidental – does the minimum apply?

In Dean v United States [2009] USSC No 08-5274, 29 April 2009 this question divided the United States Supreme Court in its interpretation of 18 U. S. C. §924(c)(1)(A), which, as summarised by Roberts CJ (joined by Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, Ginsburg and Alito JJ):

"... criminalizes using or carrying a firearm during and in relation to any violent or drug trafficking crime, or possessing a firearm in furtherance of such a crime. An individual convicted of that offense receives a 5-year mandatory minimum sentence, in addition to the punishment for the underlying crime. §924(c)(1)(A)(i). The mandatory minimum increases to 7 years "if the firearm is brandished" and to 10 years "if the firearm is discharged."

Plainly, a question of statutory interpretation. Should the common law presumption of mens rea (Morissette, 342 U. S., at 251–254, Staples, 511 U. S., at 606–607) apply to the sentencing regime? Stevens J, dissenting, thought so, and Breyer J, also dissenting, agreed. For Breyer J it was particularly important that excluding the offender from the minimum sentence would not prevent the judge from imposing a sentence close to that if the circumstances warranted. But to include the accidental shooter in the minimum regime prevents judges from making appropriate allowances. This, said Breyer J, made the rule of lenity decisive: if the legislature wanted to include accidental firing in the minimum sentence category it should have so specified.

Stevens J said that the history of the legislation indicated that intent was required, and that the majority, in arguing that there are examples of accident being inculpatory, such as the felony-murder rule, neglects to notice that in those examples harm is actually caused, whereas here it wasn't.

Roberts CJ for the majority noted that the legislation did not limit itself to intentional discharges, that it used the passive voice, which supported an inference of absence of intent, that other parts of the statute referred to intent, so its omission here was significant, that it is not unusual for the law to impose liability for the unintended consequences of unlawful acts, that the sentence enhancement regime reflects the risk of harm, and that the rule of lenity was excluded by the statutory text and structure.

The case illustrates the choices between techniques of statutory interpretation and common law presumptions. The choice between these must be based on policy, yet when the Court gives voice to a policy argument (the sentencing enhancement reflects the increased risk of harm) that is unconvincing because the same risk applied lower down the regime, at the 7 year level.

Criminal proceeds recovery and proof of offending

Even as we in New Zealand eagerly await 1 December 2009, when the new Criminal Proceeds (Recovery) Act 2009 will commence, a question about its meaning has become apparent. This question occurs to readers of R v Briggs-Price [2009] UKHL 19 (29 April 2009).

Our new legislation will replace that which exists. It will deal with forfeiture of two kinds: forfeiture of instruments used to commit qualifying offences, and forfeiture of proceeds of significant criminal activity. Proceeds are of two kinds: assets and profits.

To see the difficulty that Briggs-Price suggests, consider the provision for an order for forfeiture of profits, s 55:

"55 Making profit forfeiture order

(1) The High Court must make a profit forfeiture order if it is satisfied on the balance of probabilities that—

(a) the respondent has unlawfully benefited from significant criminal activity within the relevant period of criminal activity; and

          (b) the respondent has interests in property."

The civil standard of proof applies to "has unlawfully benefited", but does it also apply to "from significant criminal activity" (an expression which the Act defines)?

It was argued for the appellant in Briggs-Price that the Crown should be required to prove beyond reasonable doubt the commission of particular qualifying offences when it relies on this sort of approach to forfeiture. Otherwise, the presumption of innocence would be breached.

The House of Lords split 3 – 2 on this, although they were unanimous in dismissing the appeal. That split alone is reason to avoid the same argument here by an amendment to make the point clear. I should acknowledge that the legislative intent was probably to apply the civil standard, not the criminal standard, and that is the natural meaning of the provision, and it conforms to the minority opinions in Briggs-Price. Certainly, the Parliamentary intent was to make the obtaining of a conviction unnecessary, as the Explanatory Memorandum accompanying the Bill (in 2006) stated.

Lords Rodger, Brown and Neuberger held that the criminal standard applied, and Lords Phillips and Mance would have applied the civil standard.

Lord Rodger held that if the criminal standard did not apply, "... the Crown could ask the court to make a confiscation order on the basis of an alleged benefit from a specific offence of which the defendant would have been acquitted if he had been prosecuted for it." (77)

Lord Brown held that art 6(2) of the ECHR was engaged (95), and that although Geerings v Netherlands (2007) 46 EHRR 1222 applied (pursuant to which the criminal standard of proof had to be met) it was satisfied here because the Judge had found beyond reasonable doubt that the relevant criminal activity had occurred.

Lord Neuberger agreed (136) with Lord Rodger. The relevant UK legislation is referred to by Lord Phillips at para 5 – 7. It carries the same ambiguity as the New Zealand provision set out above, as s 2(8) of the Drug Trafficking Act 1994[UK] provides:

"The standard of proof required to determine any question arising under this Act as to–

(a) whether a person has benefited from drug trafficking, or

(b) the amount to be recovered in his case by virtue of this section,

shall be that applicable in civil proceedings."

Note that this clearly applies to "benefited" and to "amount", but is not clear on whether it applies to "from drug trafficking".

Injustice, oppression, flight and extradition

Injustice and oppression as grounds for resisting extradition were considered in Gomes v Trinidad and Tobago [2009] UKHL 21 (29 April 2009).

The precedent is Lord Diplock's statement in Kakis v Cyprus [1978] 1 WLR 779 (HL):

"'Unjust' I regard as directed primarily to the risk of prejudice to the accused in the conduct of the trial itself, 'oppressive' as directed to hardship to the accused resulting from change in his circumstances that have occurred during the period to be taken into consideration; but there is room for overlapping, and between them they would cover all cases where to return him would not be fair."

How much risk of unfairness is sufficient to create injustice sufficient to resist an order for extradition? The focus is on the proposed trial in the requesting state. The court must decide whether that trial carries an unacceptable risk of unfairness.

Does the court in the requested state have to decide what the court in the requesting state would decide about fairness?

Or, should the court of the requested state make its own assessment of the fairness of the proposed trial in the requesting state?

And, either way, what is the relevance of unfairness of the accused's own making? Is a trial unfair regardless of who caused the unfairness, or is a trial "fair" even if some unfairness to the accused was brought about by his conduct?

Is the "justice" of extradition the same sort of concept as the "fairness" of the proposed trial?

Without looking at the answers, one might think that the court in the requested country should make its own assessment of the risk of what it understands to be an unfair trial, and that for extradition to be refused this risk should be at least the same as that which would be sufficient to stay the proceedings in the requested country. And, unfairness is unfairness, no matter who caused it.

Logical as those suggestions might be, policy requires a different approach.

In Gomes the Report of the Appellate Committee, written by Lord Brown, holds that Lord Diplock had correctly stated the law when he said, following the passage quoted above,

"Delay in the commencement or conduct of extradition proceedings which is brought about by the accused himself by fleeing the country, concealing his whereabouts or evading arrest cannot, in my view, be relied upon as a ground for holding it to be either unjust or oppressive to return him. Any difficulties that he may encounter in the conduct of his defence in consequence of the delay due to such causes are of his own choice and making. Save in the most exceptional circumstances it would be neither unjust nor oppressive that he should be required to accept them."

Additional delay due to the dilatoriness in the requesting state will only be relevant in borderline cases where the accused is not responsible for any delay (27). The blameworthiness of the requesting state is not a matter that will normally be considered, because the accused gets the benefit of any delay that is not his fault (28).

The test for oppression will not easily be satisfied (31), and injustice has to be established in the way held in Woodcock v New Zealand [2004] 1 WLR 1979, as approved by Lord Bingham for the Board in Knowles v US [2007] 1 WLR 47 (PC):

"First, the question is not whether it would be unjust or oppressive to try the accused but whether . . . it would be unjust or oppressive to extradite him (para 20). Secondly, if the court of the requesting state is bound to conclude that a fair trial is impossible, it would be unjust or oppressive for the requested state to return him (para 21). But, thirdly, the court of the requested state must have regard to the safeguards which exist under the domestic law of the requesting state to protect the defendant against a trial rendered unjust or oppressive by the passage of time (paras 21-22). Fourthly, no rule of thumb can be applied to determine whether the passage of time has rendered a fair trial no longer possible: much will turn on the particular case (paras 14-16, 23-25). Fifthly, 'there can be no cut-off point beyond which extradition must inevitably be regarded as unjust or oppressive' (para 29)."

The first point separates the question of fairness of the proposed trial from the justice of extradition. The second makes relevant the likely view of the court in the requesting state of the fairness of the proposed trial, so that extradition is barred if that court would be bound to conclude the trial would be unfair. Third, the law of the requesting state as to whether the trial would be unjust or oppressive, must be considered.

Gomes holds that the essential question is whether a fair trial would be impossible (33) [Compare USA v Barnette noted here 27 August 2004: a flagrant or gross risk of unfairness will be sufficient to prevent extradition.] Does that mean that a high likelihood of trial unfairness would be insufficient to prevent extradition? Of course the court in the requesting state would stay the proceedings if the risk of unfairness was unacceptably high according to the standards applicable in the law of that state. That is where the third point quoted above comes into play. It may be that the standards applicable in the requesting state would be unacceptable in the law of the requested state. If they were, extradition would be refused.

Does Gomes mean that in UK law, if an accused is responsible for delay which prejudices his ability to present a defence, the trial must proceed even though it would be unfair? Can the right to a fair trial be waived? Perhaps it can, but to the contrary, see R v Coutts [2006] UKHL 39, noted here 21 July 2006. In Coutts, fairness required an alternative verdict be left to the jury, and the accused could not decide that that should not be done. This was not discussed in Gomes.

“the kingdom would come to confusion”

The interpretation of legislation can, on rare occasions, be assisted by reference to information about the creation of that legislation. Even so, there is reluctance to have resort to such material, as can be seen from R v JBT [2009] UKHL 20 (29 April 2009).

Here there was statutory ambiguity. Until the ambiguity was pointed out, almost everyone had thought the age of criminal responsibility had been made 10 years or more, by s 34 of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998[UK]:

"Abolition of rebuttable presumption that a child is doli incapax

The rebuttable presumption of criminal law that a child aged 10 or over is incapable of committing an offence is hereby abolished."

Very good. Bring them within the loving embrace of the youth justice system.

But did abolition of the presumption of incapacity mean that the defence was also abolished: couldn't the child adduce evidence to prove "I was too immature to understand that what I did was seriously wrong"?

Lord Phillips felt that the statute did not provide sufficient assistance to determine this issue, so he canvassed the history of the common law from Hale (1778 ed) through the legislation and the progress of the current provision through Parliament.

The other Law Lords concurred, but adding that they wouldn't have referred to Hansard. Lord Phillips had found Hansard helpful, for an amendment which addressed the issue unambiguously had been withdrawn in the Lords once and later, when reintroduced, had been defeated. That amendment, moved by Lord Goddard QC, was based on the assumption that the Bill in question was designed to abolish doli incapax completely (both as rule and presumption).

Lord Rodger did not explain how he would have reached the same result as did Lord Phillips without reference to Hansard, but he agreed that the passages referred to put the position beyond doubt. Lord Carswell would have got there by "construction of the section and taking account of the mischief and of the consequences of the legislation" (39), but he also felt that this was a legitimate case in which to take into account the Parliamentary materials, recognising the change in approach to such that was effected in Pepper v Hart [1993] AC 593. Lord Brown agreed that the reference to Lord Goddard QC's proposed amendment was helpful, and he mentioned the use of reference to unsuccessful amendments by Lord Nicholls in R (Jackson) v Attorney General [2006] 1 AC 262, 292. Lord Mance agreed with everyone.

In New Zealand there have been proposals to formalise reference to Parliamentary materials as aids to interpretation of legislation, but these have not been included in the current Interpretation Act 1999. The governing provision is s 5:

"Ascertaining meaning of legislation

(1) The meaning of an enactment must be ascertained from its text and in the light of its purpose.

(2) The matters that may be considered in ascertaining the meaning of an enactment include the indications provided in the enactment.

(3) Examples of those indications are preambles, the analysis, a table of contents, headings to Parts and sections, marginal notes, diagrams, graphics, examples and explanatory material, and the organisation and format of the enactment."

Nevertheless, judges do refer to Parliamentary materials: eg R v Law (2002) 19 CRNZ 500 (HC) at para 24, R v Oran (2003) 20 CRNZ 87 (CA) at para 18.

Cut-throat issues

In Jones v R [2009] HCA 17 (29 April 2009) some interesting issues were mentioned, but they did not need to be decided. They concern the use by one accused of evidence of the propensity of a co-accused.

In this case the proposed evidence was inadmissible as hearsay, and for that reason – together with an error at trial on another point being insignificant – the appeal was dismissed.

Hayne J, in a judgment concurring with that given by the other members of the Court, highlighted the issues for future consideration (37); in summary these are:

• Is it necessary that the co-accused has put his character in issue before the accused can adduce evidence of his propensity?
  

• How to manage the risk of the trial being diverted into collateral issues about the nature, extent and probative value of the evidence of those propensities.

• Should the rule in R v Pfennig (1995) 182 CLR 461; [1995] HCA 7 apply, or would it lead to diversion of the kind just mentioned?
  

• When should a ruling that such propensity evidence is admissible be followed by an order for separate trials?
   

The Pfennig point concerns whether propensity evidence should be governed by the same admissibility requirements as similar fact evidence, especially the need for "striking similarity" and the improbability of an innocent explanation for the apparent link it is sought to establish.

The recent reforms of the law of evidence in New Zealand have provided a framework for addressing these issues. Section 42
Evidence Act 2006 deals with propensity evidence about co-defendants. When will the judge permit the evidence under s 42(1)(b)? Presumably some regard would be had to matters such as those specified in s 43(3) which apply when the prosecution seeks to adduce propensity evidence. The danger of prejudice to the co-defendant has to be considered under s 43(4), and a similar consideration should apply under s 42(1)(b), although in any event the general discretion to exclude unfairly prejudicial evidence pursuant to s 8 would apply to s 42(1)(b).

There is no need for the co-accused to have put his character in issue before the accused may adduce evidence of his propensity. Collateral issues would have to be managed under the requirements of relevance (s 7), prejudice and fairness. There is no requirement of "striking similarity", merely a "tendency to show" a propensity (s 40(1)), and for the common law, see R v Holtz [2003] 1 NZLR 667; (2002) 20 CRNZ 14 (CA). As there is nothing to exclude it, the hearsay rule applies to propensity evidence.

Search incidental to arrest

An interesting aspect of Arizona v Gant [2009] USSC, No 07-542, (21 April 2009) is the omission of any reference to Herring v United States [2009] USSC, No 07-513, (14 January 2009), noted here 15 January 2009.

Gant rejects a broad reading of the Supreme Court's decision in New York v. Belton, 453 U. S. 454 (1981) which had applied an assumption that things in the vehicle were accessible to the person arrested.

The topic is the police power to search a vehicle incident to the arrest of an occupant. Gant holds that the vehicle may be searched when it is reasonable to believe that evidence of the offence for which the person was arrested might be found in the vehicle. It also holds that, since the power of search incident to arrest has the purpose of preventing the arrested person accessing weapons or destroying evidence, the search may only be of areas within the arrested person's immediate control. When the arrested person has been secured and cannot access the interior of the vehicle, a vehicle search incident to arrest is not authorised.

In Gant the search was unreasonable. Mr Gant had been arrested for driving with a suspended licence (or, as they spell it, license) and had been handcuffed and placed in the back of a patrol car. His car was then searched and a bag of cocaine was found in the pocket of a jacket which was on the back seat. The US Supreme Court held 5 – 4 that the Arizona Supreme Court had correctly held that the search was unjustified. That Court had held that the trial court should have suppressed the evidence.

In Herring, the Supreme Court held that the fact that a search was unreasonable does not mean that the exclusionary rule necessarily applies: exclusion depends on whether the efficacy of deterrence of official misconduct outweighs the substantial cost of letting guilty defendants go free. This issue was not argued on this appeal.

One can readily imagine that evidence of a really serious crime might be found as a result of an unreasonable search of a vehicle following the arrest of an occupant for a relatively minor matter. Automatic exclusion would be absurd in those circumstances. The issue of admissibility is distinct from the issue that was argued here – the constitutionality of the search.

Reviewing or revising

There can be a fine line between evaluating facts and making up new ones.

In Carroll v R [2009] HCA 13 (21 April 2009) the CCA NSW majority had held that a sentence imposed for manslaughter was "manifestly inadequate". That ground for allowing the prosecutor's appeal amounted to an assertion that the sentence was unreasonable or plainly unjust. It is one of the recognised ways of challenging the exercise of a discretion.

Sentencing remarks have to be carefully cast, lest they stray beyond the offending that has been proved or acknowledged by plea.

Here the CCA majority had latched on to an objective aspect of the offending that was never in dispute - that the offender's violence was not justified - and used that to ignore a matter that was relevant: that there had been some provocation from the victim.

The second error by the CCA majority was to exaggerate what had been admitted. The unlawful act necessary for manslaughter – here a head-butt to the victim's face – was acknowledged by the guilty plea to be an unlawful and dangerous act that carried with it an appreciable risk of serious injury. But the CCA majority stretched this to "severe injury was clearly foreseeable and death at least a possibility", which was not acknowledged. All the offender had admitted by pleading guilty was that his act had carried an appreciable risk of serious injury to the victim.

Back then, goes this case, to the CCA for proper consideration of the prosecutor's appeal.

Private garbage?

Do the police act improperly if they search, without warrant, the contents of a rubbish bag left on a property by the fence line for uplifting by the official garbage collectors? This was the issue in R v Patrick [2009] SCC 17 (9 April 2009).

The police action involved a trespass: the act of reaching into the air space of the property occupied by the appellant, and uplifting the bag, which had been left on a stand in an opening or indentation in the fence at the boundary.

In the bag was evidence of ecstasy manufacturing, and the appellant was consequently convicted of unlawfully producing, possessing and trafficking in that substance.

There had been six such searches, on separate days, of the appellant's rubbish bags, and information obtained was used in support of an application for a warrant to search the address.

For evidence of serious offending to be excluded on grounds of unreasonable search it is necessary that it was obtained by means that were seriously improper. That is, exclusion of the evidence must not be a disproportionate response to the impropriety. On that basis the evidence here was admissible. Arguing otherwise requires asserting a serious impropriety, which in turn requires asserting breach of a significant privacy interest.

Abella J came closest to recognising a significant privacy interest. She delivered a judgment concurring with that of the other judges (delivered by Binnie J, appropriately enough as a cruel punster might observe), but reached that conclusion – that there was no impropriety – on the basis that the police had, before they searched the rubbish bags, reasonable suspicion that the appellant had been offending in this way. Such a threshold of suspicion was necessary, she held, because of the appellant's privacy interest which was "diminished ... not unlike the reduced expectation at border crossings" (para 90).

That, I suggest, is unsatisfactory, because it creates uncertainty over when a search warrant is needed. Border crossings are different, because submission to search is required.

The joint judgment gets to grips with analysis of privacy expectation, applying R. v. Tessling, 2004 SCC 67 (CanLII), 2004 SCC 67, 2004 SCC 67 (CanLII), [2004] 3 S.C.R. 432. There are three types of privacy interest: personal, territorial, and informational. This case involved assertion of territorial and informational privacy interests. Here, the interests were appropriately analysed as being informational. Issues were whether the appellant had a direct interest in the information and a subjective expectation of privacy in it; then, if he did, was his expectation reasonable in all the circumstances?

Here the conclusion was that the appellant had abandoned any reasonable expectation of privacy: he had done all he needed to in order to commit the bags to the municipal collection system. It would have been different (ie not unequivocally abandoned) if he had not placed the bags within reach of the collectors.

Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed. Only one, of all the 11 judges who considered this case, concluded that the evidence should have been excluded. Conrad JA emphasised the territorial privacy aspect and would not have permitted the totality of the circumstances test to diminish that, and also reasoned that people who leave garbage for collection expect it to be made anonymous by being mixed with other people's garbage.

Interesting issues were discussed, as is reflected by the participation of five interveners in this case.

What if the police had obtained the bags from the official collectors immediately after the bags had been lawfully uplifted? The availability of alternative lawful means of obtaining the evidence can weigh in favour of increasing the impropriety (as the police are expected to behave lawfully). But, arguably, the ready availability of lawful means should make the actual impropriety less, on a sort of "where's the real harm?" rationale.

Extended interrogations and voluntariness

Awful legislative drafting caused a 5 – 4 split in the United States Supreme Court in Corley v United States [2009] No 07-10441, 6 April 2009.

The peculiarity of the legislation makes the case of little interest outside the USA but the difference between the majority (delivered by Souter J, joined by Stevens, Kennedy, Ginsburg and Breyer JJ) and the minority (delivered by Alito J, joined by Roberts CJ, Scalia and Thomas JJ) judgments reflects differing approaches to the significance of the context of a subsection.

Before looking at the details, I can summarise the broad position of the majority as being that the subsection (c) could not be read down to accommodate the wider meaning to be given to subsection (a). There was no legislative suggestion that (a) had to be the dominant provision, and in any event they dealt with different topics.

The case is about whether delay in bringing the accused before a court meant that his confession was inadmissible even though it was voluntarily made.

The first part of the legislation, 18 USC §3501(a), provides:

"In any criminal prosecution brought by the United States or by the District of Columbia, a confession, as defined in subsection (e) hereof, shall be admissible in evidence if it is voluntarily given. Before such confession is received in evidence, the trial judge shall, out of the presence of the jury, determine any issue as to voluntariness. If the trial judge determines that the confession was voluntarily made it shall be admitted in evidence and the trial judge shall permit the jury to hear relevant evidence on the issue of voluntariness and shall instruct the jury to give such weight to the confession as the jury feels it deserves under all the circumstances."

Note that this does not refer to the other subsections in §3501. Also, it only deals with voluntariness.

The minority treat this as the dominant provision, so that delay does not matter if the confession is voluntary.

The part of the legislation dealing with delay is §3501(c):

"In any criminal prosecution by the United States or by the District of Columbia, a confession made or given by a person who is a defendant therein, while such person was under arrest or other detention in the custody of any law-enforcement officer or law-enforcement agency, shall not be inadmissible solely because of delay in bringing such person before a magistrate judge or other officer empowered to commit persons charged with offenses against the laws of the United States or of the District of Columbia if such confession is found by the trial judge to have been made voluntarily and if the weight to be given the confession is left to the jury and if such confession was made or given by such person within six hours immediately following his arrest or other detention: Provided, That the time limitation contained in this subsection shall not apply in any case in which the delay in bringing such person before such magistrate judge or other officer beyond such six-hour period is found by the trial judge to be reasonable considering the means of transportation and the distance to be traveled to the nearest available such magistrate judge or other officer."

Note that this is a rule drafted in the negative, when it is, if read with the proviso, more sensible as a positive rule of exclusion. In effect it means a statement made after six hours of arrest or detention is inadmissible, provided that a longer time may not render the confession inadmissible if it was reasonable in the light of travel practicalities. That is how the majority interpreted it.

The minority reasoned that the admission of confessions made within six hours did not justify the implication that those made after longer delay were to be excluded.

The majority held that the minority's reading rendered subsection (c) redundant, or, as it said, "nonsensical and superfluous". The interpretative canon is that

" '[a] statute should be construed so that effect is given to all its provisions, so that no part will be inoperative or superfluous, void or insignificant . . . .' " Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U. S. 88, 101 (2004) (quoting 2A N. Singer, Statutes and Statutory Construction §46.06, pp.181–186 (rev. 6th ed. 2000))."

The majority pointed out that the minority were not reading the section as a whole, and to say that (a) is clear on its own proves nothing. The minority treated subsection as if it said "a confession will not be treated as involuntary because of delay if ...", whereas the word is inadmissible, not involuntary. Voluntariness and admissibility are not synonymous and both concepts are used in subsection (3); their different usage is not to be treated as simply a mistake in draftsmanship. They are different under the McNabb-Mallory rule at common law, which Congress is presumed to have been aware of:
Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U. S. 677, 699 (1979).

The majority reasoned that many evidential rules would be redundant if the only criterion for admissibility was voluntariness (the reduction ad absurdum argument), and that the legislative history supported its interpretation. The mischief of subsection (3) is interrogations of unlimited duration:

"No one with any smattering of the history of 20th-century dictatorships needs a lecture on the subject, and we understand the need even within our own system to take care against going too far. "[C]ustodial police interrogation, by its very nature, isolates and pressures the individual," Dickerson, 530 U. S., at 435, and there is mounting empirical evidence that these pressures can induce a frighteningly high percentage of people to confess to crimes they never committed, see, e.g., Drizin & Leo, The Problem of False Confessions in the Post-DNA World, 82 N. C. L. Rev. 891, 906–907 (2004).

"Justice Frankfurter's point in McNabb is as fresh as ever: "The history of liberty has largely been the history of observance of procedural safeguards." 318 U. S., at 347. McNabb-Mallory is one of them, and neither the text nor the history of §3501 makes out a case that Congress meant to do away with it."

So, illustrated here are various approaches to statutory interpretation: reading a provision in context, avoiding redundancy, reference to legislative intent, avoidance of absurdity. Another point was that established approaches should not be departed from, as here where the rule that relevant evidence is admissible (Rule 402, Federal Rules of Evidence) has been understood to be subject to exclusionary rules.

Jury selection

Just a glance at Rivera v Illinois [2009] USSC No 07-9995 (31 March 2009) will get you thinking about whether there should be peremptory challenges to potential jurors.

There is huge variety in the jury selection procedures that jury trial jurisdictions have developed. Peremptory challenges are no longer allowed in England and Wales. Where such challenges are permitted, their number varies. In the USA there are measures to prevent peremptory challenges being exercised on racial or sexist grounds. That requires the judge to determine whether a peremptory challenge should be permitted.

In Rivera the judge wrongly refused to allow a peremptory challenge. The trial proceeded with that juror knowing she was not wanted by the accused. She became the foreman (foreperson) of the jury. The Supreme Court unanimously held that the error did not raise due process issues, as there was no risk of bias.

Perhaps the Court had to come to that conclusion, because to reverse the error here would have the effect of discouraging judges from ever exercising the control over the use of peremptory challenges that was designed to overcome racial or sexist discrimination in jury selection.

Be that as it may, Rivera illustrates the complications that can arise from sensitivity to the motives for which peremptory challenges may be exercised.

How big should juries be? How can it be ensured they are not biased? What sort of inquiry should be permitted into the competence of potential jurors? These issues go to the fundamentals of the jury trial process: the need for the facts at issue in a trial to be determined impartially.

Youth justice procedures in Canada

A Supreme Court of Canada case, abundant in citations of authors and cases, and with 12 counsel appearing, deals with aspects of youth justice: R v SJ L-G [2009] SCC 14 (27 March 2009).

The case establishes that when young persons are jointly charged with adults, young persons are nevertheless tried in the youth court, as there is a statutory separation of trial systems. Whereas the purpose of the adult courts is to emphasise the need for punishment, youth courts favour rehabilitation, reintegration and fair and proportionate accountability.

Further, there is no constitutional right to a preliminary hearing, which is only a screening mechanism. A preliminary hearing is distinct from discovery, and absence of a preliminary hearing does not impair the right to discovery.

The case is largely an exercise in statutory interpretation, so is not of great interest in jurisdictions where legislation differs.

Duties, errors and complaints

For discussion of counsel's duties in relation to defences that have no real prospect of success, see Knowles v Mirzayance [2009] USSC No 07-1315 (24 March 2009).

Points of general interest mentioned here are:

• There is no requirement that a defence has to be run if all that can be said for it is that there is "nothing to lose" in running it.
  
• In alleging deficient representation by counsel, an appellant must show both deficient performance by counsel, and prejudice (ie a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different).
  
• Deficient performance requires that the appellant show that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.
  
• Counsel's conduct was virtually unchallengeable where he had made a decision on an informed basis after thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible options.
  
• There is no prevailing professional norm that counsel must assert the only defence available, even one almost certain to lose.
  

And another decision of the United States Supreme Court is of general interest for its terminology concerning inappropriate defence tactics: Puckett v United States [2009] USSC No 07-9712 (25 March 2009):

• Sandbagging: a defendant's conduct in remaining silent about his objection and belatedly raising the error only if the case does not conclude in his favour. Cf. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U. S. 72, 89 (1977); see also United States v. Vonn, 535 U. S. 55, 72 (2002).
  
• Gaming the system: instead of pointing out an error in a timely way, "wait[ing] to see if the sentence later str[ikes] him as satisfactory," Vonn, 535 U. S., at 73, and then seeking a second bite at the apple by raising the claim.
  

And a phrase which is probably new to many people: "hornbook law", used here in the sentence "But it is hornbook law that misrepresentation requires an intent at the time of contracting not to perform." The idea is that this is the sort of law that is hallowed.

In Puckett, it was conceded that a plea bargain had been broken by the prosecution, but the Court found that in the circumstances this did not invalidate the plea of guilty and that there was no prejudice to the appellant as it was he would "likely would not have" (as Americans say) obtained the benefits that the parties had agreed to. He was seeking to use his guilty plea as a sign of contrition, but he had subsequently reoffended so the plea could hardly be said to have come from contrition. Plain error review requires, as held in United States v. Olano, 507 U. S. 725 (1993), (1) an error that has not been waived; (2) the error must be clear or obvious, (3) the error must have affected the appellant's substantial rights – usually in that it affected the result of the proceeding; (4) and, if those requirements are met, a remedy may be given if the error has seriously affected the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.

But to begin with, the error must be complained of at the earliest opportunity:

""anyone familiar with the work of courts understands that errors are a constant in the trial process, that most do not much matter, and that a reflexive inclination by appellate courts to reverse because of unpreserved error would be fatal." United States v. Padilla, 415 F. 3d 211, 224 (CA1 2005) (en banc) (Boudin, C. J., concurring)."

Just leave it to the Crown

The Supreme Court of New Zealand has decided the jury vetting case (see blogs for 14 April 2008 and 29 July 2008): Gordon-Smith v R [2009] NZSC 20 (23 March 2009).

The majority (McGrath J dissenting) upheld the Court of Appeal majority decision:

"22. ... the Crown should disclose any previous convictions of a potential juror known to it, if the previous conviction gives rise to a real risk that the juror might be prejudiced against the accused or in favour of the Crown. Disclosure should not otherwise be made. By this means the interests of accused persons are reconciled with the legitimate privacy and security concerns of jurors. The non-disclosure of a previous conviction which does not give rise to a real risk of prejudice cannot be said to jeopardise the accused's right to a fair trial."

McGrath J's dissent, echoing the position taken by Robertson J in the Court of Appeal, led him to conclude:

"87. ... the Crown has to make disclosure within a reasonable time prior to trial of all information concerning convictions of those on the panel whenever that information is in the Crown's possession and a juror with a prior conviction is not to be challenged by the Crown. The ... Crown must similarly disclose other information it receives from the police which may indicate a juror is possibly biased."

The dissent reasoned that, since the accused's right to a fair trial is absolute (84, citing R v Condon [2007] 1 NZLR 300 (SC), at para 77), and as there is no need to supplement the extensive legislative provisions recently introduced to protect jurors' privacy interests, and as opinions may vary on the significance of previous convictions in relation to potential juror bias (82), and as a well-informed observer would have reasonable grounds for apprehending that a jury may not be impartial when selected in the context of an imbalance of information as between Crown and defence, all information available to the prosecutor should be shared with the defence (86, 87). McGrath J would also have required Crown challenges to be exercised in a principled way in accordance with instructions that would need to be promulgated.

The majority downplayed the risk of unfairness, calling it "entirely speculative" (17). The recent legislation bolstering jurors' privacy interests was taken to be a lead the Court should follow (19), and

"20. With these points in mind we do not consider it is necessary or desirable to go as far as Robertson J and require all information to be made available. That would unreasonably impact on jurors' legitimate concerns for their privacy and security, and for no sufficient reason. ... ."

The majority would not require disclosure of any information other than convictions.

In other words, the Crown can decide when a previous conviction gives rise to a real risk of bias such that the defence would wish to challenge the juror.

Many readers of this decision will be sceptical of the majority judgment. Sarcastic readers (for alas, some there will be) will think the Crown may as well exercise all the defence challenges.

The nastiness of tapering

For a horror story of abuse of power see Takitota v. The Attorney General & Ors (Bahamas) [2009] UKPC 12 (18 March 2009). How do the courts calculate how much money to give a person who has been unlawfully detained for years in inhumane and degrading conditions?

There are two aspects to consider: first, constitutional or vindicatory damages, and second, compensation for loss of liberty.

Exemplary damages are not appropriate where constitutional or vindicatory damages are awarded:

"15. Their Lordships consider that it would not be appropriate to make an award both by way of exemplary damages and for breach of constitutional rights. When the vindicatory function of the latter head of damages has been discharged, with the element of deterrence that a substantial award carries with it, the purpose of exemplary damages has largely been achieved. To make a further award of exemplary damages, as the appellant's counsel sought, would be to introduce duplication ... ."

The fact that constitutional or vindicatory damages are to be awarded should not affect the calculation of the compensatory damages. But, in calculating the amount appropriate for compensation for a lengthy period of unlawful detention (here it was over 8 years), the phenomenon of "tapering" comes into play.

"9. ... it is usual and proper to reduce the level of damages by tapering them when dealing with an extended period of unlawful imprisonment: cf Thompson v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [1998] 1 QB 498, 515, per Lord Woolf MR. ... ."

Tapering looks rather odd, but it is an established method of calculation. It is a bit like reducing a sentence for multiple offences on totality grounds to prevent the final sentence being out of proportion to the harm that the offender caused. But I think it is morally dubious. Is a person to receive less compensation because he may have become accustomed to inhumane treatment? Does the law grow weary of his claim? Don't the days become increasingly valuable, as they are each a greater proportion of his remaining life?

Here the Board upheld the amount awarded for constitutional or vindicatory damages, but remitted the question of compensatory damages to the Court of Appeal because that Court's judgment was imprecise and did not enable assessment of the correctness of its mathematics. The haphazard nature of tapering is illustrated where, after calculating compensatory damages on a dollars-per-day basis, the Court of Appeal continued:

"96. In light of the fact that the appellant will be receiving a lump sum [ie $100,000 for constitutional or vindicatory damages] we would reduce the figure for compensatory damages by $330,500.00 and award the sum of $400,000.00 as compensation for the loss of 8 years and two months of the appellant's life. We will not, however, reduce the sum of $100,000.00 by way of exemplary damages since that sum is awarded to show the strong disapproval of the courts for the conduct of the respondents in this case from the time of the appellant's arrest until this case is finally disposed of."

Why chop off $330,500? The Court was wrong to use constitutional damages as the reason for doing this, but how much will it take away as "tapering"? The Privy Council thought the local court better placed to set the amount of compensation, but one wonders.

Finality

Three Privy Council decisions:

The inherent jurisdiction of final appellate courts

Bain v R (New Zealand) [2008] UKPC 6 (16 March 2009) at para 6:

"The Privy Council, like other final courts of appeal, has an inherent jurisdiction to discharge or vary its own orders in cases in which this is necessary for the purposes of justice. But the exercise of this jurisdiction will be rare, because finality is generally in the interests of justice. In Taylor v Lawrence [2003] QB 528 the English Court of Appeal discussed the circumstances in which it would exercise the jurisdiction in cases in which it was for practical purposes a final court of appeal because the case was not of sufficient general public importance to justify leave to appeal to the House of Lords. Lord Woolf CJ said (at p.547):

"What will be of the greatest importance is that it should be clearly established that a significant injustice has probably occurred and that there is no alternative effective remedy.""

The significance of absent evidence

In John v The State (Trinidad and Tobago) [2009] UKPC 9 (16 March 2009) there had been no identification parade in circumstances where one should have been held (26). The witness, an accomplice, claimed to have been forced to drive the offender to a Club where a robbery and murder occurred, and then to drive them away. He also claimed to have recognised the appellant as someone he had seen hanging around Queen and Nelson Streets, Port of Spain. This witness, a taxi driver, was, much later, given immunity from prosecution in exchange for evidence identifying the offender. He identified the appellant in the dock at the preliminary hearing.

Immediately after the offending the witness had given the police two facts which led to the appellant's arrest: the nickname "Dollars" by which the other offenders had called the person, and that he picked up the person at Sea Lots and returned him there after the offending.

The Board split 4-1 on whether the absence of an identification parade had caused the trial to be unfair. Baroness Hale dissented; she would have held the trial to have been unfair. She referred (43) to the majority's bootstraps argument: one can't say this was a recognition case, therefore the absence of a parade didn't matter, without assuming that the identification was correct. The majority (judgment delivered by Lord Brown, with brief concurring remarks by Lord Hoffmann at 34 – 36) considered that on the evidence actually given, in the context of the judicial cautions that the jury received, there was no significant possibility of mistaken recognition here (23, 27).

This case is one of a clash of theories about the witness's assertion of the link between the offender and the appellant.

Send out the jury while we discuss threats

Too much information was given to the jury before a chambers discussion of the possibility that an accused had made threats to witnesses in Mitcham v R (Saint Christopher and Nevis) [2008] UKPC 7 (16 March 2009). The court record summarised what had happened (9):

"MR. MERCHANT, DPP rises to state that certain destructing developments have occurred which threaten the orderly conduct of the matter. It relates to threats."

Not to worry, said the Privy Council: this was a fleeting and oblique reference to threats (18); there had been no request to discharge the jury (and discharge would not have been justified), and the point was not taken in the Court of Appeal.

The proper procedure was referred to at 13, with the possible judicial responses mentioned at 14. The Board approved the approach to the decision whether to discharge the jury taken by Auld LJ in R v Lawson [2005] EWCA Crim 84, [2007] 1 Cr App R 20.

The melancholy fact

The melancholy fact of the existence of dishonest lawyers has led to the need, on occasion, to intercept the private communications between lawyers and their clients. The House of Lords has considered whether a statutory regime had the effect of overriding the client's right to private consultation: In re McE [2009] UKHL 15 (11 March 2009).

The majority (Lord Phillips dissenting) held that as a matter of interpretation the powers of surveillance contained in the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000[UK] ("RIPA") are capable of extending to the private communications between a lawyer and his client.

Baroness Hale referred to the general terms of s 27(1) of RIPA, which make covert surveillance under the Act "lawful for all purposes". She referred to the history of surveillance legislation, which had been introduced after the ECtHR had held that the House of Lords had been wrong in thinking that there was no privacy right attaching to telephone communications: Malone v United Kingdom (1985) 7 EHRR 14. The intention of the legislation is, as Lord Neuberger said at 110, that s 27(1) should be able to impact on Convention rights and on all rights.

The leading opinion was delivered by Lord Carswell, who addressed the two arguments advanced by the appellants. These were that the principle of legality pointed to a construction of RIPA that preserved the right to private consultation with a lawyer, and that the same construction was supported by the maxim generalia specialibus non derogant.

He held that the principle of legality, stated in R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Simms [2000] 2 AC 115, did not apply here as it was most unlikely that Parliament had overlooked the possibility that privileged communications might be intercepted (100), and that the maxim did not assist, as there was no surveillance legislation when the private consultation rights were established (101). This latter point looks a little weak, and Lord Neuberger added (115) that the maxim could be applied the other way around from that advanced by the appellants. That too is a bit weak, and the stronger rationale for the majority's interpretation lies in necessity (per Lord Carswell at 102).

Lord Phillips dissented on the basis that if Parliament wishes to permit the interception of privileged communications it can say so expressly (41).

Lord Neuberger referred to "the melancholy fact" (117)

" ... that there are dishonest lawyers, and it is therefore positively consistent with the permissible purpose of RIPA, and indeed with the public interest, that their freedom of action be curtailed, and that their abuse of their clients' rights of privilege and rights to privacy be exposed, and, where appropriate, punished. That applies as much to lawyers with clients in custody as to those with clients at liberty."

Pressures of work and difficult clients

Just a small note today on an illustration of how some sorts of delay can be attributable to the accused, not to the prosecution: Vermont v Brillon [2009] USSC 9 March 2009.

Here there was a three year delay before trial, two years of which were wrongly attributed by the Vermont Supreme Court to the State. These were caused by multiple changes of assigned counsel (at least six) who had difficulties in continuing to act: Mr Brillon fired one, allegedly threatened another's life, and dismissed another for alleged incompetence (no judicial finding was made on that). Not all the changes in counsel were the fault of Mr Brillon, and for some periods he was without assigned counsel. There was, however, no systemic breakdown of the public defender service.

The United States Supreme Court applied the ad hoc balancing exercise required by Barker v. Wingo, 407 U. S. 514 (1972), and held that the Vermont court had made the error of attributing to the state the failure of several assigned counsel to move the case forward, and had failed adequately to take into account the effect of Mr Brillon's disruptive behaviour.

The difficulty with attributing to the State the delays due to requests by assigned counsel for continuances due to their heavy workloads was (held the US SC) that this would become an avenue by which such counsel could seek dismissal on delay grounds, and the courts would come to treat requests for continuances by assigned counsel with skepticism. Then, assigned counsel would be treated differently from privately instructed counsel.

The US Supreme Court held that there would have been no delay issue here if Mr Brillon had not dismissed his first counsel on the eve of trial, and if he had not acted aggressively to his third counsel. The six month period during which he was without counsel was insufficient to base a delay application. The case was remanded to the Vermont court for further proceedings not inconsistent with the USSC's opinion.

We all occasionally have clients who are demanding out of all proportion to the fee their cases will bring. Many unpaid hours can be devoted to ensuring proper instructions are received and proper advice is given. Is it right to pretend that publicly funded counsel have the same ability to tolerate the inevitable frustrations as privately instructed counsel? A State will often be assiduous to restrict the billable hours of its publicly funded lawyers, and, where these are salaried counsel, to maximise their workloads. The courts should be sensitive to detecting when those policies amount to systemic failure.