A hundred years on, R v Blight (1903) 22 NZLR 837 (CA) retains its potency. The House of Lords has referred to it in R v J [2004] UKHL 42 (14 October 2004), in which a majority upheld the prohibition on the prosecution evading a statutory time limit by alleging a similar offence, not subject to such a limit, based on the same facts:
[65] … there may indeed be some initial difficulties. But your Lordships would merely be adopting the same approach as has applied in the case of the equivalent legislation in New Zealand for over a century, following the decision in R v Blight 22 NZLR 837. Significantly, [Crown counsel] was unable to point to any insuperable problems which the prosecutors or courts had encountered there. On the contrary, when, in R v Hibberd [2001] 2 NZLR 211, the Court of Appeal came to interpret the Crimes Act 1961 as amended to cover homosexual offences, in the light of their experience they deliberately adopted the same approach to the time-bar as had been laid down in R v Blight.
Baroness Hale dissented:
[90] … The rationale behind the time limit can no longer be that which it was said to be in R v Blight 22 NZLR 837. If it is that the defendant can no longer have a fair trial, I would certainly agree that such prosecutions should be stayed either as an abuse of process or as outside the prosecutor's competence to bring. If it is, as was suggested by the Criminal Law Revision Committee when it recommended retention of the time limit in its 15th report in 1984, that people should not be prosecuted for offences which were "stale", it is unclear what this means in a case where a fair trial is still possible. If it means that something which was once a matter deserving of punishment is no longer so because of the passage of time, then this will not invariably be so. At one extreme will be the teenage romance between a boy and a girl who have since gone their separate ways, where no possible personal or public interest would be served by prosecution. At the other will be prolonged and serious abuse of a position of trust by a person who might well be left to do it again unless action is taken. It will all depend upon the circumstances, in which the interests of the accused, the victim and of society will all play their part. A just and humane prosecution policy should be capable of taking all these factors into account.
The difference between the majority and the minority reflects formalist and pragmatic analysis, respectively.
Tuesday, October 26, 2004
Friday, October 15, 2004
Evidential or legal burdens on the defence
Sometimes the legislation creating an offence places a burden on the defendant, if he is to avoid conviction, to prove something. In the absence of any statutory specification of the standard of proof which is placed on the defence by such provisions, the common law has traditionally held them to impose a legal burden of proof on the balance of probabilities. If he fails to meet this burden, the accused may be convicted even though there might be a reasonable doubt about his guilt. In this sense, legal burdens infringe the presumption of innocence. Courts have recognised this, but have regarded the shift in legal burden as justified. Justifications have been the mischief at which the legislation is aimed, and the ease with which the burden may be met.
In Attorney-General’s Reference (No 4 of 2002) [2004] UKHL 43 (14 October 2004) (decided jointly with Sheldrake v DPP) the House of Lords had to consider the effect of human rights law on this position, in the light of its obligation pursuant to s 3 of the Human Rights Act 1998 [UK] to apply the law so as to conform with the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights in its interpretation of the European Convention on Human Rights. Section 3(1) provides:
"3. - (1) So far as it is possible to do so, primary legislation and subordinate legislation must be read and given effect in a way which is compatible with the Convention rights.
Lord Bingham of Cornhill delivered the leading speech for the majority; the minority agreed with his statement of the law but differed in its application in relation to one of these two appeals. At para 9 the parallel concerns of domestic and European law were mentioned:
"The right to a fair trial has long been recognised in England and Wales, although the conditions necessary to achieve fairness have evolved, in some ways quite radically, over the years, and continue to evolve. The presumption of innocence has also been recognised since at latest the early 19th century, although … the presumption has not been uniformly treated by Parliament as absolute and unqualified. There can be no doubt that the underlying rationale of the presumption in domestic law and in the Convention is an essentially simple one: that it is repugnant to ordinary notions of fairness for a prosecutor to accuse a defendant of crime and for the defendant to be then required to disprove the accusation on pain of conviction and punishment if he fails to do so. The closer a legislative provision approaches to that situation, the more objectionable it is likely to be. To ascertain the scope of the presumption under the Convention, domestic courts must have regard to the Strasbourg case law. It has there been repeatedly recognised that the presumption of innocence is one of the elements of the fair criminal trial required by article 6(1): see, for example, Bernard v France (1998) 30 EHRR 808, para 37."
Strasbourg law was summarised in para 21:
"From this body of authority certain principles may be derived. The overriding concern is that a trial should be fair, and the presumption of innocence is a fundamental right directed to that end. The Convention does not outlaw presumptions of fact or law but requires that these should be kept within reasonable limits and should not be arbitrary. It is open to states to define the constituent elements of a criminal offence, excluding the requirement of mens rea. But the substance and effect of any presumption adverse to a defendant must be examined, and must be reasonable. Relevant to any judgment on reasonableness or proportionality will be the opportunity given to the defendant to rebut the presumption, maintenance of the rights of the defence, flexibility in application of the presumption, retention by the court of a power to assess the evidence, the importance of what is at stake and the difficulty which a prosecutor may face in the absence of a presumption. Security concerns do not absolve member states from their duty to observe basic standards of fairness. The justifiability of any infringement of the presumption of innocence cannot be resolved by any rule of thumb, but on examination of all the facts and circumstances of the particular provision as applied in the particular case."
The question comes down to proportionality. In the appeal over which the House of Lords was split, the question involved the interpretation of s 11 of the Terrorism Act 2000 [UK], which provides:
11 Membership
(1) A person commits an offence if he belongs or professes to belong to a proscribed organisation.
(2) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under subsection (1) to prove—
(a) that the organisation was not proscribed on the last (or only) occasion on which he became a member or began to profess to be a member, and
(b) that he has not taken part in the activities of the organisation at any time while it was proscribed.
What standard of proof does subsection (2) carry? Six considerations were relevant (para 51):
"(1) ... a person who is innocent of any blameworthy or properly criminal conduct may fall within section 11(1). There would be a clear breach of the presumption of innocence, and a real risk of unfair conviction, if such persons could exonerate themselves only by establishing the defence provided on the balance of probabilities. It is the clear duty of the courts, entrusted to them by Parliament, to protect defendants against such a risk. It is relevant to note that a defendant who tried and failed to establish a defence under section 11(2) might in effect be convicted on the basis of conduct which was not criminal at the date of commission.
(2) While a defendant might reasonably be expected to show that the organisation was not proscribed on the last or only occasion on which he became a member or professed to be a member, so as to satisfy subsection (2)(a), it might well be all but impossible for him to show that he had not taken part in the activities of the organisation at any time while it was proscribed, so as to satisfy subsection (2)(b). Terrorist organisations do not generate minutes, records or documents on which he could rely. Other members would for obvious reasons be unlikely to come forward and testify on his behalf. If the defendant's involvement ... had been abroad, any evidence might also be abroad and hard to adduce. While the defendant himself could assert that he had been inactive, his evidence might well be discounted as unreliable. A's own case is a good example. He arrived as a stowaway. He described himself on different occasions as Palestinian and also as Jordanian. An immigration adjudicator concluded that he was Moroccan. The judge, as already noted, thought he might well be a fantasist. He was not a person whose uncorroborated testimony would carry weight. Thus although section 11(2) preserves the rights of the defence, those rights would be very hard to exercise effectively.
(3) If section 11(2) were held to impose a legal burden, the court would retain a power to assess the evidence, on which it would have to exercise a judgment. But the subsection would provide no flexibility and there would be no room for the exercise of discretion. If the defendant failed to prove the matters specified in subsection (2), the court would have no choice but to convict him.
(4) The potential consequence for a defendant of failing to establish a subsection (2) defence is severe: imprisonment for up to ten years.
(5) While security considerations must always carry weight, they do not absolve member states from their duty to ensure that basic standards of fairness are observed.
(6) Little significance can be attached to the requirement in section 117 of the Act that the Director of Public Prosecutions give his consent to a prosecution (a matter mentioned by the Court of Appeal in para 42 of its judgment) for the reasons given by the Court of Appeal in para 91 of its judgment in Attorney General's Reference (No 1 of 2004) [2004] EWCA Crim 1025."
Accordingly (para 53), since it was possible to "read down" the legislation, s 11(2) was held to place an evidential burden, not a legal burden on the accused. That means, as Lord Bingham began by saying (para 1):
"An evidential burden is not a burden of proof. It is a burden of raising, on the evidence in the case, an issue as to the matter in question fit for consideration by the tribunal of fact. If an issue is properly raised, it is for the prosecutor to prove, beyond reasonable doubt, that that ground of exoneration does not avail the defendant."
This case has persuasive value for New Zealand courts, because the influence of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 on our common law is comparable to the influence of the European Convention on Human Rights on English common law. It is an illustration of how the interpretation of the burden as evidential rather than legal is not "strained and unnatural" (as it had been described in R v Phillips [1991] 3 NZLR 175 (CA)).
In the two appeals considered by the House of Lords in the case reviewed here, one concerning a defence to an excess alcohol driving offence was held to require a legal burden on the defendant, while the other, in the context of alleged belonging to a terrorist organisation, was held to impose only an evidential burden on the accused.
In Attorney-General’s Reference (No 4 of 2002) [2004] UKHL 43 (14 October 2004) (decided jointly with Sheldrake v DPP) the House of Lords had to consider the effect of human rights law on this position, in the light of its obligation pursuant to s 3 of the Human Rights Act 1998 [UK] to apply the law so as to conform with the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights in its interpretation of the European Convention on Human Rights. Section 3(1) provides:
"3. - (1) So far as it is possible to do so, primary legislation and subordinate legislation must be read and given effect in a way which is compatible with the Convention rights.
Lord Bingham of Cornhill delivered the leading speech for the majority; the minority agreed with his statement of the law but differed in its application in relation to one of these two appeals. At para 9 the parallel concerns of domestic and European law were mentioned:
"The right to a fair trial has long been recognised in England and Wales, although the conditions necessary to achieve fairness have evolved, in some ways quite radically, over the years, and continue to evolve. The presumption of innocence has also been recognised since at latest the early 19th century, although … the presumption has not been uniformly treated by Parliament as absolute and unqualified. There can be no doubt that the underlying rationale of the presumption in domestic law and in the Convention is an essentially simple one: that it is repugnant to ordinary notions of fairness for a prosecutor to accuse a defendant of crime and for the defendant to be then required to disprove the accusation on pain of conviction and punishment if he fails to do so. The closer a legislative provision approaches to that situation, the more objectionable it is likely to be. To ascertain the scope of the presumption under the Convention, domestic courts must have regard to the Strasbourg case law. It has there been repeatedly recognised that the presumption of innocence is one of the elements of the fair criminal trial required by article 6(1): see, for example, Bernard v France (1998) 30 EHRR 808, para 37."
Strasbourg law was summarised in para 21:
"From this body of authority certain principles may be derived. The overriding concern is that a trial should be fair, and the presumption of innocence is a fundamental right directed to that end. The Convention does not outlaw presumptions of fact or law but requires that these should be kept within reasonable limits and should not be arbitrary. It is open to states to define the constituent elements of a criminal offence, excluding the requirement of mens rea. But the substance and effect of any presumption adverse to a defendant must be examined, and must be reasonable. Relevant to any judgment on reasonableness or proportionality will be the opportunity given to the defendant to rebut the presumption, maintenance of the rights of the defence, flexibility in application of the presumption, retention by the court of a power to assess the evidence, the importance of what is at stake and the difficulty which a prosecutor may face in the absence of a presumption. Security concerns do not absolve member states from their duty to observe basic standards of fairness. The justifiability of any infringement of the presumption of innocence cannot be resolved by any rule of thumb, but on examination of all the facts and circumstances of the particular provision as applied in the particular case."
The question comes down to proportionality. In the appeal over which the House of Lords was split, the question involved the interpretation of s 11 of the Terrorism Act 2000 [UK], which provides:
11 Membership
(1) A person commits an offence if he belongs or professes to belong to a proscribed organisation.
(2) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under subsection (1) to prove—
(a) that the organisation was not proscribed on the last (or only) occasion on which he became a member or began to profess to be a member, and
(b) that he has not taken part in the activities of the organisation at any time while it was proscribed.
What standard of proof does subsection (2) carry? Six considerations were relevant (para 51):
"(1) ... a person who is innocent of any blameworthy or properly criminal conduct may fall within section 11(1). There would be a clear breach of the presumption of innocence, and a real risk of unfair conviction, if such persons could exonerate themselves only by establishing the defence provided on the balance of probabilities. It is the clear duty of the courts, entrusted to them by Parliament, to protect defendants against such a risk. It is relevant to note that a defendant who tried and failed to establish a defence under section 11(2) might in effect be convicted on the basis of conduct which was not criminal at the date of commission.
(2) While a defendant might reasonably be expected to show that the organisation was not proscribed on the last or only occasion on which he became a member or professed to be a member, so as to satisfy subsection (2)(a), it might well be all but impossible for him to show that he had not taken part in the activities of the organisation at any time while it was proscribed, so as to satisfy subsection (2)(b). Terrorist organisations do not generate minutes, records or documents on which he could rely. Other members would for obvious reasons be unlikely to come forward and testify on his behalf. If the defendant's involvement ... had been abroad, any evidence might also be abroad and hard to adduce. While the defendant himself could assert that he had been inactive, his evidence might well be discounted as unreliable. A's own case is a good example. He arrived as a stowaway. He described himself on different occasions as Palestinian and also as Jordanian. An immigration adjudicator concluded that he was Moroccan. The judge, as already noted, thought he might well be a fantasist. He was not a person whose uncorroborated testimony would carry weight. Thus although section 11(2) preserves the rights of the defence, those rights would be very hard to exercise effectively.
(3) If section 11(2) were held to impose a legal burden, the court would retain a power to assess the evidence, on which it would have to exercise a judgment. But the subsection would provide no flexibility and there would be no room for the exercise of discretion. If the defendant failed to prove the matters specified in subsection (2), the court would have no choice but to convict him.
(4) The potential consequence for a defendant of failing to establish a subsection (2) defence is severe: imprisonment for up to ten years.
(5) While security considerations must always carry weight, they do not absolve member states from their duty to ensure that basic standards of fairness are observed.
(6) Little significance can be attached to the requirement in section 117 of the Act that the Director of Public Prosecutions give his consent to a prosecution (a matter mentioned by the Court of Appeal in para 42 of its judgment) for the reasons given by the Court of Appeal in para 91 of its judgment in Attorney General's Reference (No 1 of 2004) [2004] EWCA Crim 1025."
Accordingly (para 53), since it was possible to "read down" the legislation, s 11(2) was held to place an evidential burden, not a legal burden on the accused. That means, as Lord Bingham began by saying (para 1):
"An evidential burden is not a burden of proof. It is a burden of raising, on the evidence in the case, an issue as to the matter in question fit for consideration by the tribunal of fact. If an issue is properly raised, it is for the prosecutor to prove, beyond reasonable doubt, that that ground of exoneration does not avail the defendant."
This case has persuasive value for New Zealand courts, because the influence of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 on our common law is comparable to the influence of the European Convention on Human Rights on English common law. It is an illustration of how the interpretation of the burden as evidential rather than legal is not "strained and unnatural" (as it had been described in R v Phillips [1991] 3 NZLR 175 (CA)).
In the two appeals considered by the House of Lords in the case reviewed here, one concerning a defence to an excess alcohol driving offence was held to require a legal burden on the defendant, while the other, in the context of alleged belonging to a terrorist organisation, was held to impose only an evidential burden on the accused.
Thursday, October 14, 2004
Reasoning with similar fact evidence
The recent Canadian case, R v Perrier 2004 SCC 56 (30 September 2004), reminds us about the controversy concerning whether evidence about charges on which the jury acquits the accused can be used as similar fact evidence against him on other charges considered at the same trial: see Mahoney, "Basing Convictions on Acquittals: Conjuring by the Court of Appeal" in Robertson (ed) Essays on Criminal Law: A Tribute to Professor Gerald Orchard (2004, Brookers, Wellington). Mahoney argues that a juror who is unsure that the accused committed the other offences, and who therefore would find him not guilty of them, cannot then use the evidence of those when deciding whether the accused is guilty of the offence in respect of which the prosecution says the evidence is relevant on a similar fact basis.
The New Zealand Court of Appeal has held the contrary in R v Holtz [2002] NZCA] 323, [2003] 1 NZLR 667; (2002) 20 CRNZ 14. Care is needed, as the Court pointed out in para 47:
"The care with which evidence of similar acts is scrutinised is justified because of the prejudice that inevitably arises from the risk of guilt being improperly inferred from mere propensity or disposition evidenced by previous bad conduct. But, where the evidence is truly probative and cogent, admission is appropriate so long as the circumstances are such that, while allowing the probative value of the evidence to be availed of, the risk of improper use can be avoided by appropriate directions to the jury."
Essentially the differences in these points of view is attributable to the differing standards of proof for the admission of evidence on the one hand, and the proof of guilt on the other.
In Holtz, at para 38, the Court said:
" … Where [similar fact] evidence is the only evidence or substantially the only evidence available from which the jury is asked to infer that the accused was the person who committed the offence charged, since the offence must be proved beyond reasonable doubt, the accused’s responsibility for the pattern of events necessarily must be found established beyond reasonable doubt before a verdict of guilty is justified. But that is because the offence charged must be proved beyond reasonable doubt. It is not because the similar fact evidence on which a verdict of guilty is based must be established beyond reasonable doubt before it can be used. By contrast it may be that in a particular case the evidence of pattern may be just another strand of circumstantial evidence pointing toward the accused. In that event, to require proof beyond reasonable doubt [of the similar facts], would be quite inconsistent with the proper approach to circumstantial evidence. Accordingly we do not accept as of universal application that, where identity is in issue, similar fact evidence cannot be used unless it is found to the standard of beyond reasonable doubt that the accused was responsible for the past conduct and that the same person was responsible for the offence charged…."
Mahoney agrees (p 41) that similar fact evidence is a form of circumstantial evidence, but suggests that, on the question of admissibility, similar fact evidence needs special treatment because its admission is exceptional. That said, however, Mahoney focuses his argument not on the decision as to admissibility, but rather on the way the jury should use similar fact evidence. He accepts (p 43) that jurors may have initial doubts about circumstantial evidence, and still use it in coming to their decision; but, he continues, if they find the accused guilty of the main offence, that means they must, at that point, have no doubts about the similar fact evidence:
"It is impossible to declare the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt if doubts about the circumstantial evidence remain at the end of the jury’s deliberations. Doubts about the evidence upon which a verdict is founded amount to doubts about the verdict."
The Supreme Court of Canada mentioned the topic obliquely in Perrier. As to the question of admissibility, the Court said:
"[18] … The point is that we must be cautious when using propensity evidence in the context of identity. We want to be sure, on a balance of probabilities, that the same person committed the acts in question such that we can safely say it is not a coincidence nor a case of mistaken identity."
Then,
"[23] Once the trial judge has determined that the crime charged and the similar act were likely committed by the same person, the judge must then consider whether there is evidence linking the accused to the similar act. …
If the similar facts relied upon were not in fact the acts of the accused, then they have no probative value.
"[24] The threshold is not particularly high. The trial judge must determine whether there is "some evidence" linking the accused to the similar acts. However, evidence of mere opportunity or possibility is not sufficient."
All well and good, as far as admissibility is concerned. How, then, should the jury reason if the evidence is ruled admissible? The SCC followed the English approach:
"[29] … ‘The issue for the jury, once they are satisfied that it is the same gang who have committed both groups of offences, will be whether the prosecution have established on all the admissible evidence that the particular defendant was a member of that gang and, where the prosecution say that that defendant was a member of the gang on both occasions, whether the totality of the evidence has established that beyond reasonable doubt.’ " (a quotation from R. v. Brown, [1996] E.W.J. No. 2403 (QL) (C.A.))
In Perrier it was held that the evidence should not have been admitted, and the Court did not need to examine in more detail how the jury might otherwise have properly used it. There does, however, appear to be consistency with the Mahoney approach.
It is not always necessary to go as far as Mahoney and require juries to convict on the similar fact charges if they also convict on the main charge. As was pointed out in Holtz, things that are, on the balance of probabilities, true, can combine with other evidence to establish something else beyond reasonable doubt. A jury may well be sure of the main charge and acquit on the others, as they did in Holtz. See also the entries under the heading Bayes' Theorem in the Index to this site.
[Update: see the discussion of R v Mitchell (Northern Ireland) on 21 October 2016.]
The New Zealand Court of Appeal has held the contrary in R v Holtz [2002] NZCA] 323, [2003] 1 NZLR 667; (2002) 20 CRNZ 14. Care is needed, as the Court pointed out in para 47:
"The care with which evidence of similar acts is scrutinised is justified because of the prejudice that inevitably arises from the risk of guilt being improperly inferred from mere propensity or disposition evidenced by previous bad conduct. But, where the evidence is truly probative and cogent, admission is appropriate so long as the circumstances are such that, while allowing the probative value of the evidence to be availed of, the risk of improper use can be avoided by appropriate directions to the jury."
Essentially the differences in these points of view is attributable to the differing standards of proof for the admission of evidence on the one hand, and the proof of guilt on the other.
In Holtz, at para 38, the Court said:
" … Where [similar fact] evidence is the only evidence or substantially the only evidence available from which the jury is asked to infer that the accused was the person who committed the offence charged, since the offence must be proved beyond reasonable doubt, the accused’s responsibility for the pattern of events necessarily must be found established beyond reasonable doubt before a verdict of guilty is justified. But that is because the offence charged must be proved beyond reasonable doubt. It is not because the similar fact evidence on which a verdict of guilty is based must be established beyond reasonable doubt before it can be used. By contrast it may be that in a particular case the evidence of pattern may be just another strand of circumstantial evidence pointing toward the accused. In that event, to require proof beyond reasonable doubt [of the similar facts], would be quite inconsistent with the proper approach to circumstantial evidence. Accordingly we do not accept as of universal application that, where identity is in issue, similar fact evidence cannot be used unless it is found to the standard of beyond reasonable doubt that the accused was responsible for the past conduct and that the same person was responsible for the offence charged…."
Mahoney agrees (p 41) that similar fact evidence is a form of circumstantial evidence, but suggests that, on the question of admissibility, similar fact evidence needs special treatment because its admission is exceptional. That said, however, Mahoney focuses his argument not on the decision as to admissibility, but rather on the way the jury should use similar fact evidence. He accepts (p 43) that jurors may have initial doubts about circumstantial evidence, and still use it in coming to their decision; but, he continues, if they find the accused guilty of the main offence, that means they must, at that point, have no doubts about the similar fact evidence:
"It is impossible to declare the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt if doubts about the circumstantial evidence remain at the end of the jury’s deliberations. Doubts about the evidence upon which a verdict is founded amount to doubts about the verdict."
The Supreme Court of Canada mentioned the topic obliquely in Perrier. As to the question of admissibility, the Court said:
"[18] … The point is that we must be cautious when using propensity evidence in the context of identity. We want to be sure, on a balance of probabilities, that the same person committed the acts in question such that we can safely say it is not a coincidence nor a case of mistaken identity."
Then,
"[23] Once the trial judge has determined that the crime charged and the similar act were likely committed by the same person, the judge must then consider whether there is evidence linking the accused to the similar act. …
If the similar facts relied upon were not in fact the acts of the accused, then they have no probative value.
"[24] The threshold is not particularly high. The trial judge must determine whether there is "some evidence" linking the accused to the similar acts. However, evidence of mere opportunity or possibility is not sufficient."
All well and good, as far as admissibility is concerned. How, then, should the jury reason if the evidence is ruled admissible? The SCC followed the English approach:
"[29] … ‘The issue for the jury, once they are satisfied that it is the same gang who have committed both groups of offences, will be whether the prosecution have established on all the admissible evidence that the particular defendant was a member of that gang and, where the prosecution say that that defendant was a member of the gang on both occasions, whether the totality of the evidence has established that beyond reasonable doubt.’ " (a quotation from R. v. Brown, [1996] E.W.J. No. 2403 (QL) (C.A.))
In Perrier it was held that the evidence should not have been admitted, and the Court did not need to examine in more detail how the jury might otherwise have properly used it. There does, however, appear to be consistency with the Mahoney approach.
It is not always necessary to go as far as Mahoney and require juries to convict on the similar fact charges if they also convict on the main charge. As was pointed out in Holtz, things that are, on the balance of probabilities, true, can combine with other evidence to establish something else beyond reasonable doubt. A jury may well be sure of the main charge and acquit on the others, as they did in Holtz. See also the entries under the heading Bayes' Theorem in the Index to this site.
[Update: see the discussion of R v Mitchell (Northern Ireland) on 21 October 2016.]
Sunday, October 10, 2004
Last criminal appeal to the Privy Council
The final criminal appeal from New Zealand to the Privy Council is expected to be heard early next year. The Court of Appeal decision, R v Howse (2003) 20 CRNZ 826 has already been noted in this blog for its unrestricted view of the jurisdiction of that statute-based court to hear appeals based on claims of a miscarriage of justice. That point, of course, will not be the subject of the forthcoming appeal. The appeal will hinge, we may anticipate, on whether the accused had a fair trial. If he did not, the next question will be whether an unfair trial can be cured by the proviso that notwithstanding the unfairness there was no miscarriage of justice.
On the first, and threshold, issue, whether the accused received a fair trial, the Court of Appeal was less than forthright. It found that several errors had occurred, and that these could be regarded, "…prima facie at least, as having occasioned a miscarriage of justice" (para 43). The errors concerned the admission of evidence that should have been ruled inadmissible, and the failure of the trial judge to direct the jury on how evidence of what the murdered victims had said could be used by the jury. In effect, the appellant will have to persuade the Privy Council that the errors amounted to breaches of the right to a trial according to law by an unbiased jury; in other words, the right to a fair trial. The Court of Appeal was less than forthright because it did not say directly that these errors amounted to breach of the accused’s right to a fair trial. In calling the position a prima facie miscarriage of justice, the Court treated the concept of fair trial as being subject to whether there was a miscarriage of justice.
The second question, whether an unfair trial is necessarily a miscarriage of justice, can only be treated as open if one is prepared to acknowledge that, if a court thinks that the evidence against an accused is overwhelming, trial fairness does not matter. Most people, we venture to suppose, would baulk at reaching such a conclusion. A breach of the right to a fair trial should of itself amount to a miscarriage of justice.
The usual test for whether a miscarriage of justice has occurred is whether the accused has been wrongly denied a real possibility of an acquittal through an error or errors at trial. That requirement should not apply where the trial has been unfair to the accused.
On the first, and threshold, issue, whether the accused received a fair trial, the Court of Appeal was less than forthright. It found that several errors had occurred, and that these could be regarded, "…prima facie at least, as having occasioned a miscarriage of justice" (para 43). The errors concerned the admission of evidence that should have been ruled inadmissible, and the failure of the trial judge to direct the jury on how evidence of what the murdered victims had said could be used by the jury. In effect, the appellant will have to persuade the Privy Council that the errors amounted to breaches of the right to a trial according to law by an unbiased jury; in other words, the right to a fair trial. The Court of Appeal was less than forthright because it did not say directly that these errors amounted to breach of the accused’s right to a fair trial. In calling the position a prima facie miscarriage of justice, the Court treated the concept of fair trial as being subject to whether there was a miscarriage of justice.
The second question, whether an unfair trial is necessarily a miscarriage of justice, can only be treated as open if one is prepared to acknowledge that, if a court thinks that the evidence against an accused is overwhelming, trial fairness does not matter. Most people, we venture to suppose, would baulk at reaching such a conclusion. A breach of the right to a fair trial should of itself amount to a miscarriage of justice.
The usual test for whether a miscarriage of justice has occurred is whether the accused has been wrongly denied a real possibility of an acquittal through an error or errors at trial. That requirement should not apply where the trial has been unfair to the accused.
Wednesday, October 06, 2004
The good and the bad
Although we have some reservations about the correctness of the Court of Appeal’s decision in R v Howse [2003] 3 NZLR 767; (2003) 20 CRNZ 826, it is reassuring to note a passage in the judgment that reinforces the primacy of justice over jurisdictional limitations:
"… The ultimate criterion on appeal is whether a miscarriage of justice has occurred. There cannot properly be any jurisdictional bar after trial preventing an accused from attempting to demonstrate such a miscarriage. Nor, for similar reasons, does it matter that evidence challenged on appeal was not challenged at trial. That does not jurisdictionally preclude this Court from addressing a point and giving effect to it if it has sufficient force." (para 15)
To suggest that the Court will not let itself be constrained by statutory limitations on its jurisdiction, if that constraint would lead to a miscarriage of justice, may be taking this dictum too far. However, one is reminded of the sensible approach of the House of Lords, which, when confronted with applying a statute that would have prevented a fair trial for the accused, held that the statute, although absolute in its terms, nevertheless was subject to an implied exception which the court could "read in": R v A [2002] 1 AC 45; [2001] 3 All ER 1, discussed in Mathias, "Criminal fairness in the House of Lords" [2002] NZLJ 435.
"… The ultimate criterion on appeal is whether a miscarriage of justice has occurred. There cannot properly be any jurisdictional bar after trial preventing an accused from attempting to demonstrate such a miscarriage. Nor, for similar reasons, does it matter that evidence challenged on appeal was not challenged at trial. That does not jurisdictionally preclude this Court from addressing a point and giving effect to it if it has sufficient force." (para 15)
To suggest that the Court will not let itself be constrained by statutory limitations on its jurisdiction, if that constraint would lead to a miscarriage of justice, may be taking this dictum too far. However, one is reminded of the sensible approach of the House of Lords, which, when confronted with applying a statute that would have prevented a fair trial for the accused, held that the statute, although absolute in its terms, nevertheless was subject to an implied exception which the court could "read in": R v A [2002] 1 AC 45; [2001] 3 All ER 1, discussed in Mathias, "Criminal fairness in the House of Lords" [2002] NZLJ 435.
Monday, October 04, 2004
Who informed?
A recently reported case, although decided over a year ago, on 24 July 2003, illustrates how pressure of time can result in the Court of Appeal accepting unsoundly based submissions; R v De Bruin (2003) 20 CRNZ 782 (CA). The judgment was delivered the day after argument, because this was a pre-trial appeal and the trial was due to start within a short time.
The defence wanted to ask the police at trial who it was who had acted as a police informer, because grounds for attacking the credibility of that person may then have been apparent to the defence. It is only in rare cases that the identity of an informer will be a relevant matter, as for example where the informer may have planted evidence against the accused, or where the informer was in fact the offender and is seeking to pass blame on to the accused.Normally, if the police refuse to disclose information about an informer prior to trial, an application can be made by the defence for a court order for disclosure. Such an application will rely on the court’s inherent jurisdiction, in which case there is no right of appeal; it could not be made under s 344A of the Crimes Act 1961, which carries a right of appeal to the Court of Appeal, because until disclosure is made there is no evidence about which a ruling as to admissibility can be sought: R v Moore [2001] 2 NZLR 761; (2001) 18 CRNZ 519 (CA).
In De Bruin the Crown invited counsel for the defence to take the 344A approach, and in due course that was done. The invitation may have been disingenuous, because in the Court of Appeal the Crown changed its tack, arguing that:
"The essence of public interest immunity is that it protects from disclosure information which is otherwise relevant and admissible. The informer’s identity is admissible but protected."
Of course at the stage at which this application was made, the trial was imminent, and the question was whether evidence of the informer’s identity could be elicited at trial, not whether it should be disclosed to the defence prior to trial. The Crown was deflecting the Court from the issue of the admissibility of an answer that a question at trial would elicit, by suggesting there was no issue about admissibility for the court to rule on under s 344A..
The Crown’s submission was, essentially, an argument that the informer’s identity could not be the subject of a 344A application or an appeal pre-trial because the issue was not the admissibility of the evidence of the identity of the informer; rather, suggested the Crown, the issue was for the trial judge, and was whether public interest immunity should be declined. That is, it was a matter for the trial judge in the exercise of the inherent power to prevent an abuse of process.
Unfortunately, the Court accepted this submission. However, the submission was flawed. If the identity of the informer was "protected", it was inadmissible at trial; the real Crown submission was that although the informer’s identity was relevant, it should be ruled inadmissible. Indeed, in apparently conceding relevance (by accepting admissibility), the Crown could have been taken to be admitting that disclosure would assist the defence at trial.
If correct, the Crown’s submission would mean that no ruling about evidence that was sought to be excluded under the court’s inherent power to prevent an abuse of process would be a ruling about admissibility, because it would be a ruling about the discretionary exclusion of admissible evidence. In fact, such issues are routinely dealt with as admissibility issues and rulings are the subject of appeals. The usual construction of the legislation involves using the concept of admissibility in a broad sense: if the jury cannot learn of evidence, that is because it is "inadmissible", even though, technically, it is "admissible but excluded pursuant to the court’s inherent jurisdiction."
Analysing decisions into admissibility decisions, and decisions about the discretionary exclusion of admissible evidence, is useful in the context of determining the procedural rules concerning the operation of the discretion, but such analysis is not appropriate as an aid to statutory interpretation of s 344A.If the defence had used s 344A itself, applying for an order that questions it proposed to ask the appropriate witness (possibly the officer in charge of the case) would yield admissible evidence, the position would have been clear.
Another aspect of De Bruin is objectionable, although the Court can hardly be criticised for not anticipating the way the House of Lords would develop the law in R v H [2004] UKHL 3 (5 February 2004). In De Bruin it was presumed that the information could be withheld from the defence, subject to the defence satisfying the court that disclosure was necessary in the interests of trial fairness. In contrast, R v H held that full disclosure is to be presumed to be appropriate, and it is for the Crown to satisfy the court that information should be withheld; furthermore, if withholding of the evidence is permitted, the question then is whether the result would be a fair trial for the accused. If there would be unfairness to the accused, disclosure must be ordered even though the prosecution may then decide not to proceed with the case.
See also: Mathias, "Public interest immunity and fairness to the accused" [2004] NZLJ 301.
The defence wanted to ask the police at trial who it was who had acted as a police informer, because grounds for attacking the credibility of that person may then have been apparent to the defence. It is only in rare cases that the identity of an informer will be a relevant matter, as for example where the informer may have planted evidence against the accused, or where the informer was in fact the offender and is seeking to pass blame on to the accused.Normally, if the police refuse to disclose information about an informer prior to trial, an application can be made by the defence for a court order for disclosure. Such an application will rely on the court’s inherent jurisdiction, in which case there is no right of appeal; it could not be made under s 344A of the Crimes Act 1961, which carries a right of appeal to the Court of Appeal, because until disclosure is made there is no evidence about which a ruling as to admissibility can be sought: R v Moore [2001] 2 NZLR 761; (2001) 18 CRNZ 519 (CA).
In De Bruin the Crown invited counsel for the defence to take the 344A approach, and in due course that was done. The invitation may have been disingenuous, because in the Court of Appeal the Crown changed its tack, arguing that:
"The essence of public interest immunity is that it protects from disclosure information which is otherwise relevant and admissible. The informer’s identity is admissible but protected."
Of course at the stage at which this application was made, the trial was imminent, and the question was whether evidence of the informer’s identity could be elicited at trial, not whether it should be disclosed to the defence prior to trial. The Crown was deflecting the Court from the issue of the admissibility of an answer that a question at trial would elicit, by suggesting there was no issue about admissibility for the court to rule on under s 344A..
The Crown’s submission was, essentially, an argument that the informer’s identity could not be the subject of a 344A application or an appeal pre-trial because the issue was not the admissibility of the evidence of the identity of the informer; rather, suggested the Crown, the issue was for the trial judge, and was whether public interest immunity should be declined. That is, it was a matter for the trial judge in the exercise of the inherent power to prevent an abuse of process.
Unfortunately, the Court accepted this submission. However, the submission was flawed. If the identity of the informer was "protected", it was inadmissible at trial; the real Crown submission was that although the informer’s identity was relevant, it should be ruled inadmissible. Indeed, in apparently conceding relevance (by accepting admissibility), the Crown could have been taken to be admitting that disclosure would assist the defence at trial.
If correct, the Crown’s submission would mean that no ruling about evidence that was sought to be excluded under the court’s inherent power to prevent an abuse of process would be a ruling about admissibility, because it would be a ruling about the discretionary exclusion of admissible evidence. In fact, such issues are routinely dealt with as admissibility issues and rulings are the subject of appeals. The usual construction of the legislation involves using the concept of admissibility in a broad sense: if the jury cannot learn of evidence, that is because it is "inadmissible", even though, technically, it is "admissible but excluded pursuant to the court’s inherent jurisdiction."
Analysing decisions into admissibility decisions, and decisions about the discretionary exclusion of admissible evidence, is useful in the context of determining the procedural rules concerning the operation of the discretion, but such analysis is not appropriate as an aid to statutory interpretation of s 344A.If the defence had used s 344A itself, applying for an order that questions it proposed to ask the appropriate witness (possibly the officer in charge of the case) would yield admissible evidence, the position would have been clear.
Another aspect of De Bruin is objectionable, although the Court can hardly be criticised for not anticipating the way the House of Lords would develop the law in R v H [2004] UKHL 3 (5 February 2004). In De Bruin it was presumed that the information could be withheld from the defence, subject to the defence satisfying the court that disclosure was necessary in the interests of trial fairness. In contrast, R v H held that full disclosure is to be presumed to be appropriate, and it is for the Crown to satisfy the court that information should be withheld; furthermore, if withholding of the evidence is permitted, the question then is whether the result would be a fair trial for the accused. If there would be unfairness to the accused, disclosure must be ordered even though the prosecution may then decide not to proceed with the case.
See also: Mathias, "Public interest immunity and fairness to the accused" [2004] NZLJ 301.
Sunday, September 26, 2004
Formalism and pragmatism
Readers of Richard A Posner's "The Principles of Jurisprudence" (1990, Harvard University Press) will be well acquainted with his criticism of legal formalism. Essentially, formalism regards the law as containing answers to all the problems it will encounter, whereas pragmatism recognises that judges have to look outside the law for just solutions to legal problems.
One might ask, is Shaheed formalist or pragmatic? It is criticised by those who would wish the issue of admissibility of evidence obtained through a breach of the accused's rights to be determined by application of rules. An appropriate rule, they argue, would be that evidence obtained in breach of the accused's rights is inadmissible. Plainly, such arguments suppose the law to be formalist. If, therefore, Shaheed itself is formalist, there appears to be a contradiction in its critics' arguments. They cannot criticise it for not being what it is.
The ultimate question pursuant to Shaheed is whether exclusion of the evidence would be a proportionate response to the breach of rights through which it was obtained. This amounts to weighing the seriousness of the alleged offending against the seriousness of the wrong suffered by the accused. We therefore have to decide whether these matters are best assessed in formalist, or in pragmatic, terms.
The seriousness of the alleged offending is precedent-determined in the light of the legislation creating the offence and the penalty. Precedents for sentencing incorporate the relevant policy considerations. In the absence of precedent as a guide to the seriousness of the offence, courts would be guided by the maximum penalty and the legislation relating to sentencing. In other words, the answer to assessing the seriousness of the offence lies within the bounds of the law: it is a formalist issue.
The seriousness of the wrong done to the accused is also precedent-determined. This is because a large body of case law has developed around the consequences of wrongful conduct of the authorities in the obtaining of evidence, both before and after the enactment of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990. The importance of the infringed right is determined in formalist terms.
It may be, that in the absence of any precedent or principles in the common law, the courts will have to take a more pragmatic approach to the assessment of this balance, but once that is done in a new case, the requirements of stare decisis dictate that formalism will become the appropriate approach to similar subsequent cases. Precedent requires that the application of Shaheed rapidly becomes formalised.
Critics of Shaheed who, rightly - although Posner would disagree - reject pragmatism, and who insist on formalism, should agree with Shaheed. What they really object to is judicial discretion. They fear arbitrariness. However, discretion in the context of formalism is not lawlessness. The Supreme Court of the United States has recently, in Hamdi v Rumsfeld (see last blog), taken a formalist stand, upholding fundamental legal values in the face of the exigencies of present times.
One might ask, is Shaheed formalist or pragmatic? It is criticised by those who would wish the issue of admissibility of evidence obtained through a breach of the accused's rights to be determined by application of rules. An appropriate rule, they argue, would be that evidence obtained in breach of the accused's rights is inadmissible. Plainly, such arguments suppose the law to be formalist. If, therefore, Shaheed itself is formalist, there appears to be a contradiction in its critics' arguments. They cannot criticise it for not being what it is.
The ultimate question pursuant to Shaheed is whether exclusion of the evidence would be a proportionate response to the breach of rights through which it was obtained. This amounts to weighing the seriousness of the alleged offending against the seriousness of the wrong suffered by the accused. We therefore have to decide whether these matters are best assessed in formalist, or in pragmatic, terms.
The seriousness of the alleged offending is precedent-determined in the light of the legislation creating the offence and the penalty. Precedents for sentencing incorporate the relevant policy considerations. In the absence of precedent as a guide to the seriousness of the offence, courts would be guided by the maximum penalty and the legislation relating to sentencing. In other words, the answer to assessing the seriousness of the offence lies within the bounds of the law: it is a formalist issue.
The seriousness of the wrong done to the accused is also precedent-determined. This is because a large body of case law has developed around the consequences of wrongful conduct of the authorities in the obtaining of evidence, both before and after the enactment of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990. The importance of the infringed right is determined in formalist terms.
It may be, that in the absence of any precedent or principles in the common law, the courts will have to take a more pragmatic approach to the assessment of this balance, but once that is done in a new case, the requirements of stare decisis dictate that formalism will become the appropriate approach to similar subsequent cases. Precedent requires that the application of Shaheed rapidly becomes formalised.
Critics of Shaheed who, rightly - although Posner would disagree - reject pragmatism, and who insist on formalism, should agree with Shaheed. What they really object to is judicial discretion. They fear arbitrariness. However, discretion in the context of formalism is not lawlessness. The Supreme Court of the United States has recently, in Hamdi v Rumsfeld (see last blog), taken a formalist stand, upholding fundamental legal values in the face of the exigencies of present times.
Tuesday, September 21, 2004
Just hearings for detained "enemy combatants"
In Hamdi v Rumsfeld, 542 US 507 (28 June 2004) the Supreme Court grappled with the rights of a detained man, allegedly an "enemy combatant" in the face of his application for release. The Supreme Court analysed the problem as a conflict between "the private interest that will be affected by the official action" against the Government’s asserted interest, "including the function involved." It will be noted that the problem is thought of, not as a triangulation of interests, but as a conflict between two interests.
The plurality of the Court recognised,
"…as critical as the Government’s interest may be in detaining those who actually pose an immediate threat to the national security of the United States during ongoing international conflict, history and common sense teach us that an unchecked system of detention carries the potential to become a means for oppression and abuse of others who do not present that sort of threat."
And further,
"Striking the proper constitutional balance here is of great importance to the Nation during this period of ongoing combat. But it is equally vital that our calculus not give short shrift to the values that this country holds dear or to the privilege that is American citizenship. It is during our most challenging and uncertain moments that our Nation’s commitment to due process is most severely tested; and it is in those times that we must preserve our commitment at home to the principles for which we fight abroad… . We therefore hold that a citizen-detainee seeking to challenge his classification as an enemy combatant must receive notice of the factual basis for his classification, and a fair opportunity to rebut the Government’s factual assertions before a neutral decisionmaker."
On the other hand,
"… the exigencies of the circumstances may demand that, aside from these core elements, enemy combatant proceedings may be tailored to alleviate their uncommon potential to burden the Executive at a time of ongoing military conflict. Hearsay, for example, may need to be accepted as the most reliable available evidence from the Government in such a proceeding. Likewise, the Constitution would not be offended by a presumption in favor of the Government’s evidence, so long as that presumption remained a rebuttable one and fair opportunity for rebuttal were provided. Thus, once the Government puts forth credible evidence that the habeas petitioner meets the enemy-combatant criteria, the onus could shift to the petitioner to rebut that evidence with more persuasive evidence that he falls outside the criteria. A burden-shifting scheme of this sort would meet the goal of ensuring that the errant tourist, embedded journalist, or local aid worker has a chance to prove military error while giving due regard to the Executive once it has put forth meaningful support for its conclusion that the detainee is in fact an enemy combatant."
The parties were left to devise an appropriate form of procedure. The plurality recognised that the tribunal could be military, and that it might require an onus on the accused, and that full disclosure of the Government’s evidence need not necessarily be made to the accused. Hearsay may be permitted, and even a brief summary based on hearsay may be sufficient for the Government to put the accused to disproof.
Ronald Dworkin has commented on the extra-ordinariness of the placing of the burden of proof on the accused, and on the difficulties that he may confront even if assisted by counsel: http://www.nybooks.com/articles/17293.
Clearly, in times of war, the law must be practical. A solution might be found in adopting, or adapting, the Continental system of pre-trial investigation involving the proces verbal and the dossier, and the trial system of intime conviction (when conviction raisonee is inappropriate). It is possible to have a respectable justice system that does not involve full disclosure, that is not averse to hearsay evidence, and that does not involve adversorial procedure in the sense that term is understood in the Anglo-American legal tradition. In the Continental system the judge must ask himself whether, as a matter of conscience and good faith, he is "personally convinced" of the truth of the prosecutor’s allegation. The difficulty is whether that state of mind can exist where the defence has not had full access to, or opportunity to challenge, the evidence presented by the prosecution.
The plurality of the Court recognised,
"…as critical as the Government’s interest may be in detaining those who actually pose an immediate threat to the national security of the United States during ongoing international conflict, history and common sense teach us that an unchecked system of detention carries the potential to become a means for oppression and abuse of others who do not present that sort of threat."
And further,
"Striking the proper constitutional balance here is of great importance to the Nation during this period of ongoing combat. But it is equally vital that our calculus not give short shrift to the values that this country holds dear or to the privilege that is American citizenship. It is during our most challenging and uncertain moments that our Nation’s commitment to due process is most severely tested; and it is in those times that we must preserve our commitment at home to the principles for which we fight abroad… . We therefore hold that a citizen-detainee seeking to challenge his classification as an enemy combatant must receive notice of the factual basis for his classification, and a fair opportunity to rebut the Government’s factual assertions before a neutral decisionmaker."
On the other hand,
"… the exigencies of the circumstances may demand that, aside from these core elements, enemy combatant proceedings may be tailored to alleviate their uncommon potential to burden the Executive at a time of ongoing military conflict. Hearsay, for example, may need to be accepted as the most reliable available evidence from the Government in such a proceeding. Likewise, the Constitution would not be offended by a presumption in favor of the Government’s evidence, so long as that presumption remained a rebuttable one and fair opportunity for rebuttal were provided. Thus, once the Government puts forth credible evidence that the habeas petitioner meets the enemy-combatant criteria, the onus could shift to the petitioner to rebut that evidence with more persuasive evidence that he falls outside the criteria. A burden-shifting scheme of this sort would meet the goal of ensuring that the errant tourist, embedded journalist, or local aid worker has a chance to prove military error while giving due regard to the Executive once it has put forth meaningful support for its conclusion that the detainee is in fact an enemy combatant."
The parties were left to devise an appropriate form of procedure. The plurality recognised that the tribunal could be military, and that it might require an onus on the accused, and that full disclosure of the Government’s evidence need not necessarily be made to the accused. Hearsay may be permitted, and even a brief summary based on hearsay may be sufficient for the Government to put the accused to disproof.
Ronald Dworkin has commented on the extra-ordinariness of the placing of the burden of proof on the accused, and on the difficulties that he may confront even if assisted by counsel: http://www.nybooks.com/articles/17293.
Clearly, in times of war, the law must be practical. A solution might be found in adopting, or adapting, the Continental system of pre-trial investigation involving the proces verbal and the dossier, and the trial system of intime conviction (when conviction raisonee is inappropriate). It is possible to have a respectable justice system that does not involve full disclosure, that is not averse to hearsay evidence, and that does not involve adversorial procedure in the sense that term is understood in the Anglo-American legal tradition. In the Continental system the judge must ask himself whether, as a matter of conscience and good faith, he is "personally convinced" of the truth of the prosecutor’s allegation. The difficulty is whether that state of mind can exist where the defence has not had full access to, or opportunity to challenge, the evidence presented by the prosecution.
Thursday, September 16, 2004
Policy and recognition of defences
The flexibility of the common law is such that policy prevails when recognition of new defences is in issue. Illustrating this is Behrooz v Secretary of the Department of Immigration [2004] HCA 36 (6 August 2004). The issue was whether it would be a defence to a charge of escaping detention as an illegal immigrant that the conditions of detention were inhumane. The 6-judge majority of the High Court of Australia held that no such defence, amounting to a right to escape, could be recognised. Kirby J, dissenting, held that the common law permitted such a defence. The parties recognised that this was not a case where the facts supported a defence of necessity.
It would be wrong in principle to exhalt any single dissenting judgment in cases where the split is so uneven, but this case shows how contrasting use may be made of considerations such as existing common law, the relationship between courts and the legislature (under Australia's Constitution), international law, and the limitations of practical reality as far as alternative remedies for detainees are concerned.
It would be wrong in principle to exhalt any single dissenting judgment in cases where the split is so uneven, but this case shows how contrasting use may be made of considerations such as existing common law, the relationship between courts and the legislature (under Australia's Constitution), international law, and the limitations of practical reality as far as alternative remedies for detainees are concerned.
Tuesday, September 14, 2004
Fairness and access to witnesses
In USA v Moussaoui USCA 4th Circuit No 03-4792, 13 September 2004, the prosecution refused to permit the accused access to three detainees whom he wanted to call as witnesses. The detainees were (are) under interrogation, and according to the prosecution it would not be in the public interest to interrupt that process. The Court recognised that fundamental questions arose here, including the accused's constitutional right to a fair trial. The parties were ordered to try to negotiate a satisfactory procedure.
Here, the issue of the right to present a defence was essentially that dealt with, on different facts, in R v B [1995] 2 NZLR 172 (CA) and R v Griffin [2001] 3 NZLR 577 (CA). It may be, upon careful analysis of the circumstances, a fair procedure can be devised; but if not, the proceedings should be stayed, at least until such time as adequate access to witnesses is granted to the accused.
Here, the issue of the right to present a defence was essentially that dealt with, on different facts, in R v B [1995] 2 NZLR 172 (CA) and R v Griffin [2001] 3 NZLR 577 (CA). It may be, upon careful analysis of the circumstances, a fair procedure can be devised; but if not, the proceedings should be stayed, at least until such time as adequate access to witnesses is granted to the accused.
Interception and search
The extension of warrants to intercept private communications, from oral to any form of communication, pursuant to s 35 and Schedule 2 of the Crimes Amendment Act 2003[NZ], has not drawn all private communications within the same warrant procedure. This is because, as the Court noted in R v C 5/8/04, CA184/04, the new legislation only covers, because of its definition of "intercept", interceptions that occur while the communication is taking place or is in transit. Therefore, records of text messages retained by a service provider can be seized under a search warrant but not under an interception warrant. Of course, a search warrant cannot be issued for material that does not exist at the time the warrant is sought.
What, one might wonder, is the position in relation to email messages that have not been received by their intended recipient? Until received, the records of them held by the service provider are not records of completed communications, so their "in transit" quality appears to make the interception warrant procedure applicable. They may, however, be received between the application for the interception warrant and its being used, in which case a search warrant would be needed. Plainly, the police will have to seek both types of warrant in such cases.
Does this mean the police need to have reasonable grounds to believe that a communication has both been received and not been received?
What, one might wonder, is the position in relation to email messages that have not been received by their intended recipient? Until received, the records of them held by the service provider are not records of completed communications, so their "in transit" quality appears to make the interception warrant procedure applicable. They may, however, be received between the application for the interception warrant and its being used, in which case a search warrant would be needed. Plainly, the police will have to seek both types of warrant in such cases.
Does this mean the police need to have reasonable grounds to believe that a communication has both been received and not been received?
Thursday, September 09, 2004
Applying Shaheed: principles
For an article on three principles to use in applying Shaheed, see this link ...
Monday, September 06, 2004
The prosecution has to prove guilt; does it also have to prove its evidence is admissible?
One would have thought, prior to R v P 11/6/04, CA102/04, that if the defence advanced grounds for disputing the admissibility of prosecution evidence, then the prosecution would have to satisfy the court that its evidence was indeed admissible. The party adducing evidence should have to establish that such evidence is admissible. The same applies, one would have thought, to defence evidence: if the prosecution advances proper grounds for objecting to its admission, the defence should have to establish the admissibility of the evidence it proposes to use.
Not so, we now are told in P. The court likened the pre-trial procedure for obtaining rulings on admissibility under s 344A of the Crimes Act 1961, to civil proceedings to review a determination on the issue. The result should be the same, said the Court, as far as the burden of establishing the issue is concerned. Therefore, said the Court, under s 344A the defence must satisfy the judge that the evidence is not admissible.
The likening of the two kinds of proceedings is fallacious. The wording of s 344A is such that it requires the party seeking to adduce the evidence (usually, but not necessarily, the Crown) to obtain an order that its evidence is admissible. The court needs to be satisfied that the evidence is admissible before it can make the order. By contrast, in civil proceedings for review of an order admitting evidence, the party objecting to admission of the evidence (usually - not that this form of procedure is often used, for obvious reasons - the accused) has the burden of persuading the court that the order of the court below was erroneous. The party with the burden is different, according to which form of procedure is used.
It is unlikely that s 344A was introduced in order to put the burden of persuading the court on the accused, contrary to the plain meaning of its words.
The better view, it is respectfully suggested, is that of the Privy Council in Mohammed v The State [1999] 2 AC 111, holding that when there is an issue of breach of rights, the prosecution has to prove beyond reasonable doubt that there was no breach. If it cannot do so, and if the issue is the fairness of the trial, then the evidence cannot be admitted; but if the issue is compliance with some other, non-absolute right, then a balancing exercise is required. Only in the latter case, where balancing occurs, are the notions of burden and standard of proof on the issue of admissibility inappropriate. That point is only reached, however, after the prosecution has been unable to exclude a reasonable possibility that a breach of rights occurred.
Not so, we now are told in P. The court likened the pre-trial procedure for obtaining rulings on admissibility under s 344A of the Crimes Act 1961, to civil proceedings to review a determination on the issue. The result should be the same, said the Court, as far as the burden of establishing the issue is concerned. Therefore, said the Court, under s 344A the defence must satisfy the judge that the evidence is not admissible.
The likening of the two kinds of proceedings is fallacious. The wording of s 344A is such that it requires the party seeking to adduce the evidence (usually, but not necessarily, the Crown) to obtain an order that its evidence is admissible. The court needs to be satisfied that the evidence is admissible before it can make the order. By contrast, in civil proceedings for review of an order admitting evidence, the party objecting to admission of the evidence (usually - not that this form of procedure is often used, for obvious reasons - the accused) has the burden of persuading the court that the order of the court below was erroneous. The party with the burden is different, according to which form of procedure is used.
It is unlikely that s 344A was introduced in order to put the burden of persuading the court on the accused, contrary to the plain meaning of its words.
The better view, it is respectfully suggested, is that of the Privy Council in Mohammed v The State [1999] 2 AC 111, holding that when there is an issue of breach of rights, the prosecution has to prove beyond reasonable doubt that there was no breach. If it cannot do so, and if the issue is the fairness of the trial, then the evidence cannot be admitted; but if the issue is compliance with some other, non-absolute right, then a balancing exercise is required. Only in the latter case, where balancing occurs, are the notions of burden and standard of proof on the issue of admissibility inappropriate. That point is only reached, however, after the prosecution has been unable to exclude a reasonable possibility that a breach of rights occurred.
Saturday, September 04, 2004
Between finding evidence and getting a search warrant: illegal police occupancy of premises
A recent decision illustrates problems that arise because of a gap in the law. It also illustrates how judicial reasoning can be uninformative.
When a statutory power of warrantless search for drugs has come to an end, but stolen property has been discovered, the need for a search warrant to seize that property creates a gap in the continuity of lawful police action if they remain, without permission of the occupier, on the property pending grant of the search warrant. The consequences of this hiatus for the admissibility of the evidence of discovery of the stolen property was considered by the NZCA in R v H 25/8/04, CA233/04. On the facts of that case, the actions of the police in remaining in a garage attached to a dwellinghouse and sorting through property found there while they waited for the search warrant to be obtained, was held to be unlawful but reasonable. The Court held that even if the conduct was unreasonable the evidence would be admissible under the Shaheed balancing test as no adverse consequences flowed from the unreasonable conduct. What had occurred was merely a technical failure in the means used by the police to secure and preserve the evidence.
Plainly the decision is correct on the facts of the case. Readers may wonder what the Court meant when it said that no adverse consequences flowed from the conduct of the police. The Court does not elaborate, but presumably it envisages situations where police presence caused some loss to the accused, such as inability to earn a legitimate income during that period, or perhaps some extra-ordinary disruption to the legitimate daily routine of the occupier.
Shaheed requires that exclusion of the evidence should be a proportionate response to the misconduct. The difficulty that arises in judicial reasoning when the court proceeds to consider what the consequences would be if the search had been found to be unreasonably conducted, is that there are no facts in the case to illustrate such a finding, because the conduct that was found to have occurred was reasonable. To say that if the court had found the search to have been unreasonable, the balance would nevertheless favour admission of the evidence, tells us nothing about how the balancing exercise works because there are no illustrative facts.
When a statutory power of warrantless search for drugs has come to an end, but stolen property has been discovered, the need for a search warrant to seize that property creates a gap in the continuity of lawful police action if they remain, without permission of the occupier, on the property pending grant of the search warrant. The consequences of this hiatus for the admissibility of the evidence of discovery of the stolen property was considered by the NZCA in R v H 25/8/04, CA233/04. On the facts of that case, the actions of the police in remaining in a garage attached to a dwellinghouse and sorting through property found there while they waited for the search warrant to be obtained, was held to be unlawful but reasonable. The Court held that even if the conduct was unreasonable the evidence would be admissible under the Shaheed balancing test as no adverse consequences flowed from the unreasonable conduct. What had occurred was merely a technical failure in the means used by the police to secure and preserve the evidence.
Plainly the decision is correct on the facts of the case. Readers may wonder what the Court meant when it said that no adverse consequences flowed from the conduct of the police. The Court does not elaborate, but presumably it envisages situations where police presence caused some loss to the accused, such as inability to earn a legitimate income during that period, or perhaps some extra-ordinary disruption to the legitimate daily routine of the occupier.
Shaheed requires that exclusion of the evidence should be a proportionate response to the misconduct. The difficulty that arises in judicial reasoning when the court proceeds to consider what the consequences would be if the search had been found to be unreasonably conducted, is that there are no facts in the case to illustrate such a finding, because the conduct that was found to have occurred was reasonable. To say that if the court had found the search to have been unreasonable, the balance would nevertheless favour admission of the evidence, tells us nothing about how the balancing exercise works because there are no illustrative facts.
Friday, September 03, 2004
The triangulation of interests fallacy
Some criminal courts apply a model that they call a "triangulation of interests" when they purport to determine whether a course of action would be fair to the accused. According to this model, which is flawed, the interests of the accused are balanced against those of the community and those of the victim. It is false to suggest that a fair trial for the accused is not a community interest. Fair trials for accused persons is so important that the community, through its laws, recognises that the prosecution must prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt before a conviction can be entered. Similarly, fair treatment for victims is also an important community interest. However, criminal trials are different from civil trials in an important respect. In civil cases fairness can be a matter of triangulation of interests. That may mean that proceedings have to continue notwithstanding some forensic disadvantage to a party. The court, in these cases, has the task of ensuring any such disadvantages do not amount to civil unfairness in a triangulated sense, and of staying the proceedings if there is no other way of avoiding an unfair trial.
But in criminal cases, the accused's right to procedural fairness is the dominant, or basic, concern. In contrast, the prosecution may have to accept some unfairness, for example where probative evidence against the accused is ruled inadmissible for public policy reasons. It is often said that if an accused cannot be tried fairly then he should not be tried at all. Triangulation is not an appropriate method of determining unfairness to the accused, but unfortunately this point has not always been clear.
But in criminal cases, the accused's right to procedural fairness is the dominant, or basic, concern. In contrast, the prosecution may have to accept some unfairness, for example where probative evidence against the accused is ruled inadmissible for public policy reasons. It is often said that if an accused cannot be tried fairly then he should not be tried at all. Triangulation is not an appropriate method of determining unfairness to the accused, but unfortunately this point has not always been clear.
In R v A (No 2) [2002] 1 AC 45 (HL) at 65 Lord Steyn acknowledged the absolute nature of the accused's right to a fair trial, and that a conviction obtained in breach of this right cannot stand (citing R v Forbes [2001] 1 AC 473, 487 para 24). He referred to the balancing exercise as being directed at what a fair trial entails. This asks us to contemplate a triangulation process to determine what course is appropriate, and to use that to define the procedural fairness of the trial from the accused's point of view. One might wonder whether, if the meaning of "fair trial" is determined by balancing, the right to a fair trial can really be said to be absolute.
Another variation on the triangulation model was used in Mohammed v The State [1999] 2 AC 111 (PC), in which Lord Steyn was a member of the Board. The model used in this case envisages the balancing exercise as applicable to rights that are "lesser" than the accused's right to procedural fairness, but in respect of the latter right no balancing is permitted because his right is absolute. This seems to leave intact the meaning of "fair trial" but without saying what that meaning is.
There is, unfortunately, some evidence of a drift back to a flawed approach whereby fairness to the accused is seen as something that can be diminished (derogated from). In R(Ullah) v Special Adjudicator [2004] UKHL 26 (17 June 2004) Lord Steyn, in some obiter comments in para 44 that were, it is respectfully suggested, unfortunate, said that the rights in Article 6 of the Convention (which include the accused's right to a fair trial) are subject to derogation in time of war or public emergency, in which circumstances a triangulation of interests arose. It is difficult to see what relevance extreme conditions have to the ordinary administration of the law. The other Law Lords did not refer to this point, and Lord Carswell, said (carefully) that he agreed with what Lord Steyn and Lord Bingham said about Articles 2,4,5,7 and 8 (ie omitting 6). Lord Bingham referred to the need for a "flagrant" denial of the right to a fair trial, but he effectively said in para 24 that that means that there must be a strong case for the claim that there would be unfairness. Baroness Hale rather briefly, and confusingly, said she agreed with Lords Bingham, Steyn and Carswell.
For an update, see my tribute to Lord Bingham in this commentary, 16 September 2010.
Another variation on the triangulation model was used in Mohammed v The State [1999] 2 AC 111 (PC), in which Lord Steyn was a member of the Board. The model used in this case envisages the balancing exercise as applicable to rights that are "lesser" than the accused's right to procedural fairness, but in respect of the latter right no balancing is permitted because his right is absolute. This seems to leave intact the meaning of "fair trial" but without saying what that meaning is.
There is, unfortunately, some evidence of a drift back to a flawed approach whereby fairness to the accused is seen as something that can be diminished (derogated from). In R(Ullah) v Special Adjudicator [2004] UKHL 26 (17 June 2004) Lord Steyn, in some obiter comments in para 44 that were, it is respectfully suggested, unfortunate, said that the rights in Article 6 of the Convention (which include the accused's right to a fair trial) are subject to derogation in time of war or public emergency, in which circumstances a triangulation of interests arose. It is difficult to see what relevance extreme conditions have to the ordinary administration of the law. The other Law Lords did not refer to this point, and Lord Carswell, said (carefully) that he agreed with what Lord Steyn and Lord Bingham said about Articles 2,4,5,7 and 8 (ie omitting 6). Lord Bingham referred to the need for a "flagrant" denial of the right to a fair trial, but he effectively said in para 24 that that means that there must be a strong case for the claim that there would be unfairness. Baroness Hale rather briefly, and confusingly, said she agreed with Lords Bingham, Steyn and Carswell.
For an update, see my tribute to Lord Bingham in this commentary, 16 September 2010.
Friday, August 27, 2004
Is partial fairness acceptable?
In USA v Barnette [2004] UKHL 37 (22 July 2004) the House of Lords considered the problem of whether a judgment from a foreign court should be enforced in the UK although that foreign judgment may have arisen from proceedings that were unfair to the party opposing enforcement. As it turned out, the HL decided that the foreign court proceedings did not involve unfairness, so consideration of the problem was obiter. However, of interest is the question of whether degrees of unfairness may be tolerated. Parts of Barnette refer to the need for a "flagrant" or "gross" denial of fairness, and the need for "an extreme degree" of unfairness.
It is suggested that a distinction exists between degrees of risk of unfairness, which is a proper consideration, and degrees of unfairness, which is a fallacy. Dicta relied on in Barnette refer to the threshold that needs to be met before the court will act to prevent a breach, in other words, how sure the court needs to be that a breach of fair trial rights had occurred. Some rights are subject to qualification, and in relation to those it may be correct to refer to a gross denial of them, but the right to a fair trial is recognised as fundamental, primary and absolute. References to flagrant breaches or gross breaches of the right to a fair trial should be read as meaning breaches which are clearly demonstrated and not merely speculative.
It is suggested that a distinction exists between degrees of risk of unfairness, which is a proper consideration, and degrees of unfairness, which is a fallacy. Dicta relied on in Barnette refer to the threshold that needs to be met before the court will act to prevent a breach, in other words, how sure the court needs to be that a breach of fair trial rights had occurred. Some rights are subject to qualification, and in relation to those it may be correct to refer to a gross denial of them, but the right to a fair trial is recognised as fundamental, primary and absolute. References to flagrant breaches or gross breaches of the right to a fair trial should be read as meaning breaches which are clearly demonstrated and not merely speculative.
Thursday, August 26, 2004
Personal searches on suspicion
The common law has constrained the ability of police officers to search suspects, the greatest power being in relation to suspects who have been arrested. Arrested people may be searched if there is a possibility that a weapon will be found, in the interests of preventing harm. There has been no general common law power to search people, and where powers of search exist they have been created by statute. For example, s 202B of the Crimes Act 1961 [NZ] allows a police officer to search a person if there are reasonable grounds to believe that an offensive weapon will be found.
The Supreme Court of Canada in Mann v R [2004] SCC 52 (23 July 2004) has changed the common law by permitting a police officer to "pat down" a person if the officer can (if challenged to do so in court) articulate a reason why such a procedure was necessary to protect the safety of the officer. Such "pat down" searches occur without necessarily involving the detention of the person, and consequently rights that come into play upon detention do not arise. The officer must, of course, be acting in execution of duty in speaking to the person, and this includes the general duty to prevent and investigate crime. The person need not therefore be suspected of committing an offence.
Plainly, while it is sensible to allow officers to ensure their own safety while they act within the law, difficult issues of fact may arise because of the fine line between patting down and ascertaining the contents of a pocket. Such a line was breached in Mann, where the officer reached into a pocket where he had detected something soft (which turned out to be a bag of cannabis); he had gone beyond acting to secure his safety. There could easily be disputes over whether the person consented to revealing what was in his pocket, although it must be acknowledged that the courts are used to determining such disputes. It is, of course, inherently unlikely that a person would give free consent to a search, if he knew that the officer had no right to require it, when it would inevitably incriminate him.
The Supreme Court of Canada in Mann v R [2004] SCC 52 (23 July 2004) has changed the common law by permitting a police officer to "pat down" a person if the officer can (if challenged to do so in court) articulate a reason why such a procedure was necessary to protect the safety of the officer. Such "pat down" searches occur without necessarily involving the detention of the person, and consequently rights that come into play upon detention do not arise. The officer must, of course, be acting in execution of duty in speaking to the person, and this includes the general duty to prevent and investigate crime. The person need not therefore be suspected of committing an offence.
Plainly, while it is sensible to allow officers to ensure their own safety while they act within the law, difficult issues of fact may arise because of the fine line between patting down and ascertaining the contents of a pocket. Such a line was breached in Mann, where the officer reached into a pocket where he had detected something soft (which turned out to be a bag of cannabis); he had gone beyond acting to secure his safety. There could easily be disputes over whether the person consented to revealing what was in his pocket, although it must be acknowledged that the courts are used to determining such disputes. It is, of course, inherently unlikely that a person would give free consent to a search, if he knew that the officer had no right to require it, when it would inevitably incriminate him.
Wednesday, August 25, 2004
Eroding jury unanimity
In R v Siloata 14/7/04, CA477/03 the NZCA held that when the presumption of purpose of supply applies upon proof that the accused had possession of a particular quantity of drug, the accused has to disprove that purpose to the unanimous satisfaction of the jury: there is no room for disagreement among jurors about this. If one juror thinks the accused has not satisfied the burden of proof then all jurors must find him guilty.
The Court said that to hold otherwise would defeat the reason for having the statutory presumption of purpose.
Unfortunately, the Court's reasoning means that the presumption cannot be used unless all jurors agree that the accused had possession of the necessary quantity of drug. This disadvantages the prosecution. The Court's reasoning confuses the fact-finding role of individual jurors (each of whom should be able to use the presumption if they find the necessary preliminary fact proved) with the verdict-finding role of the jury as a whole (which has to be agreed on its verdict).
Update: readers will be pleased to note that the Supreme Court has overruled the Court of Appeal's decision on this point: Siloata v R 16/12/04, SCC CRI 8/2004.
The Court said that to hold otherwise would defeat the reason for having the statutory presumption of purpose.
Unfortunately, the Court's reasoning means that the presumption cannot be used unless all jurors agree that the accused had possession of the necessary quantity of drug. This disadvantages the prosecution. The Court's reasoning confuses the fact-finding role of individual jurors (each of whom should be able to use the presumption if they find the necessary preliminary fact proved) with the verdict-finding role of the jury as a whole (which has to be agreed on its verdict).
Update: readers will be pleased to note that the Supreme Court has overruled the Court of Appeal's decision on this point: Siloata v R 16/12/04, SCC CRI 8/2004.
Information obtained by torture
In A and others v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] EWCA Civ 1123 (11 August 2004) it was recognised that the Court may permit information obtained by torture carried out on an informant by strangers to the litigation outside the jurisdiction to be used by one party to the proceedings in support of its case for extradition of the opposing party.
This introduces a moral cloud over the Court's readiness to prevent an abuse of its proceedings (or to prevent an abuse of executive power).
Update: this decision was overruled in A v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] UKHL 71 (noted here on 9 December 2005).
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