When does a breach of a detainee’s right to be informed of the reasons for detention or arrest make the detention or arrest unlawful?
In Saadi v UK [2008] ECHR 79 (29 January 2008) the appellants had been held in detention at a facility at Oakington for 76 hours before they were properly informed of the reasons, which were that this was the procedure for fast-tracking their applications for refugee status. The Grand Chamber held, 11 to 6, that the procedures for processing applicants for refugee status did not breach their right to liberty and security (Art 5 § 1), but it held unanimously that there had been a violation of the Art 5 §2 right to be informed promptly of the reasons for the detention.
This latter point, that there was a breach of the right to be informed promptly of the reasons for arrest or detention, had been accepted by the House of Lords: [2002] UKHL 41 at para 48, per Lord Slynn with whom the others concurred:
“48. It is agreed that the forms served on the claimants here were inappropriate. It was, to say the least, unfortunate but without going as far as Collins J [at first instance] in his criticism of the Immigration Service, I agree with him that even on his approach the failure to give the right reason for detention and the giving of no or wrong reasons did not in the end affect the legality of the detention.”
Why not? This point, apparently being agreed between the parties, was not explained. The Court of Appeal, [2001] EWCA Civ 1512, did not deal with it, and Collins J (whose judgment is appended to the CA’s judgment) held, at para 15:
“The use of inappropriate forms and the giving of reasons for detention on those forms which may not have been wholly accurate do not affect the lawfulness of the detention. The real reason [for the detention] was the new Oakington process [ie the fast-track processing of applications]. If that was lawful, the disgraceful failure to prepare proper forms cannot render it unlawful. In any event, it may be that in the cases of the illegal entrants the immigration officers could properly rely on at least the absence of identification and the clandestine entry as factors justifying detention even if, had Oakington not been used, temporary admission would have been granted. I do not need to go into the matter further since Mr Scannell has not sought to argue that the muddle about reasons renders the detentions unlawful.”
In the European Court, the Grand Chamber upheld the Chamber’s decision that there had been a breach of the right to be informed promptly of the reasons for detention, and also that the finding of the Court constituted just satisfaction for the breach. This had not been contested on the appeal to the Grand Chamber.
Accordingly, it seems that it must be taken as obvious that if a detention is lawful, it will not become unlawful merely because of a breach of the right to be informed of the reasons for it. This right must be seen as very much a lesser right, than the right to liberty. Pragmatically, of course, that is appropriate, as it may be difficult to communicate with uncooperative detainees. The breach might have some utility in supporting a claim of self defence, if the defendant, having offered physical resistance to being detained, was consequently charged with obstruction or assault.
This approach, separating questions of the lawfulness of the arrest or detention from questions of the consequences of the breach of the right to be informed promptly of the reasons for the arrest or detention, is common. For example, in Manuel v Superintendent of Hawkes Bay Regional Prison [2005] 1 NZLR 161 (CA), it was held that:
“[64] In the High Court Miller J was prepared to accept that there were breaches of s23(1)(a) and (b) of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act [the right to be informed at the time of the arrest or detention of the reason for it, and the right to consult and instruct a lawyer without delay and to be informed of that right] which occurred when the appellant was taken into custody pursuant to the interim recall order. He concluded, however that the detention was not unlawful and, in this regard, he referred to R v Shaheed [2002] 2 NZLR 377. Miller J was unimpressed by the contention that there was also a breach of s23(3) [the right to be brought before a court as soon as possible]. He said that the suggestion that the appellant should have been taken before a Court was inconsistent with the procedure provided for under the Criminal Justice Act. In any event, when the appellant was taken into custody on the interim recall warrant, he was not "arrested for an offence".
“[65] We broadly agree with Miller J although we have reservations as to whether there was a breach of s23(1)(a) and, indeed, as to the relevance of Shaheed. The failure to comply with s23 did not render the detention under the interim recall warrant unlawful. Still less could such failure render unlawful the detention under the final recall warrant. The contention that the appellant was required to be taken before a Court by reason of s23(3) is untenable essentially for the reasons given by Miller J.”
Here the Court of Appeal had reservations about whether it was relevant to balance the right of the state to recall a parolee to detention against the right of the parolee to be informed of the reasons for his detention, which is the exercise behind the reference to Shaheed. It would indeed be an extension of the application of Shaheed if it were to be used in this context, because that is currently reserved for the determination of evidence admissibility (now enacted in s 30 of the Evidence Act 2006). What is noteworthy here is the way the courts assume that breach of the lesser right could not affect the lawfulness of the arrest or detention.
Thursday, January 31, 2008
Friday, January 18, 2008
Fixing bad law: bias in military tribunals
Perceived bias can amount to a breach of a suspect’s rights at a stage of the proceedings prior to trial. This is illustrated in Boyle v United Kingdom [2008] ECHR 15 (8 January 2008). The question of whether the suspect should be released on bail prior to his court martial was determined by his commanding officer, who was potentially required to make other decisions in the proceedings, including whether to amend the charge, dismiss it, deal with it summarily, or refer it to a higher authority for determination, and whether to be involved in the prosecution of the charge. There was also a conflict between the CO’s roles because he was responsible for discipline within the suspect’s unit.
The European Court held that there had been a breach of Art 5.3 of the Convention, as the commanding officer was not within the meaning of the phrase “a judge or other officer authorised by law to exercise judicial power” because the suspect’s misgivings about the CO’s impartiality were objectively justified.
The approach to whether there is bias (actual or perceived) is the same as when the tribunal is acting as a court (eg Martin v United Kingdom blogged here 30 October 2006), but here the issue was not fair hearing (Art 6) but instead it was the exercise of judicial power (Art 5.3).
As far as remedy was concerned, the appellant had been denied bail and was acquitted at court martial. He did not claim pecuniary loss. He did seek damages for breach of his rights, but since it could not be said that if his rights had not been breached he would have been released on bail, the Court held that the judgment itself was just satisfaction for any non-pecuniary damage. For another example of this result, see Young v United Kingdom, blogged 19 January 2007.
We may wonder how snappily changes are made to the law that the European Court finds to have been in breach of the Convention. In Young, the proceedings in the European Court began on 4 July 2000 and were concluded on 16 January 2007. In the meantime, the Prison Rules were amended from 18 April 2005 in ways that appear to be designed to meet the criticisms which were made in Young.
The present case, Boyle, began in the European Court on 25 February 2000 and was in respect of proceedings that had been conducted under the Army Act 1955[UK]. New legislation, the Armed Forces Act 2006[UK] is now in place.
The European Court held that there had been a breach of Art 5.3 of the Convention, as the commanding officer was not within the meaning of the phrase “a judge or other officer authorised by law to exercise judicial power” because the suspect’s misgivings about the CO’s impartiality were objectively justified.
The approach to whether there is bias (actual or perceived) is the same as when the tribunal is acting as a court (eg Martin v United Kingdom blogged here 30 October 2006), but here the issue was not fair hearing (Art 6) but instead it was the exercise of judicial power (Art 5.3).
As far as remedy was concerned, the appellant had been denied bail and was acquitted at court martial. He did not claim pecuniary loss. He did seek damages for breach of his rights, but since it could not be said that if his rights had not been breached he would have been released on bail, the Court held that the judgment itself was just satisfaction for any non-pecuniary damage. For another example of this result, see Young v United Kingdom, blogged 19 January 2007.
We may wonder how snappily changes are made to the law that the European Court finds to have been in breach of the Convention. In Young, the proceedings in the European Court began on 4 July 2000 and were concluded on 16 January 2007. In the meantime, the Prison Rules were amended from 18 April 2005 in ways that appear to be designed to meet the criticisms which were made in Young.
The present case, Boyle, began in the European Court on 25 February 2000 and was in respect of proceedings that had been conducted under the Army Act 1955[UK]. New legislation, the Armed Forces Act 2006[UK] is now in place.
Wednesday, January 02, 2008
LCN DNA analysis
The recent decision of the Northern Ireland Crown Court in R v Hoey [2007] NICC 49 (20 December 2007) mentions that New Zealand is one of two countries (the other being the Netherlands) where the Low Copy Number DNA analysis technique is accepted as a sound basis for expert opinion in evidence.
For a discussion of that case, and of whether LCN DNA evidence has been accepted for that purpose in New Zealand, see my draft paper available here.
For a discussion of that case, and of whether LCN DNA evidence has been accepted for that purpose in New Zealand, see my draft paper available here.
Friday, December 21, 2007
Cunctation
Can the prosecution cure an unreasonable delay in the proceedings against an accused by speeding them up? Or, once the accused’s right to a trial without undue delay is breached, is the only remedy a stay of the proceedings?
A difference in the English authorities on this point was recently resolved by the Privy Council in a devolution case, Spiers v Ruddy (Scotland) [2007] UKPC D2 (12 December 2007).
The resolution of the difference brought the law into line with Strasbourg jurisprudence, by upholding Attorney-General’s Reference (No 2 of 2001) [2003] UKHL 68, and declining to follow R v HM Advocate [2002] UKPC D3.
Accordingly, if it is still possible to hold a fair trial, a stay of proceedings is not the appropriate remedy for undue delay, unless it would be, for any compelling reason, unfair to try the accused. Where neither of these two forms of unfairness are present, the appropriate remedy would be a reduction of sentence or payment of compensation.
The distinction between the forms of unfairness is important. If a person cannot be tried fairly, then he cannot be tried at all: this is axiomatic, as Lord Bingham said at para 15 of Spiers v Ruddy.
The other form of unfairness, not discussed in the case, would presumably be the public policy form of unfairness, which really means that continuation of the proceedings would bring the administration of justice into disrepute. Public policy fairness has broad application. I have mentioned public policy fairness in discussing Simmons v R (Bahamas) 4 April 2006 and Williams v R (Jamaica) 26 April 2006.
Of interest here is the mention of reduction of sentence as a remedy for undue delay. It is possible that reduction of sentence (which, obviously, is only applicable if the case proceeds to sentencing) could be a more widely used remedy for breach of rights. One of the factors that New Zealand’s new Evidence Act 2006 mentions as relevant to the decision whether to exclude improperly obtained evidence is the existence of alternative remedies that can adequately provide redress: s 30(3)(f).
A difference in the English authorities on this point was recently resolved by the Privy Council in a devolution case, Spiers v Ruddy (Scotland) [2007] UKPC D2 (12 December 2007).
The resolution of the difference brought the law into line with Strasbourg jurisprudence, by upholding Attorney-General’s Reference (No 2 of 2001) [2003] UKHL 68, and declining to follow R v HM Advocate [2002] UKPC D3.
Accordingly, if it is still possible to hold a fair trial, a stay of proceedings is not the appropriate remedy for undue delay, unless it would be, for any compelling reason, unfair to try the accused. Where neither of these two forms of unfairness are present, the appropriate remedy would be a reduction of sentence or payment of compensation.
The distinction between the forms of unfairness is important. If a person cannot be tried fairly, then he cannot be tried at all: this is axiomatic, as Lord Bingham said at para 15 of Spiers v Ruddy.
The other form of unfairness, not discussed in the case, would presumably be the public policy form of unfairness, which really means that continuation of the proceedings would bring the administration of justice into disrepute. Public policy fairness has broad application. I have mentioned public policy fairness in discussing Simmons v R (Bahamas) 4 April 2006 and Williams v R (Jamaica) 26 April 2006.
Of interest here is the mention of reduction of sentence as a remedy for undue delay. It is possible that reduction of sentence (which, obviously, is only applicable if the case proceeds to sentencing) could be a more widely used remedy for breach of rights. One of the factors that New Zealand’s new Evidence Act 2006 mentions as relevant to the decision whether to exclude improperly obtained evidence is the existence of alternative remedies that can adequately provide redress: s 30(3)(f).
Thursday, December 20, 2007
"Never mind your alibi, put the balaclava on ..."
Where errors at trial meant that it could not be said that guilt was proved beyond reasonable doubt, the conviction had to be quashed and there was no question of whether the proviso should be applied: Evans v R [2007] HCA 59 (13 December 2007) at para 10 of the joint majority judgment of Gummow and Hayne JJ. A confusing aspect of this case is its references to the proviso. This is hardly surprising, given the state of the law. There were several differences between the judges on other points too.
The critical errors at trial were two, and they focused on two different sorts of evidence. The first was evidence of clothing that the accused was required by the prosecutor to wear while sitting in the witness box, and the second was evidence that the accused was not permitted to call in the nature of an alibi.
As to the clothing, the majority held that was an error, but Gummow and Hayne JJ (jointly) differed from the third member of the majority, Kirby J, as to what the error was. The joint judgment held that the evidence of what the accused looked like wearing the clothing was irrelevant and inadmissible for that reason. Kirby J found this reasoning objectionable because the point had not been argued and (para 84) “This Court does not enjoy a roving commission to create new grounds of appeal”. But, on this point of relevance, Kirby J agreed with Heydon J (with whom Crennan J also agreed) that the evidence was relevant. However, in Kirby J’s view, the evidence was inadmissible because its illegitimately prejudicial effect outweighed its probative value (para 108):
“…The complaint is that the prosecutor's questions made him sit, in the jury's presence, in a garb often associated with armed robberies; inescapably similar to the appearance of the offender shown on the video film and photographic stills; and necessarily looking sinister and criminal-like. Even if glanced at for a moment, such an image (like images of hijackers, terrorists and murderers in well-remembered films, documentaries and news broadcasts) would etch an eidetic imprint on the jury's collective mind. It is an image unfairly prejudicial to the appellant.”
The second critical error, excluding the evidence of alibi (notice not having being given), was the subject of agreement between Gummow, Hayne and Kirby JJ. The error resulted in the defence not being able to be fully put at trial. The defence had to explain why a cap containing the accused’s DNA had been recovered from the scene of the robbery. The only innocent explanation, in the circumstances, could have been that it had been planted there by the actual robber. This possibility could have been raised if the jury had heard the alibi evidence, although it only went as far as establishing that at the relevant time the accused was routinely at a distant location and no departure from that routine could be remembered.
The dissenters, Heydon and Crennan JJ, approached this point differently, holding that there was no evidentiary support for the suggestion that the cap had been planted at the scene, so the absence of the alibi evidence did not matter. This, one might think, misses the point that it was the alibi evidence that would have been relied on to support an inference of planting.
Heydon J, in a passage (para 189 – 222) with which Kirby and Crennan JJ agreed, discussed the concepts of views, demonstrations and reconstructions at common law, and the statutory references to inspections, demonstrations and experiments in the uniform evidence legislation. Kirby J disagreed with Heydon J’s holding on the status of the in-court wearing of the clothing here: Kirby J held it to be a demonstration at common law (para 107).
There was some mention of how the proviso should be approached in the light of Weiss v R (blogged here 16 January 2006). Kirby J mentioned the aspects that seem to be uncontroversial (para 116 – 118):
“116 The central holding in Weiss, which followed suggestions to similar effect in relation to the role of appellate courts both in criminal … and civil … appeals, was that the appellate function must, in every case, be discharged by the intermediate court for itself. It must be done by reference to principles derived from the statutory language. It is not to be discharged by incantations involving speculation concerning what the jury or judge at trial (or a future jury or judge) would, or might, or should have done if this or that had happened or not happened. About this much, there is, I believe, unanimity in this Court. It has emphasised the very substantial role and duty of appellate courts to review the evidence and to reach conclusions for themselves by the application of the statutory tests.
“117 There is also unanimity (for the possibility is expressly reserved in Weiss …) that there may be cases where "errors or miscarriages of justice occurring in the course of a criminal trial may amount to such a serious breach of the presuppositions of the trial as to deny the application of the … proviso".
“118 Beyond these points, there remain questions that I regard as still alive for final resolution if tendered to this Court in a suitable case. In a sense, those questions may be a product of the "conundrum" which the joint reasons in this appeal recognise as appearing on the face of the common form legislation in which criminal appeal jurisdiction is expressed throughout this country…. Elsewhere and earlier, the "conundrum" was described as "a riddle of the kind which Plutarch records caused Homer to die of chagrin"….”[footnotes omitted]
Part of the difficulty is the tangled language that is used to state the position. The joint judgment in the present case, at para 41 – 42, highlights and indeed endorses, a particularly complex passage in Weiss. Nonetheless, the position here was that (para 48 – 49):
“48 Because the alibi evidence was not called and was not tested at trial, the Court of Criminal Appeal could not decide from the record of the trial and the additional material received on the hearing of the appeal that the appellant was proved beyond reasonable doubt to be guilty of the offences on which the jury returned its verdicts of guilty. It could not do that because the material upon which it had to act was incomplete. An important element of the material had been excluded at trial and was necessarily presented to the Court of Criminal Appeal untested. Because it was untested the Court of Criminal Appeal could not say whether it could be taken at less than its face value. And at face value it left an issue about who took the cap to the scene and dropped it there not capable of resolution beyond reasonable doubt.
“49 The Court of Criminal Appeal could not determine beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant was the robber. The errors at trial both undermined his defence and in an important respect prevented him putting it fully. The sworn evidence the appellant had given may well have been undermined by having him dress as the robber. The alibi evidence it had to consider was necessarily incomplete.
“50 It is not then necessary to go on to decide what significance should be attached to the several features of the trial that suggest that the trial judge did not have sufficient mastery of the proceedings to ensure a fair trial. That is, it is not necessary to explore what kinds of failure in the trial process preclude the application of the proviso, beyond noting that in Weiss the Court said … that "no single universally applicable criterion can be formulated which identifies cases in which it would be proper for an appellate court not to dismiss the appeal, even though persuaded that the evidence properly admitted at trial proved, beyond reasonable doubt, the accused's guilt". [footnote omitted]
“51 These issues need not be resolved in this matter. They need not be resolved because the errors made at trial undermined the appellant's defence and prevented him putting it fully. The Court of Criminal Appeal ought not to have decided that the appellant had been proved beyond reasonable doubt guilty of the offences charged. The Court of Criminal Appeal ought not to have decided that there had been no substantial miscarriage of justice.”
This seems to mean that the appellate court should have decided that the miscarriage of justice here was substantial, and that therefore the proviso could not apply. If so, this contradicts claim in para 10 of the joint judgment, mentioned above at the beginning of this commentary, that no question arose as to whether the proviso should be applied. There was a question, and it should have been answered in the negative. I have noted many cases on the proviso (see Index), and no doubt will continue to do so. There are differences in the ways courts interpret it, and these tend to arise from the concepts of “miscarriage” of justice, and “substantial miscarriage” of justice. The juxtaposition of these concepts creates the conundrum mentioned here. In my view, the straightforward approach seems to be that the accused in the present case had not had a fair trial, because he was not allowed to present his defence, and because unfairly prejudicial evidence had been adduced. Those errors caused unfairness in that the determination of the facts was biased against the accused. Since the trial was not fair, the conviction could not be saved by the proviso.
The critical errors at trial were two, and they focused on two different sorts of evidence. The first was evidence of clothing that the accused was required by the prosecutor to wear while sitting in the witness box, and the second was evidence that the accused was not permitted to call in the nature of an alibi.
As to the clothing, the majority held that was an error, but Gummow and Hayne JJ (jointly) differed from the third member of the majority, Kirby J, as to what the error was. The joint judgment held that the evidence of what the accused looked like wearing the clothing was irrelevant and inadmissible for that reason. Kirby J found this reasoning objectionable because the point had not been argued and (para 84) “This Court does not enjoy a roving commission to create new grounds of appeal”. But, on this point of relevance, Kirby J agreed with Heydon J (with whom Crennan J also agreed) that the evidence was relevant. However, in Kirby J’s view, the evidence was inadmissible because its illegitimately prejudicial effect outweighed its probative value (para 108):
“…The complaint is that the prosecutor's questions made him sit, in the jury's presence, in a garb often associated with armed robberies; inescapably similar to the appearance of the offender shown on the video film and photographic stills; and necessarily looking sinister and criminal-like. Even if glanced at for a moment, such an image (like images of hijackers, terrorists and murderers in well-remembered films, documentaries and news broadcasts) would etch an eidetic imprint on the jury's collective mind. It is an image unfairly prejudicial to the appellant.”
The second critical error, excluding the evidence of alibi (notice not having being given), was the subject of agreement between Gummow, Hayne and Kirby JJ. The error resulted in the defence not being able to be fully put at trial. The defence had to explain why a cap containing the accused’s DNA had been recovered from the scene of the robbery. The only innocent explanation, in the circumstances, could have been that it had been planted there by the actual robber. This possibility could have been raised if the jury had heard the alibi evidence, although it only went as far as establishing that at the relevant time the accused was routinely at a distant location and no departure from that routine could be remembered.
The dissenters, Heydon and Crennan JJ, approached this point differently, holding that there was no evidentiary support for the suggestion that the cap had been planted at the scene, so the absence of the alibi evidence did not matter. This, one might think, misses the point that it was the alibi evidence that would have been relied on to support an inference of planting.
Heydon J, in a passage (para 189 – 222) with which Kirby and Crennan JJ agreed, discussed the concepts of views, demonstrations and reconstructions at common law, and the statutory references to inspections, demonstrations and experiments in the uniform evidence legislation. Kirby J disagreed with Heydon J’s holding on the status of the in-court wearing of the clothing here: Kirby J held it to be a demonstration at common law (para 107).
There was some mention of how the proviso should be approached in the light of Weiss v R (blogged here 16 January 2006). Kirby J mentioned the aspects that seem to be uncontroversial (para 116 – 118):
“116 The central holding in Weiss, which followed suggestions to similar effect in relation to the role of appellate courts both in criminal … and civil … appeals, was that the appellate function must, in every case, be discharged by the intermediate court for itself. It must be done by reference to principles derived from the statutory language. It is not to be discharged by incantations involving speculation concerning what the jury or judge at trial (or a future jury or judge) would, or might, or should have done if this or that had happened or not happened. About this much, there is, I believe, unanimity in this Court. It has emphasised the very substantial role and duty of appellate courts to review the evidence and to reach conclusions for themselves by the application of the statutory tests.
“117 There is also unanimity (for the possibility is expressly reserved in Weiss …) that there may be cases where "errors or miscarriages of justice occurring in the course of a criminal trial may amount to such a serious breach of the presuppositions of the trial as to deny the application of the … proviso".
“118 Beyond these points, there remain questions that I regard as still alive for final resolution if tendered to this Court in a suitable case. In a sense, those questions may be a product of the "conundrum" which the joint reasons in this appeal recognise as appearing on the face of the common form legislation in which criminal appeal jurisdiction is expressed throughout this country…. Elsewhere and earlier, the "conundrum" was described as "a riddle of the kind which Plutarch records caused Homer to die of chagrin"….”[footnotes omitted]
Part of the difficulty is the tangled language that is used to state the position. The joint judgment in the present case, at para 41 – 42, highlights and indeed endorses, a particularly complex passage in Weiss. Nonetheless, the position here was that (para 48 – 49):
“48 Because the alibi evidence was not called and was not tested at trial, the Court of Criminal Appeal could not decide from the record of the trial and the additional material received on the hearing of the appeal that the appellant was proved beyond reasonable doubt to be guilty of the offences on which the jury returned its verdicts of guilty. It could not do that because the material upon which it had to act was incomplete. An important element of the material had been excluded at trial and was necessarily presented to the Court of Criminal Appeal untested. Because it was untested the Court of Criminal Appeal could not say whether it could be taken at less than its face value. And at face value it left an issue about who took the cap to the scene and dropped it there not capable of resolution beyond reasonable doubt.
“49 The Court of Criminal Appeal could not determine beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant was the robber. The errors at trial both undermined his defence and in an important respect prevented him putting it fully. The sworn evidence the appellant had given may well have been undermined by having him dress as the robber. The alibi evidence it had to consider was necessarily incomplete.
“50 It is not then necessary to go on to decide what significance should be attached to the several features of the trial that suggest that the trial judge did not have sufficient mastery of the proceedings to ensure a fair trial. That is, it is not necessary to explore what kinds of failure in the trial process preclude the application of the proviso, beyond noting that in Weiss the Court said … that "no single universally applicable criterion can be formulated which identifies cases in which it would be proper for an appellate court not to dismiss the appeal, even though persuaded that the evidence properly admitted at trial proved, beyond reasonable doubt, the accused's guilt". [footnote omitted]
“51 These issues need not be resolved in this matter. They need not be resolved because the errors made at trial undermined the appellant's defence and prevented him putting it fully. The Court of Criminal Appeal ought not to have decided that the appellant had been proved beyond reasonable doubt guilty of the offences charged. The Court of Criminal Appeal ought not to have decided that there had been no substantial miscarriage of justice.”
This seems to mean that the appellate court should have decided that the miscarriage of justice here was substantial, and that therefore the proviso could not apply. If so, this contradicts claim in para 10 of the joint judgment, mentioned above at the beginning of this commentary, that no question arose as to whether the proviso should be applied. There was a question, and it should have been answered in the negative. I have noted many cases on the proviso (see Index), and no doubt will continue to do so. There are differences in the ways courts interpret it, and these tend to arise from the concepts of “miscarriage” of justice, and “substantial miscarriage” of justice. The juxtaposition of these concepts creates the conundrum mentioned here. In my view, the straightforward approach seems to be that the accused in the present case had not had a fair trial, because he was not allowed to present his defence, and because unfairly prejudicial evidence had been adduced. Those errors caused unfairness in that the determination of the facts was biased against the accused. Since the trial was not fair, the conviction could not be saved by the proviso.
Wednesday, December 19, 2007
Firearm "use" in drug transactions
Some gems from Watson v US No.06-571, 10 December 2007:
“we do not normally speak or write the Government’s way.” per Souter J, delivering the Court’s judgment in Watson, and quoting Lopez v. Gonzales, 549 U. S. (2006) (slip op., at 5).
“The Government may say that a person “uses” a firearm simply by receiving it in a barter transaction, but no one else would.” Souter J.
“I would overrule Smith, and thereby render our precedent both coherent and consistent with normal usage. Cf. Henslee v. Union Planters Nat. Bank & Trust Co., 335 U. S. 595, 600 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (“Wisdom too often never comes, and so one ought not to reject it merely because it comes late.”).” per Ginsburg J, concurring in Watson.
In Watson, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a conflict in the Circuit Courts over whether a person “uses” a firearm when he trades drugs in order to obtain a gun.
I have previously noted an interpretation of the word “use”(see blog on 23 July 2007 concerning R v Steele SCC and mentioning Bailey v US) where the issue was whether a gun had been used in the commission of a crime, when its presence was revealed to a victim.
In Watson, the issue, relevant to sentencing, was whether in giving drugs and receiving in exchange a gun the offender had used the gun in the drug trafficking crime. In Smith v. United States, 508 U. S. 223 (1993) it had been held that giving a gun in exchange for drugs was using the firearm. Ginsburg J, as noted above, would have overruled that decision, but the other members of the Court did not think it was necessary to do so, and held that Smith simply did not address the present issue.
The interpretative problem was addressed in this way: “With no statutory definition or definitive clue, the meaning of the verb “uses” has to turn on the language as we normally speak it”. Unsurprisingly, the result was that a gun is not used in the commission of a drug trafficking offence by the person who receives the gun in exchange for the drugs. As Ginsburg J rather wittily put it, “It is better to receive than to give, the Court holds today, at least when the subject is guns.”
Techniques of judicial reasoning are illustrated here in the Court’s treatment of the prosecution’s arguments. I summarise the arguments here, although this may not be particularly intelligible, but it is the form of argument that I am highlighting.
The Government argued that an interpretative clue was provided by a nearby provision in the statute, and also that symmetry favoured its view ( ie both parties to the transaction are responsible for the danger to society posed by the use of the firearm; the danger recognised in Smith was reciprocated here).
The Court dismissed the context point on the ground that the other provision was too vague about who the user of the firearm would be in a transaction and this meant there was no pressure to apply the same meaning to the present provision; and, in any event, applying the same meaning in the different contexts would require overruling an earlier decision - Bailey v. United States, 516 U. S. 137 (1995) – which was unanimous and not challenged by the Government.
The symmetry argument was dismissed on the ground that, not only did it strain language, but also it was weakened by the Government’s pointing out that, in any event, receiving the gun in exchange for drugs would (at least in the Government’s view, the Court left the point open) be within another section which covered possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug transaction. This “does leave the appeal to symmetry under-whelming in a contest with the English language, on the Government’s very terms.”
“we do not normally speak or write the Government’s way.” per Souter J, delivering the Court’s judgment in Watson, and quoting Lopez v. Gonzales, 549 U. S. (2006) (slip op., at 5).
“The Government may say that a person “uses” a firearm simply by receiving it in a barter transaction, but no one else would.” Souter J.
“I would overrule Smith, and thereby render our precedent both coherent and consistent with normal usage. Cf. Henslee v. Union Planters Nat. Bank & Trust Co., 335 U. S. 595, 600 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (“Wisdom too often never comes, and so one ought not to reject it merely because it comes late.”).” per Ginsburg J, concurring in Watson.
In Watson, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a conflict in the Circuit Courts over whether a person “uses” a firearm when he trades drugs in order to obtain a gun.
I have previously noted an interpretation of the word “use”(see blog on 23 July 2007 concerning R v Steele SCC and mentioning Bailey v US) where the issue was whether a gun had been used in the commission of a crime, when its presence was revealed to a victim.
In Watson, the issue, relevant to sentencing, was whether in giving drugs and receiving in exchange a gun the offender had used the gun in the drug trafficking crime. In Smith v. United States, 508 U. S. 223 (1993) it had been held that giving a gun in exchange for drugs was using the firearm. Ginsburg J, as noted above, would have overruled that decision, but the other members of the Court did not think it was necessary to do so, and held that Smith simply did not address the present issue.
The interpretative problem was addressed in this way: “With no statutory definition or definitive clue, the meaning of the verb “uses” has to turn on the language as we normally speak it”. Unsurprisingly, the result was that a gun is not used in the commission of a drug trafficking offence by the person who receives the gun in exchange for the drugs. As Ginsburg J rather wittily put it, “It is better to receive than to give, the Court holds today, at least when the subject is guns.”
Techniques of judicial reasoning are illustrated here in the Court’s treatment of the prosecution’s arguments. I summarise the arguments here, although this may not be particularly intelligible, but it is the form of argument that I am highlighting.
The Government argued that an interpretative clue was provided by a nearby provision in the statute, and also that symmetry favoured its view ( ie both parties to the transaction are responsible for the danger to society posed by the use of the firearm; the danger recognised in Smith was reciprocated here).
The Court dismissed the context point on the ground that the other provision was too vague about who the user of the firearm would be in a transaction and this meant there was no pressure to apply the same meaning to the present provision; and, in any event, applying the same meaning in the different contexts would require overruling an earlier decision - Bailey v. United States, 516 U. S. 137 (1995) – which was unanimous and not challenged by the Government.
The symmetry argument was dismissed on the ground that, not only did it strain language, but also it was weakened by the Government’s pointing out that, in any event, receiving the gun in exchange for drugs would (at least in the Government’s view, the Court left the point open) be within another section which covered possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug transaction. This “does leave the appeal to symmetry under-whelming in a contest with the English language, on the Government’s very terms.”
Tuesday, December 18, 2007
Policy v Logic
R v Daley [2007] SCC 53 (13 December 2007) calls to mind the different approaches that have been taken to the problems for criminal responsibility that are raised by the accused’s state of intoxication during the commission of what is alleged to be an offence.
The tension between policy and logic has been resolved differently in various jurisdictions.
The policy originating in English law has been adopted and developed in Canada. Fundamentally, this involves distinguishing (controversially) between offences of specific intent, and offences of basic intent. Intoxication is not, as a matter of policy, an impediment to liability for an offence of basic intent. It will, however, be relevant to whether the accused is liable for an offence of specific intent. This is discussed in Daley at paras 34 – 53.
In New Zealand the tension between policy and logic is resolved in favour of logic. The focus is on whether the mental element necessary for liability for the relevant offence was present. The position is summarised in Adams on Criminal Law, CA23.50:
“For the history of defences based on intoxication: see Singh (1933) 49 LQR 528; and for a review of the law in New Zealand: see the Criminal Law Reform Committee, Report on Intoxication as a Defence to a Criminal Charge (1984). The applicable principles are the same whether the defendant was affected by alcohol or by other drugs, or both: R v Lipman [1970] 1 QB 152; DPP v Majewski [1977] AC 443; [1976] 2 All ER 142 (HL); Viro v R (1978) 141 CLR 88; compare R v Hardie [1984] 3 All ER 848; CA23.52. The basic rule is that intoxication is never in itself a defence: R v Kamipeli [1975] 2 NZLR 610 (CA), at p 616; R v Munro (1986) 2 CRNZ 249 (CA); R v Doherty (1887) 16 Cox CC 306, at p 308; DPP v Beard [1920] AC 479, at p 499. It is not a defence that intoxication removed a defendant’s inhibitions and caused him or her to act in a way he or she would not have done when sober, or prevented the defendant knowing the act was wrong: A-G for Northern Ireland v Gallagher [1963] AC 349; [1961] 3 All ER 299 (HL), at p 380; p 313 per Lord Denning; R v Sheehan [1975] 1 WLR 739, at p 744. But there may be a defence if a mental element required for the offence was absent as a result of intoxication. In such a case the defence is the absence of the required mental element, not the intoxication, although the evidence which may support such a defence includes the fact of intoxication, as well as other relevant circumstances: Kamipeli (above), at p 616.”
It is not necessary, under this approach, to distinguish in law between states of intoxication such as advanced or extreme intoxication. Nor is it necessary to classify offences as involving specific or basic intent. Nor is it necessary to distort the concept of recklessness to accommodate liability for drunken lack of foresight.
Generalisations about the Australian jurisdictions must be treated with caution. Broadly, the common law jurisdictions generally take the same logical approach as in New Zealand: R v O’Connor (1980) 146 CLR 64 (HCA), although this may be modified by statute, as it is for example in South Australia by the Criminal Law Consolidation (Intoxication) Amendment Act 2004 (No 40 of 2004), s 5. This creates liability, notwithstanding absence of voluntariness or intention due to intoxication, for offences that do not require proof of foresight of consequences or awareness of surrounding circumstances. If death is caused, a different rule applies: the question becomes whether the accused was criminally negligent; if so, he may be convicted of manslaughter. In Queensland, a Code state, the logical approach is taken: see s 28 of the Criminal Code 1899.
If the logical approach may seem to offer little protection against the harm that may be caused by a person who deliberately removes himself from criminal liability by becoming intoxicated before embarking on his illegal purpose, the forensic realities may provide some reassurance. In practice, the prosecutor’s catch-phrase in such cases is, “A drunken intent is still an intent!” and this memorable formulation, usually repeated by the judge in summing up, is difficult to counter. “A drunken lack of intent is still lack of intent” is about as good a response as defence counsel can make. It may be that policy enters by the back door, through pragmatic fact-finding.
The tension between policy and logic has been resolved differently in various jurisdictions.
The policy originating in English law has been adopted and developed in Canada. Fundamentally, this involves distinguishing (controversially) between offences of specific intent, and offences of basic intent. Intoxication is not, as a matter of policy, an impediment to liability for an offence of basic intent. It will, however, be relevant to whether the accused is liable for an offence of specific intent. This is discussed in Daley at paras 34 – 53.
In New Zealand the tension between policy and logic is resolved in favour of logic. The focus is on whether the mental element necessary for liability for the relevant offence was present. The position is summarised in Adams on Criminal Law, CA23.50:
“For the history of defences based on intoxication: see Singh (1933) 49 LQR 528; and for a review of the law in New Zealand: see the Criminal Law Reform Committee, Report on Intoxication as a Defence to a Criminal Charge (1984). The applicable principles are the same whether the defendant was affected by alcohol or by other drugs, or both: R v Lipman [1970] 1 QB 152; DPP v Majewski [1977] AC 443; [1976] 2 All ER 142 (HL); Viro v R (1978) 141 CLR 88; compare R v Hardie [1984] 3 All ER 848; CA23.52. The basic rule is that intoxication is never in itself a defence: R v Kamipeli [1975] 2 NZLR 610 (CA), at p 616; R v Munro (1986) 2 CRNZ 249 (CA); R v Doherty (1887) 16 Cox CC 306, at p 308; DPP v Beard [1920] AC 479, at p 499. It is not a defence that intoxication removed a defendant’s inhibitions and caused him or her to act in a way he or she would not have done when sober, or prevented the defendant knowing the act was wrong: A-G for Northern Ireland v Gallagher [1963] AC 349; [1961] 3 All ER 299 (HL), at p 380; p 313 per Lord Denning; R v Sheehan [1975] 1 WLR 739, at p 744. But there may be a defence if a mental element required for the offence was absent as a result of intoxication. In such a case the defence is the absence of the required mental element, not the intoxication, although the evidence which may support such a defence includes the fact of intoxication, as well as other relevant circumstances: Kamipeli (above), at p 616.”
It is not necessary, under this approach, to distinguish in law between states of intoxication such as advanced or extreme intoxication. Nor is it necessary to classify offences as involving specific or basic intent. Nor is it necessary to distort the concept of recklessness to accommodate liability for drunken lack of foresight.
Generalisations about the Australian jurisdictions must be treated with caution. Broadly, the common law jurisdictions generally take the same logical approach as in New Zealand: R v O’Connor (1980) 146 CLR 64 (HCA), although this may be modified by statute, as it is for example in South Australia by the Criminal Law Consolidation (Intoxication) Amendment Act 2004 (No 40 of 2004), s 5. This creates liability, notwithstanding absence of voluntariness or intention due to intoxication, for offences that do not require proof of foresight of consequences or awareness of surrounding circumstances. If death is caused, a different rule applies: the question becomes whether the accused was criminally negligent; if so, he may be convicted of manslaughter. In Queensland, a Code state, the logical approach is taken: see s 28 of the Criminal Code 1899.
If the logical approach may seem to offer little protection against the harm that may be caused by a person who deliberately removes himself from criminal liability by becoming intoxicated before embarking on his illegal purpose, the forensic realities may provide some reassurance. In practice, the prosecutor’s catch-phrase in such cases is, “A drunken intent is still an intent!” and this memorable formulation, usually repeated by the judge in summing up, is difficult to counter. “A drunken lack of intent is still lack of intent” is about as good a response as defence counsel can make. It may be that policy enters by the back door, through pragmatic fact-finding.
Monday, December 17, 2007
... the verdict of you all?
It is easy to agree with one, then the other, of two opposing views of a case. In WGC v R [2007] HCA 58 (12 December 2007) the first two judgments (Gummow CJ and Kirby J) come to the same conclusion and for similar reasons, and they seem entirely convincing. But they are dissenting judgments. The next judgment in the case, by Hayne and Heydon JJ, in its turn seems entirely convincing, although it comes to the opposite conclusion. By the time I get to Crennan J’s judgment – and she now has the disposition of the appeal under her command – I am not surprised to see her agreement with Hayne and Heydon JJ, since that is the judgment freshest in my mind.
How can two opposite conclusions seem viable? When this occurs it may be because the difference is over a fundamental point of interpretation. This indeed was the case here, where the statutory definition of an offence raised issues over what was an element of the offence and what was a mere particular, and how the obligation placed on the defence to prove certain matters affected the identification of the elements of the offence.
At a slightly lesser level of abstraction, a question in the case involved whether the verdict of the jury may not have been unanimous. Was this a case where guilt may have been proved by two separate and independent theories, so that the jury had to agree on which one they accepted, or was this a case where the defence had to prove more than one issue, and the jury may have had different reasons for deciding that the defence had failed overall?
The offence was the sort of sexual offending that is defined variously in different jurisdictions, but broadly it was having sexual intercourse with a girl aged of or above 12 and under 17 years. The charge specified a period over which the particular offending was alleged to have occurred. The majority held that this range of dates was not an element of the charge, but was merely a particular of the offending that did not have to be proved. The minority held that the date on which the offending was alleged was an element of the charge and so had to be proved beyond reasonable doubt. The statute provided a defence if the accused proved that at the time of the intercourse the girl was aged of or over 16 and that he believed on reasonable grounds that she was of or over 17.
In this case the accused admitted having intercourse with the complainant but said it occurred several years after she claimed it did, and that at the time she was aged 16 and he had the belief necessary for the defence.
Did the accused’s stance at trial make the date of the occurrence of the intercourse an element of the offence, for the prosecution to prove? Or was his stance at trial an allegation that he made that was purely a matter of defence?
Gummow CJ held (para 7) that an accused does not make allegations. This position thus coloured his interpretation of the definition of the offence, and Kirby J’s approach was similar. In particular, Kirby J pointed out (para 92), that jurors could not reach the verdict of guilty by some members concluding that the intercourse occurred when she was under 16 (so that the statutory defence did not apply) and others concluding that it occurred when she was 16 but the accused failed to establish that he believed she was 17 and that this belief was reasonable. If the jury held such differing views they were not unanimous on when the intercourse occurred. Since, for the minority, the time of the offence was an element that had to be proved beyond reasonable doubt, the accused should have been acquitted and a new trial should have been ordered.
The majority reasoning involved a focus on what were the elements of the offence as distinct from particulars provided to assist the accused in identifying the conduct that was impugned. On the view that the accused was alleging a different date than the prosecution (Hayne and Heydon JJ at para 116), and that this allegation was simply a part of endeavouring to establish the defence, the way was clear to concluding that the date on which the offending was alleged was not, in law, an element for the prosecution to establish. What the prosecution did have to establish beyond reasonable doubt was that, at whatever time the intercourse occurred, the complainant was of or over 12 and under 17 years of age.
An important reason advanced by Hayne and Heydon JJ for this interpretation was the procedural difficulty that would arise if the date of the intercourse was an element of the offence. As there was no evidential basis for alleging intercourse at the date claimed by the accused, until the accused gave evidence, an alternative charge could not have been laid at the outset. Once the accused gave evidence, there would be a basis for alleging intercourse with a girl aged 16, but if the indictment was amended by adding that count, the accused would have to be given the opportunity to plead to it and, more significantly, to cross-examine prosecution witnesses again. That muddle (which, it must be said, seems to be an overstatement of the difficulties in how the situation could have been managed: the accused, always aware of his case, would be expected to put it to the witnesses as they gave their evidence the first time: see the rule in Browne v Dunn, blogged here 12 December 2005 and 23 March 2007) is avoided if the count in the indictment is read as not specifying the date as an element and as capable of covering both versions of the facts.
As to the opacity of the verdict point (how could the basis for the jury’s verdict be ascertained for sentencing purposes?), the majority held that this is not an unusual situation: there may be different reasons for the failure of the defence, and the Judge could make his own assessment of the facts on sentencing.
So, it all came down to a difference over whether the date was an element of the offence. The minority interpretation was that the date was an element because it had particular legal consequences: if intercourse occurred when the complainant said it did, the statutory defence relied on here did not apply, but if it occurred when the accused said it did, then the defence did apply. This was a matter on which, in the minority view, the jury needed to be unanimous. Kirby J reviewed the law in New Zealand (para 87 et seq), Canada (88 – 89) and England (90), emphasising the need for the members of a jury to agree on the theory of guilt (or, the factual basis for guilt).
I have discussed this case without quoting the statutory provision which was in issue, s 49(3) and (4) of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA), because it is the consequences for the shapes of arguments that arise from each alternative interpretation that is of interest here. Depending on what the elements of the offence are, there may be difficulties with jury unanimity.
How can two opposite conclusions seem viable? When this occurs it may be because the difference is over a fundamental point of interpretation. This indeed was the case here, where the statutory definition of an offence raised issues over what was an element of the offence and what was a mere particular, and how the obligation placed on the defence to prove certain matters affected the identification of the elements of the offence.
At a slightly lesser level of abstraction, a question in the case involved whether the verdict of the jury may not have been unanimous. Was this a case where guilt may have been proved by two separate and independent theories, so that the jury had to agree on which one they accepted, or was this a case where the defence had to prove more than one issue, and the jury may have had different reasons for deciding that the defence had failed overall?
The offence was the sort of sexual offending that is defined variously in different jurisdictions, but broadly it was having sexual intercourse with a girl aged of or above 12 and under 17 years. The charge specified a period over which the particular offending was alleged to have occurred. The majority held that this range of dates was not an element of the charge, but was merely a particular of the offending that did not have to be proved. The minority held that the date on which the offending was alleged was an element of the charge and so had to be proved beyond reasonable doubt. The statute provided a defence if the accused proved that at the time of the intercourse the girl was aged of or over 16 and that he believed on reasonable grounds that she was of or over 17.
In this case the accused admitted having intercourse with the complainant but said it occurred several years after she claimed it did, and that at the time she was aged 16 and he had the belief necessary for the defence.
Did the accused’s stance at trial make the date of the occurrence of the intercourse an element of the offence, for the prosecution to prove? Or was his stance at trial an allegation that he made that was purely a matter of defence?
Gummow CJ held (para 7) that an accused does not make allegations. This position thus coloured his interpretation of the definition of the offence, and Kirby J’s approach was similar. In particular, Kirby J pointed out (para 92), that jurors could not reach the verdict of guilty by some members concluding that the intercourse occurred when she was under 16 (so that the statutory defence did not apply) and others concluding that it occurred when she was 16 but the accused failed to establish that he believed she was 17 and that this belief was reasonable. If the jury held such differing views they were not unanimous on when the intercourse occurred. Since, for the minority, the time of the offence was an element that had to be proved beyond reasonable doubt, the accused should have been acquitted and a new trial should have been ordered.
The majority reasoning involved a focus on what were the elements of the offence as distinct from particulars provided to assist the accused in identifying the conduct that was impugned. On the view that the accused was alleging a different date than the prosecution (Hayne and Heydon JJ at para 116), and that this allegation was simply a part of endeavouring to establish the defence, the way was clear to concluding that the date on which the offending was alleged was not, in law, an element for the prosecution to establish. What the prosecution did have to establish beyond reasonable doubt was that, at whatever time the intercourse occurred, the complainant was of or over 12 and under 17 years of age.
An important reason advanced by Hayne and Heydon JJ for this interpretation was the procedural difficulty that would arise if the date of the intercourse was an element of the offence. As there was no evidential basis for alleging intercourse at the date claimed by the accused, until the accused gave evidence, an alternative charge could not have been laid at the outset. Once the accused gave evidence, there would be a basis for alleging intercourse with a girl aged 16, but if the indictment was amended by adding that count, the accused would have to be given the opportunity to plead to it and, more significantly, to cross-examine prosecution witnesses again. That muddle (which, it must be said, seems to be an overstatement of the difficulties in how the situation could have been managed: the accused, always aware of his case, would be expected to put it to the witnesses as they gave their evidence the first time: see the rule in Browne v Dunn, blogged here 12 December 2005 and 23 March 2007) is avoided if the count in the indictment is read as not specifying the date as an element and as capable of covering both versions of the facts.
As to the opacity of the verdict point (how could the basis for the jury’s verdict be ascertained for sentencing purposes?), the majority held that this is not an unusual situation: there may be different reasons for the failure of the defence, and the Judge could make his own assessment of the facts on sentencing.
So, it all came down to a difference over whether the date was an element of the offence. The minority interpretation was that the date was an element because it had particular legal consequences: if intercourse occurred when the complainant said it did, the statutory defence relied on here did not apply, but if it occurred when the accused said it did, then the defence did apply. This was a matter on which, in the minority view, the jury needed to be unanimous. Kirby J reviewed the law in New Zealand (para 87 et seq), Canada (88 – 89) and England (90), emphasising the need for the members of a jury to agree on the theory of guilt (or, the factual basis for guilt).
I have discussed this case without quoting the statutory provision which was in issue, s 49(3) and (4) of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA), because it is the consequences for the shapes of arguments that arise from each alternative interpretation that is of interest here. Depending on what the elements of the offence are, there may be difficulties with jury unanimity.
Friday, December 14, 2007
The lawfulness of police helpfulness
Where do the police get their powers to be helpful?
In Ngan v R [2007] NZSC 105 (13 December 2007) the appellant was injured when his car overturned, and the police, after he had identified himself, arranged for him to be taken to hospital. Then, to clear up the accident scene, the police gathered items, including banknotes that had been scattered, and, in the course of inspecting the contents of a zipped pouch that appeared to be a sunglasses case, they discovered drugs. The purpose in taking possession of the items was to safeguard them for the owner, and the reason for opening the pouch was to make an inventory of items, also in the owner’s interests. The appellant had unsuccessfully objected to the admissibility at his trial of the evidence of the finding of the drugs.
Unsurprisingly, the Supreme Court unanimously held that the evidence was admissible. Four Judges held that there had been a search, when the pouch was unzipped, but McGrath J dissented on this point (para 101 – 117). Tipping J assumed that there had been a search, as the prosecution had not argued to the contrary, and held that the police conduct was not even prima facie unlawful as they were simply doing what any private citizen would have been entitled to do in undertaking the role of a bailee of necessity (para 44 - 54). However, in a joint judgment Elias CJ, Blanchard and Anderson JJ (delivered by Blanchard J) held that there was prima facie illegality because the police are bound by stricter standards than ordinary citizens (para 14, applying R v Waterfield [1964] 1 QB 164, 170). However, as Blanchard J put it, para 21:
“The difference in approach to Waterfield taken in these reasons from that taken in the reasons of Tipping J appears to turn on to what amounts to a prima facie unlawful interference with property. As we consider that the police conducted a search of the pouch, we take the view that prima facie there was such an interference. But it was justified in terms of Waterfield. However, the difference in approach has no practical significance because it has been overtaken by the requirements of the Bill of Rights Act.”
All five Judges agreed that pursuant to the Bill of Rights the search was reasonable and there was no reason to exclude the evidence (McGrath J indicated his agreement – if contrary to his view there was a search – at para 121). This reasonableness extended beyond the use of the information about the contents of the pouch for inventory purposes, to use as evidence of drug offending.
There was some discussion of North American authorities, as the appellant had sought to rely on them to support restriction of reasonableness to the making of an inventory. R v Caslake [1998] 1 SCR 51 was held (para 23) not to be authority for the proposition that an inventory search is unlawful because an inventory may be taken in the interests of the owner and not for police purposes. It was noted that subsequent Canadian cases have applied the Waterfield approach (R v Mann [2004] 3 SCR 59; R v Clayton and Farmer 2007 SCC 32). R v Colarusso [1994] 1 SCR 20 was also relied on by the appellant, but was distinguished (para 34) on the ground that in that case the police had an unlawful initial purpose, whereas here their purpose in carrying out the inventory was lawful. The New Zealand case R v Salmond [1992] 3 NZLR 8 (CA) was also relied on by the appellant, but was distinguished on similar grounds (para 36).
So, the answer to the question where the police get their powers to be helpful, depends on statute and common law. McGrath J was the only member of the Court who sought to go beyond that to a “residual third source of authority” (para 96), but one might respectfully wonder whether that is usefully distinct from the fundamental rule in a free society that everything is lawful except that which is prohibited by law.
At para 14 Blanchard J (with Elias CJ and Anderson J) put the central idea as follows:
“Notwithstanding that police officers may be expected to intervene in a case like the present, any interference with private liberty or property by the police is unlawful unless it can be justified either “by the text of the statute law, or by the principles of common law” [Entick v Carrington (1765) 19 How St Tr 1029 at p 1066]. An interference with property in the form of a search of the pouch occurred in this case. But was it unlawful? In order to determine whether a particular course of conduct was actually unlawful, it has been said in R v Waterfield to be relevant [[1964] 1 QB 164 at p 170. See also Hoffman v Thomas [1974] 1 WLR 374]:
“to consider whether (a) such conduct falls within the general scope of any duty imposed by statute or recognised at common law and (b) whether such conduct, albeit within the general scope of such a duty, involved an unjustifiable use of powers associated with the duty.”
“There may be less justification for any use of such powers where the conduct is not in pursuance of an “absolute” duty and where the apprehended danger is to property rather than persons. Overall, as Cooke P stressed in Minto v Police, “[t]he citizen’s protection lies in the insistence of the law that the steps should be reasonable” [[1987] 1 NZLR 374 at p 378 (CA). Further relevant considerations include the immediacy and potential seriousness of the apprehended danger: Police v Amos [1977] 2 NZLR 564 at p 568 at pp 568 – 569].”
Since the police had decided, “reasonably and therefore lawfully” (para 15) to take on the obligations analogous to those of a bailee, for the benefit of the owner, and since they had done no more than was reasonably necessary to safeguard the property (para 20 – 21), there was no unlawfulness or unreasonableness in their discovery of the drugs.
In Ngan v R [2007] NZSC 105 (13 December 2007) the appellant was injured when his car overturned, and the police, after he had identified himself, arranged for him to be taken to hospital. Then, to clear up the accident scene, the police gathered items, including banknotes that had been scattered, and, in the course of inspecting the contents of a zipped pouch that appeared to be a sunglasses case, they discovered drugs. The purpose in taking possession of the items was to safeguard them for the owner, and the reason for opening the pouch was to make an inventory of items, also in the owner’s interests. The appellant had unsuccessfully objected to the admissibility at his trial of the evidence of the finding of the drugs.
Unsurprisingly, the Supreme Court unanimously held that the evidence was admissible. Four Judges held that there had been a search, when the pouch was unzipped, but McGrath J dissented on this point (para 101 – 117). Tipping J assumed that there had been a search, as the prosecution had not argued to the contrary, and held that the police conduct was not even prima facie unlawful as they were simply doing what any private citizen would have been entitled to do in undertaking the role of a bailee of necessity (para 44 - 54). However, in a joint judgment Elias CJ, Blanchard and Anderson JJ (delivered by Blanchard J) held that there was prima facie illegality because the police are bound by stricter standards than ordinary citizens (para 14, applying R v Waterfield [1964] 1 QB 164, 170). However, as Blanchard J put it, para 21:
“The difference in approach to Waterfield taken in these reasons from that taken in the reasons of Tipping J appears to turn on to what amounts to a prima facie unlawful interference with property. As we consider that the police conducted a search of the pouch, we take the view that prima facie there was such an interference. But it was justified in terms of Waterfield. However, the difference in approach has no practical significance because it has been overtaken by the requirements of the Bill of Rights Act.”
All five Judges agreed that pursuant to the Bill of Rights the search was reasonable and there was no reason to exclude the evidence (McGrath J indicated his agreement – if contrary to his view there was a search – at para 121). This reasonableness extended beyond the use of the information about the contents of the pouch for inventory purposes, to use as evidence of drug offending.
There was some discussion of North American authorities, as the appellant had sought to rely on them to support restriction of reasonableness to the making of an inventory. R v Caslake [1998] 1 SCR 51 was held (para 23) not to be authority for the proposition that an inventory search is unlawful because an inventory may be taken in the interests of the owner and not for police purposes. It was noted that subsequent Canadian cases have applied the Waterfield approach (R v Mann [2004] 3 SCR 59; R v Clayton and Farmer 2007 SCC 32). R v Colarusso [1994] 1 SCR 20 was also relied on by the appellant, but was distinguished (para 34) on the ground that in that case the police had an unlawful initial purpose, whereas here their purpose in carrying out the inventory was lawful. The New Zealand case R v Salmond [1992] 3 NZLR 8 (CA) was also relied on by the appellant, but was distinguished on similar grounds (para 36).
So, the answer to the question where the police get their powers to be helpful, depends on statute and common law. McGrath J was the only member of the Court who sought to go beyond that to a “residual third source of authority” (para 96), but one might respectfully wonder whether that is usefully distinct from the fundamental rule in a free society that everything is lawful except that which is prohibited by law.
At para 14 Blanchard J (with Elias CJ and Anderson J) put the central idea as follows:
“Notwithstanding that police officers may be expected to intervene in a case like the present, any interference with private liberty or property by the police is unlawful unless it can be justified either “by the text of the statute law, or by the principles of common law” [Entick v Carrington (1765) 19 How St Tr 1029 at p 1066]. An interference with property in the form of a search of the pouch occurred in this case. But was it unlawful? In order to determine whether a particular course of conduct was actually unlawful, it has been said in R v Waterfield to be relevant [[1964] 1 QB 164 at p 170. See also Hoffman v Thomas [1974] 1 WLR 374]:
“to consider whether (a) such conduct falls within the general scope of any duty imposed by statute or recognised at common law and (b) whether such conduct, albeit within the general scope of such a duty, involved an unjustifiable use of powers associated with the duty.”
“There may be less justification for any use of such powers where the conduct is not in pursuance of an “absolute” duty and where the apprehended danger is to property rather than persons. Overall, as Cooke P stressed in Minto v Police, “[t]he citizen’s protection lies in the insistence of the law that the steps should be reasonable” [[1987] 1 NZLR 374 at p 378 (CA). Further relevant considerations include the immediacy and potential seriousness of the apprehended danger: Police v Amos [1977] 2 NZLR 564 at p 568 at pp 568 – 569].”
Since the police had decided, “reasonably and therefore lawfully” (para 15) to take on the obligations analogous to those of a bailee, for the benefit of the owner, and since they had done no more than was reasonably necessary to safeguard the property (para 20 – 21), there was no unlawfulness or unreasonableness in their discovery of the drugs.
Thursday, December 13, 2007
Guiding sentencing
A couple of recent decisions of the United States Supreme Court call attention to the operation of sentencing guidelines. In New Zealand we have made provision for guidelines to be issued pursuant to the Sentencing Council Act 2007. This, for us will be a new venture. Occasionally our Court of Appeal has handed down guideline judgments in particular areas of offending, but the utility of these is doubtful, as may be indicated by the creation of the Council. An interesting question will be whether sentencing guidelines are more effective when issued by the Council than when they are given in judgments.
How should departures from guidelines be treated by appellate courts? In Gall v US No 06-7949 (10 December 2007) the Court held (Thomas and Alito JJ dissenting) that appellate courts must review sentences under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard. This involves acknowledging the advantages enjoyed by the first instance court in making the decision as to sentence, and then determining whether that decision was reasonable. In US v Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005) the Court had held invalid a statute which purported to make the guidelines mandatory, and had also held that the appellate court does not examine the sentence de novo, substituting its view for that of the lower court. So, in Gall the Court held that there was no need for extraordinary circumstances before a sentence outside the guidelines could be imposed. While the guidelines are the starting point, the initial benchmark, they are not the only consideration. The question of reasonableness of the sentencing decision depends on whether the judge had abused his discretion in determining that the relevant factors justified a deviation from the range of sentences indicated by the guidelines.
The other recent decision is Kimbrough v US No 06-6330 (10 December 2007). The guidelines differentiated markedly (there was a sentence “cliff”) between sentences for dealing in different forms of cocaine, the ordinary powder form, and the crystalline “crack” form. The appropriateness of this differentiation was a matter of some difference of opinion as between the legislature, which supported the guidelines, and the Sentencing Commission which did not. The Court held that although the sentencing judge was obliged to consider the guidelines, he could determine that, in a particular case, the within-guidelines sentence would be greater than necessary. The differential in the guidelines was not an exception to the general freedom of the judge to depart from the guidelines and to taylor the sentence in recognition of other concerns. The differential in the guidelines based on the form of the drug was a departure from the practice of the Commission of setting the guidelines according to an empirical examination of sentencing levels, and the judge could take that matter into account when deciding whether departure from the guidelines was warranted.
These cases illustrate that sentencing guidelines may introduce difficulties of their own: instead of simply examining how other courts have sentenced for similar offending and placing the present case in that context, when guidelines are imposed, the court must have proper regard for them while recognising when departure is justified. Factors specified by the guidelines as relevant may be inappropriate (for example, in Kimbrough, the form of the drug rather than its quantity).
Section 9(1)(a)(v) of the Sentencing Council Act 2007[NZ] provides that it is one of the functions of the Council to give guidelines as to grounds for departure from the guidelines. In case you don’t believe me, here is subsection (1):
“(1)The functions of the Council are—
(a)to produce guidelines that are consistent with the Sentencing Act 2002 relating to— (i)sentencing principles:
(ii)sentencing levels:
(iii)particular types of sentences:
(iv)other matters relating to sentencing practice:
(v)grounds for departure from the sentencing guidelines:”
What about departure from the grounds for departure from the guidelines? We can be reasonably sure that the guidelines will not provide for departure where the guidelines are not considered by the court to be rational (as in Kimbrough), but let’s wait and see.
How should departures from guidelines be treated by appellate courts? In Gall v US No 06-7949 (10 December 2007) the Court held (Thomas and Alito JJ dissenting) that appellate courts must review sentences under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard. This involves acknowledging the advantages enjoyed by the first instance court in making the decision as to sentence, and then determining whether that decision was reasonable. In US v Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005) the Court had held invalid a statute which purported to make the guidelines mandatory, and had also held that the appellate court does not examine the sentence de novo, substituting its view for that of the lower court. So, in Gall the Court held that there was no need for extraordinary circumstances before a sentence outside the guidelines could be imposed. While the guidelines are the starting point, the initial benchmark, they are not the only consideration. The question of reasonableness of the sentencing decision depends on whether the judge had abused his discretion in determining that the relevant factors justified a deviation from the range of sentences indicated by the guidelines.
The other recent decision is Kimbrough v US No 06-6330 (10 December 2007). The guidelines differentiated markedly (there was a sentence “cliff”) between sentences for dealing in different forms of cocaine, the ordinary powder form, and the crystalline “crack” form. The appropriateness of this differentiation was a matter of some difference of opinion as between the legislature, which supported the guidelines, and the Sentencing Commission which did not. The Court held that although the sentencing judge was obliged to consider the guidelines, he could determine that, in a particular case, the within-guidelines sentence would be greater than necessary. The differential in the guidelines was not an exception to the general freedom of the judge to depart from the guidelines and to taylor the sentence in recognition of other concerns. The differential in the guidelines based on the form of the drug was a departure from the practice of the Commission of setting the guidelines according to an empirical examination of sentencing levels, and the judge could take that matter into account when deciding whether departure from the guidelines was warranted.
These cases illustrate that sentencing guidelines may introduce difficulties of their own: instead of simply examining how other courts have sentenced for similar offending and placing the present case in that context, when guidelines are imposed, the court must have proper regard for them while recognising when departure is justified. Factors specified by the guidelines as relevant may be inappropriate (for example, in Kimbrough, the form of the drug rather than its quantity).
Section 9(1)(a)(v) of the Sentencing Council Act 2007[NZ] provides that it is one of the functions of the Council to give guidelines as to grounds for departure from the guidelines. In case you don’t believe me, here is subsection (1):
“(1)The functions of the Council are—
(a)to produce guidelines that are consistent with the Sentencing Act 2002 relating to— (i)sentencing principles:
(ii)sentencing levels:
(iii)particular types of sentences:
(iv)other matters relating to sentencing practice:
(v)grounds for departure from the sentencing guidelines:”
What about departure from the grounds for departure from the guidelines? We can be reasonably sure that the guidelines will not provide for departure where the guidelines are not considered by the court to be rational (as in Kimbrough), but let’s wait and see.
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